

Enclosures to
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ENCLOSURE

Encl. #1

Mr. Corey points out in his third article, "capitalism is already being transformed." The whole world drift is toward collectivism. The real final conflict will be between a fascist collectivism, or more accurately the collectivism of the totalitarian state, and a democratic socialism. Recognition of this fact in time would give new hope, at any rate in America, for the success of non-violent methods of struggle.

Mr. Corey gives a good general picture of his "people's functional socialism" and the steps toward it, but it is imperatively necessary for him, as for all Socialists who agree with the point of view which he has expressed, to fill in the important details of their program more explicitly. I await his fuller treatment eagerly.

3. If the older socialism was mistaken in believing that it was the historical destiny of the "working class" almost automatically to achieve socialism, so will the modern advocates of the glories of "democracy," or even of a "people's functional socialism," be mistaken if they think that there is anything in the untutored and instinctive processes of the democracy we now have by which we shall achieve plenty, peace, and freedom. It is the failure of that democracy which gives rise to fascism. The achievement of our great ends requires socialism, and it requires a creative socialism, a socialism conscious of its goal and of its program, a socialism which must rest on its own organizational power. To be sure, such socialism must work in and through mass movements and mass organizations of various sorts, but emphatically it needs its own political expression. What the New Deal has done, especially if it involves America in war, can be a preparation for fascism just as truly as for the achievement of democratic socialism. Indeed, fascism, military or otherwise, in some form and under some name will win the day in America unless within the next few years a democratic Socialist movement can be built.

EARL BROWDER
Communist Party

Your invitation to write a "critical first reaction" to Lewis Corey's articles, *Marxism Reconsidered*, has caused me to read them. Here is my critical first reaction.

The underlying thought, it seems to me, could be most clearly set forth in a syllogism of formal logic:

Major premise: Mr. Corey was the most penetrating exponent of Marxist thought after Marx himself.

Minor premise: Mr. Corey failed.

Conclusion: Marxism is a failure.

Granted the first premise, the conclusion is irrefutable.

But it is the first premise that must be rejected. Mr. Corey, in all his independent writings, has always struggled against Marxism, not expounded it (see the pamphlet "Leninism—the Only Marxism Today," by Bittelman and Jerome, 1934). What he has now reconsidered is

not the validity of Marxism but rather the method of struggle against it; where formerly he conducted his fight under the guise of an adherent, he now comes out openly as an opponent. That much, at least is clear gain. May the Lord protect us from our friends; our enemies we have learned how to deal with.

As I plodded through Mr. Corey's "arguments," my subconscious mind was busy rummaging in the dim past, and as I laid the papers aside there was thrust into my consciousness a famous phrase from the age of the good Queen Victoria: "the blessed word, Mesopotamia." Yes, Mr. Corey has his blessed word, which he substitutes impartially for all the missing elements of the rational process, and which casts over all a thick aura of righteousness (or should one say self-righteousness?). It is the magic word "totalitarianism."

With this blessed word Mr. Corey conjures up the whole of his newly acquired ideology, without the inconvenience of having to set it forth in specific terms; with this word he *assumes* as established, without further examination, the propositions which his articles purport to prove to the reader. This little sleight-of-hand performance will not, of course, disturb those whose minds operate from the same assumption. We may fairly expect Mr. Corey to be quite a lion, for the next few weeks, in those circles where the blessed word solves all problems and answers all questions. With equal assurance we may expect that in critical and thinking circles, whether Marxian or otherwise, Mr. Corey's "reconsideration" will gain him but the recognition that here is a man who should go far under a Rooseveltian third term.

As honest and forthright men are more and more driven from public life by the hunger-and-war program of the "national unity" camp forming around Roosevelt, they will be replaced by the most glib devotees of the blessed word "totalitarianism." This word is the battle cry of the American bourgeoisie embarked upon a holy crusade to save Europe from socialism, from proletarian revolution, and to assure itself the lion's share of profit from a salvaged European capitalism.

Mr. Corey should hear the knock of opportunity upon his door with increasing insistence, once these articles come to the attention of the right people.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

Independent Labor League (Lovestonites)

Western socialism, based on traditions of bourgeois democracy and democratic unionism, has for some time been trying to shake off the incubus of blind acceptance—and blind rejection—of the Russian Revolution, a revolution occurring where both bourgeois and proletarian democracy were lacking. The Corey articles now broaden the scope of the discussion and thereby perform a significant service, for out of such discussion alone can

come the necessary clarification, reunification, and new advance toward socialism.

Corey makes it clear that socialism's errors and defeats do not give capitalism new vigor. Decay continues: from free trade to monopoly; toward longer and deeper crises; from productive abundance to legislated scarcity; toward autarchy and recurrent war. Capitalism is in transition toward "some sort of collectivism"—the real choice being between monopolistic, oligarchical, authoritarian forms and democratic socialism. What we have learned is that nationalization of industry does not automatically lead to increased democracy or to "withering of the state," but rather increases the dangers of totalitarianism and the need of a conscious drive to achieve freedom. This emphasis on the inseparability of democracy and socialism is the major service of Corey's articles.

With Corey's analyses I have several disagreements:

1. I think he underestimates the trade union as the most important single institution for the development of economic democracy.

2. Corey rightly emphasizes the need for a socialism expressing the interests of all functionally useful groups. But if socialism is not, in the first instance, the expression of a democratic mass movement of which labor is the most important constituent, then it is nothing at all. Is not the working class the most numerous and significant single class in modern society? Who else is to form the core and driving force? With whom shall Corey's "new middle class" combine, when it is won away from adherence to monopoly capitalism and the status quo? The greater danger is not, as Corey seems to imply, that of dictatorship by the mass of producers over technicians and administrators, but—as happened in Russia—the dictatorship of indispensable technician-administrators over the mass of producer-consumers. If the "new middle class," as some technocrats and other followers of *Common Sense* imply, is to become the core of the movement toward a new order, then bureaucracy and totalitarianism are hardly avoidable.

3. Corey rightly rejects the schematic caricature concept of class often advanced, and would use it rather as "a tool with which to identify and delimit those class interests that must be destroyed in order to realize progressive class interests." But this is quite different from the sweeping title *The Class-War Fallacy*, which I fancy is a cuckoo egg laid in his nest by some *Nation* editor.

At the extremes of the social spectrum there is more class consciousness, actual and potential, than the articles seem to reckon with. At the right, a handful has sufficient power to sway governments, manipulate opinion, subsidize fascist movements. The inclusion in the "popular front" of parties controlled by such monopolists of economic power is the real reason for the sterility of such fronts, which Corey notes but does not analyze.

4. He rightly rejects that caricature revolutionism

which worships violence and upheaval for their own sake; he warns of the destructiveness and "totalitarian potential" involved. Rightly, too, he emphasizes continuity where many have one-sidedly emphasized break; but he seems to fall into an opposite one-sidedness.

In order to move toward, not away from, a new social order we require a sharp break: (a) in the *direction* of development; (b) in the *central purpose* of production—from private profit to social use; (c) in the *control* of the mainsprings of economic and political power. Otherwise, as the "older gradualism was distorted by the upswing of capitalism," Corey will find that his new "gradualism"—an equivocal word—will be distorted by the prevailing downswing into becoming, not a new order, but gradual decay and collapse of the very foundations on which such order might be constructed.

5. Undoubtedly violence is a matrix of totalitarianism, yet history still fails to show examples of transitions to a new order without some violent attempt of the privileged to hold on to power. Against such force a democratic majority might conceivably have to use force, in addition to persuasion and affirmation of its will. The latest examples are Austria and Spain. This dilemma must be faced, not evaded.

6. To what extent is modern industry compatible with Marx's belated rejection of centralization (after the Paris Commune) and advocacy of the non-bureaucratic, decentralized, libertarian commune-state? And with Lenin's hope that "every cook" would become a polytechnic multi-expert on every phase of economic, cultural, and social life?

Incidentally, that approach derives, via France, from Jefferson, who proposed an arrangement where "every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic . . . not merely at election one day in the year but every day . . . there shall not be a man in the state who will not be a member of some one of its councils . . . and every citizen can act in person . . . in all things relating to him . . . and in the offices nearest and most interesting to him." Is Jefferson really as out-of-date as the "horse and buggy" spurners glibly imply?

The major lack in the articles I find to be omission of the overshadowing problem of peace and war. It is inextricably tied up with the problems treated. There can be no healthy socialist regrouping if this is evaded or ignored. Modern war involves maximal totalitarianism. The struggle for socialism and freedom is first of all a struggle to prevent war, limit and shorten it where it occurs, transform the institutional and economic arrangements from which it springs.

Finally, these comments are inadequate both as to praise and difference because of limitations of space; and they are personal rather than "official," since the Independent Labor League possesses no "pontifical" views on these questions; nor does it believe that matters essen-

tially experimental and scientific can possibly be "settled" by a vote of a committee, an "authoritative" citation, or adoption of twenty-one points or ninety-five theses.

ALGERNON LEE

Social-Democratic Federation

"History," says Lewis Corey, "has played one of her stupefying tricks; for it is now clear that democracy is on the defensive as much against the totalitarianism of Russian communism as against that of fascism."

Poor Mr. Corey! His position is surely not an enviable one. But we could better sympathize with him if he took it like a man instead of blaming History. The fault, poor Corey, is not History's, but yours, if you are stupefied. History may be a Theban Sphinx, who slays those who misread her riddles, but a shabby trickstress she is not.

Mr. Corey had served the Bolshevik Moloch for years, and striven to justify his ways before men; had seen him murder the young republic and slaughter its defenders and make Russia a house of horrors; had heard him revile democracy, ridicule men who valued truth above expediency, and explicitly command his acolytes to lie for his greater glory. Five years ago he had seen his Moloch put on a false-face clumsily simulating the features of democracy—but meanwhile explaining to puzzled worshipers in a whisper that all this was only a maneuver. Last August he saw the mask cast aside, saw Bolshevism and Nazism clasping hands—and was Mr. Corey stupefied! Or was he really?

Anyway, he has now more or less emerged from his stupor. Six months, in such a case, is perhaps no more than a fair equivalent for the ten seconds allowed in pugilistic practice. Barely in time, Mr. Corey has come to—somewhat groggy but still in the ring. He really is not clear as to who it was that hit him—maybe it was History, maybe not—and after three-quarters of a column he decides to "square accounts with Marx." Brave man, after all—or perhaps I'd better say rash man! Marx has taken a lot of pounding since he started to fight, but his assailants' knuckles have suffered most.

Am I being too flippant? Not a whit. Mr. Corey seems to have developed what the psychiatrists call a delusion of grandeur. With a magnificent flourish he makes an "admission of failure" on behalf of everybody in sight—save only himself. Communism has failed, Social Democracy has failed, "all variants of Marxism" have failed, non-Marxian radicalism has failed, democracy has failed, and so on. The field is clear—now just watch.

To follow Mr. Corey through some 9,000 words of pontifical irresponsibility and undertake to analyze and answer his argument systematically within my allotted space of 700 words would be folly. The subjects on which he expatiates are important. They must be adequately discussed. But Mr. Corey does not lay the basis.

MAX SHACHTMAN

Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyists)

The title of Mr. Corey's articles is misleading. What he is really reconsidering is post-war Social Democratic reformism, and with a few unimportant verbal improvements he finds it quite acceptable. The fact that he attaches to it the not entirely novel label of "people's socialism" or "functional democratic socialism" testifies only to his squeamishness about fathering what is so thoroughly bankrupt and discredited.


What Corey leaves of revolutionary Marxism after his "reconsideration" is scarcely visible to the naked eye. The Marxian theory of the state is dropped down the chute because, you see, the modern democratic state also performs some useful functions. Presumably its principal function of maintaining the social rule of the propertied class by armed force is secondary to its meritorious work of providing farmers with weather reports and regulating traffic. The Marxian theory of the class struggle and the decisive progressive role of the proletariat goes down the same chute, to be replaced by "the interests of all useful functional groups." The Marxian theory of the seizure of power for the socialist reorganization of society meets the same fate, and is replaced by the ludicrous and outworn theory of a parliamentary democracy that will absorb as much social justice as this sinful world makes possible, but absorb it by a process of osmosis, so "gradually" that the crisis-maddened capitalist class will not notice it. What is left of Marxism? A few liberalist phrases.

Corey's criticism of Social Democratic reformism leaves it essentially intact. The central point in the criticism—the stress which the German Social Democracy laid on the proletariat to the exclusion of the middle class—is simply groundless. To an ever-increasing degree, from the days of Eduard Bernstein at the turn of the century, the German Social Democracy put emphasis on the middle class; all its policies proceeded from fear of "alienating" the middle class. It ended by being completely dominated by middle-class elements. Corey is arguing against a Social Democracy that did not exist only to recommend one that did and still does exist.

This becomes quite clear in the programmatic conclusions at the end of his series. His discomfort in shifting from Marxism to reformism sticks out in every apologetic line. Gradualism? "Yes and no." But far more "yes" than "no." The only serious difference between Corey and the German Social Democrats is that he promises to put "teeth" into his gradualism. The promise need not be taken too seriously, however. Otto Bauer used to talk the same way just before he gave way to Dollfuss. Léon Blum swore that he would not be a Kerensky, only to surrender to the economic and political democracy that now flourishes so sturdily under Daladier.

In reality, Mr. Corey's teeth, and those of most middle-class radicals, are chattering with fright in the grow-

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End #2



"The More Change the More the Same"

THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO EUROPE. By Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 288 pp. \$3.75.

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

IN 1894, near the end of his life, Friedrich Engels wrote an article for the Russian journal *Sotsialdemokrat* on "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism." It was the ripe fruit of a lifetime of thought on this subject, and contained a prophetic warning of a possible world war in which "Russia and France would be on one side, Germany and Austria on the other . . . and the final decision depend on England." In 1914 this prophecy was fulfilled and Russian orthodox Marxism was proud of its prophet. But in 1934, when the Russian journal *Bolshevik* wanted to reprint the article in its number commemorating the twentieth anniversary of World War I, Joseph Stalin secretly forbade this act of Marxist piety. This was one of the first big steps in the censorship of the writings of Marx and Engels by Stalin. Now Messrs. Blackstock and Hoselitz have compiled a book of 215 pages (without counting their own commentary) made up of writings of Marx and Engels which have either never circulated freely in the "Marxist" Soviet Union or are now unobtainable, unquotable, or totally suppressed.

What can there be in these writings of "the Founders" so dangerous that the self-proclaimed "Best Disciple" has decided to suppress them? After all, Marx and Engels were not writing about Stalinism but about Czarism. They condemn Czarist reaction, autocracy, imperialism, and personal rule, but so did Lenin and Stalin. They express hope of a revolution in Russia which would put an end to Czarist absolutism and ruthless expansion, and Stalin can rightly allege that there has been such a revolution. Yet by 1934 Stalin was taking over so many elements of Czarist absolutism and autocracy to build them into his new total state regime, and so much of Czarist imperialist aims that these "sacred" writings became more and more uncomfortable and subversive.

Marx and Engels considered the ruthless expansion of Czarist absolutism to be the greatest menace to the freedom of the Russian people and

the freedom of Europe. Put Vozhd where they put Autocrat, put totalitarianism where they put absolutism, put purge where they wrote knout, and scores of passages achieve a startling contemporaneity.

"The policy of Russia is changeless," wrote Marx. "Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the pole star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."

Stalin has taken up Pan-Slavism as an instrument of imperialist policy, but Engels wrote: "The immediate objective of Pan-Slavism is the setting up under Russian domination of a Slavic empire from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathians to the Black, Aegean, and Adriatic seas . . . to convert Austria . . . to cut off one-third of Germany and all of Hungary, to change Vienna and Budapest into Slavic cities." What Marx and Engels wrote about the Balkans, Greece and Turkey, and the Dardanelles during the Crimean War sounds uncommonly like an appeal to all good democrats and all good Europeans to support the Truman Doctrine. The calls for the liberation of Poland sound like a battle cry. Even more startling are the exposures of "Russian agents," of the pose that they are liberating the countries they seek to subjugate, the hope expressed that the Russian people will overthrow their tyrannical despotism, liberate subjugated neighbor peoples, take control of their own foreign policy and domestic affairs, get rid of their oppressive bureaucracy, give land to the peasants. "A people which oppresses another cannot liberate itself."

We must be grateful to Messrs. Blackstock and Hoselitz for having

given freedom of press to Marx and Engels and made available to us these works which are suppressed in the very country that professes to be based upon Marxism and to be the guardian of Marx's and Engels's works. But they have made two serious errors in their presentation which greatly weaken their effectiveness.

First, they have failed to note that some of what Marx and Engels wrote is out of date, some of it youthful, bloodcurdling bombast, some of it part of their unexamined heritage of German nationalism, though much of it contains deep and illuminating insights valuable for our own day. Their few criticisms are so feeble as to suggest an excessive worship of a sacred text as if one authoritarianism were set up against another. Thus, they single out to quote without demurrer in their own introduction Marx's estimate of the Russian Government as "a civilized government ruling over barbarian masses."

Much more serious, in their introduction one feels a total lack of any feeling concerning the fundamental difference between totalitarianism and the more limited despotism of the Czars. In their eagerness to score a debater's point they exaggerate continuity and minimize difference to the vanishing point, concluding their introduction with a passage which must vitiate their work for any sociologist or historian who has the faintest insight into the monstrous features which differentiate the total states of Hitler and Stalin from nineteenth-century despotisms. Their conclusion ("A comparison of Stalinist Russia with Czarist Russia may be summed up by the adage: *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*") goes a long way to undermine the very purpose they set out to serve in their work.



—Bettmann Archive.

Marx and Engels—"The policy of Russia is changeless."

Bertram D. Wolfe is the author of "Three Who Made a Revolution" and other works on the USSR.

Encl #3

Leon Felipe: Poet of Spain's Tragedy

Bertram D. Wolfe

IT IS time that we in the United States knew something about Leon Felipe. Because he is the humblest and simplest of Spain's poets, because he is a solitary who can neither hunt with the pack nor join the clique nor form part of the school nor follow the directives of the party, because he is at once mystic and equalitarian — not today a wonted combination — he is neither written about nor translated into English. For nearly a quarter century his slender volumes of poetry have been going forth, one after another, each of them heralded as a literary event throughout the Spanish-speaking world. His rare public addresses, with no organization of any kind to sponsor them, have been literary events too, crowding the largest halls in Mexico City, Panama, Havana, Madrid, and other capitals. He lived and taught here in the United States for a few years and has sympathetically translated some of the best of our writers, ranging from Walt Whitman to Dos Passos, yet his very name is unknown among us.

For that matter, his private life, his real name, are unknown to many who cherish his poetry in Spain and Latin America. What he thinks and feels about man, God, Spain, and the universe is an open book with no concealments. But what he has been through and privately suffered is fully known perhaps to no one. What I have been able to glean of his personal life from the passionate monologues which are his private conversation — without benefit of that "formalized curiosity" known as research — boils down to little, and some of that uncertain.

His real name is Leon Felipe Camino (prophetic name, for *camino* is road and this man was born to wander unceasingly: he dropped the family name with his first book of poems lest people should think that it was assumed as a pose or inept wordplay). The anthologies, which by their nature seem to give the date of

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birth of all their poets, omit his. Born near the close of the last century in the most *castizo* heart of Castille, in the little village of Sequeros, Salamanca, he has been, among other things, a wandering actor (a *cómico* he told me, with that air of absorption in the tragedy of life which characterizes him); an apothecary in Spain and, for a year, on the penal island of Fernando Po; a professor of Spanish letters at Cornell and the Universities of Mexico and New Mexico; a shepherd expiating his sense of personal guilt with other shepherds on the bare hills of Northern Portugal; a wandering poet in many Latin American countries; a resident on and off since 1922 in Mexico; a returned son of Spain during the Spanish Civil War putting his pen at the service of the Republic; and now, once more, an exile in Mexico. How he got to Fernando Po is the subject of many a legend: for his part, he does not talk of it, nor would he ever commit to paper one of the greatest of his poems which one night in a Mexican café he recited to me, because it excoriates the governor of that penal island and brings back rejected memories.

His published works are often fugitive: a poem handed in manuscript to this or that friend, to whom it has been dedicated, finds its way into a magazine through the initiative of the recipient; public addresses recorded in the ephemeral pages of daily papers, discourses which are masterpieces of Spanish prose with overtones and core of poetry (in Panama there are those who still remember and can recite by heart his bitter *Adiós a Panamá*, which was his response to their farewell tribute). Besides these fugitive things which rank with his best work, there are a number of more formally published slender volumes: *Versos y oraciones del caminante* — Verses and Prayers of the Wanderer (1922); *Versos y oraciones del caminante, Segunda Serie* (1930); *Drop a Star* — the original title is in English (1933); *El payaso de las bofetadas y el pescador de caña* — The Clown Who Gets Slapped and the Man with the Fishing Rod (1938); *Antología* — which includes poems from all of the above works and some not in any of them (1938); *El hacha* — The Axe (1939).

Despite its begetting of Gongorism, Spanish poetry is noted

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for its employment of the simple language of the common folk, but in a land of popular poets, Leon Felipe is probably the most simple and most popular. From the very outset — long before he had discovered and translated *Leaves of Grass* — he had become impatient of the restrictions which even the easy metrics and assonantal rhyme of Spanish poetry impose upon utterance and feeling.

Unmake that verse.
Strip it of the adornments of rhyme,
meter, cadence
and even of the idea itself . . .
Shake the words to the winds . . .
and if there still remains something
that
will be poetry.

Such is his "theory" of poetry as expressed in one of his earlier writings. Yet, when he chooses to use consonantal rhyme and more complicated cadences, his verse does not for that lose anything of its simplicity. Not only the language and the thought but the very metaphors are as a rule humble and transparently simple. This, for instance, from his first book, expresses the equalitarian spirit of all his work:

I ride with tight rein
restraining my flight
for the point is not to be first and alone
but to get there with all and on time

And in the *Antología* there is the poem *Revolution*:

Always there'll be superior snow
robing in ermine the high hill
and humble water toiling below
to turn the wheel of the mill.
And always a sun — slayer and friend —
changing to tears the snow forever
and to cloud the water of the river.

While in one of his latest discourses (1940) we find: "The whole of my poetry is in the line, Why are there not shoes yet for everybody?"

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But, of course, that is not the whole of his poetry. The second immanent strain is that of the mystic. Not that Leon Felipe is a good son of the Church, far from it. Witness, for instance, God and the Bishop (1940):

God who knows everything
is a simpleton
and now he is kidnapped
by some bandit archbishops
who make him say over the radio
"Hallo! Hallo! Here I am with them."
But that doesn't mean that he is on their side
but that he is there, a prisoner.
He tells where he is, no more,
so that we may know
and may save him.

As a simple expression of the homely religious mysticism that runs through all of his poetry, we can take his

Ascension

*And Thou leavest,
saintly pastor,
Thy flock in this
dark vale . . .*

— Fray Luis de Leon

He came here
then went away.
Came, set our task
and went away.

Maybe behind that cloud
is one who works
even as we.
Maybe the stars
are only lighted windows
of a factory
where God has a job
to distribute, just as here.

He came here
and went away.
Came, filled our safe

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with millions of centuries and centuries,
left a few tools . . .
and went away.

He who knows all there is
knows that let alone
without gods to watch us
we do our work better.

Behind you there is no one, No One,
neither master nor foreman nor boss.
But time is yours.
Time and this chisel
with which God began creation.

Above all, Leon Felipe is the poet of Spain's tragedy. He sought to escape from it by his wanderings, but it followed him. He proclaimed in his first book that he had no fatherland, no *patria chica*, no sunlit house emblazoned with coat of arms, no ancient leathern armchair nor worm-eaten table, no portrait of a grandfather with one arm on his breast and the other on his sword, who had won battles. But wherever he went, he carried Spain with him, and in whatever far corner of the earth he spent the night talking till dawn in a café with a fellow exile, there Spain was communing with itself. (He fled from our Ithaca cursing because, though the university there had been endowed with a beautiful social house with comfortable tables and armchairs and alcoves, "in this accursed country there is no conversation.")

When Spain's darkest hour came, he felt impelled by an irresistible force to return to the land which he had said was not his. Out of the anguish of Spain's betrayal and tragedy has come the greatest of his poetry: "The Clown Who Gets Slapped and the Man with the Fishing Rod," written during the Civil War, a bitter tirade against England and the farce of "non-intervention"; "The Axe," subtitled "Spanish Elegy," wrung from him by the factional fights inside the Republican ranks, by the fratricidal war between Republican and Falangist Spaniards, by what he regarded as the final ruin of Spain. It is dedicated:

To the Knights of the Axe
To the Crusaders of Rancor and Dust . . .
To all the Spaniards of the world.

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Space forbids more than a fragment of this long and simple monody of pain with its intolerable iteration of anguish expressed in the (for English) most prosaic words of common speech. Yet a fragment may serve to give the reader some notion of what these thirty odd pages of cumulative pain are like. This is from the invocation:

Ah the sorrow
this sorrow of no longer having tears
this sorrow
of having no more tears
to water the dust!
Ah the sorrow of Spain
which is no longer more than wrinkle and dryness . . .
screwed up face
dry grief of earth
under a sky with no rains
gasp of a well sweep
over an empty well.
Oh this screwed up Spanish face
this face dramatic and grotesque
dry dusty weeping
for the dust,
for the dust of all things ended in Spain
for the dust of all the dead
and all the ruins of Spain
for the dust of a race
now lost in History forever!

Dry weeping of dust
and for dust. For dust
of a house without walls
of a tribe without blood
of ducts without tears
of furrows without water . . .
Dry weeping of dust
for dust that will no longer agglomerate
neither to make a mud-brick
nor to raise a hope.
Oh yellow accursed dust
given us by rancor and pride
of centuries

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and centuries
and centuries . . .
For this dust is not of today
nor come to us from abroad
we are all desert and African . . .

Nobody here has any tears
and for what are we to live
if we have no tears?
For what have we any longer to weep
if our weeping does not bind?
In this land
tears do not bind
neither tears nor blood . . .
Sandy earth without water
wrung flesh without tears
rebellious dust of rancorous rock
and hostile lavas
yellow atoms and sterile
of unfruitfulness
vengeful motes
sand quarry of envy . . .
wait dry and forgotten
till the sea overflows . . .

Why have you all said
that in Spain there are two bands
if there is only dust?

In Spain there are no bands
in this land there are no bands
in this accursed land there are no bands
there is only a yellow axe
which rancor has edged sharp
an axe which falls always
always
always
implacable and tireless
on any humble union:
on two prayers that fuse
on two tools that interlace
on two hands that grasp each other.
The order is to chop

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to chop
to chop
to chop till dust is reached
down to the atom.
Here there are no bands
there are no bands
neither reds
nor whites
nor patricians
nor plebeians . . .
Here there are only atoms
atoms that bite one another . . .

From here no one escapes
for tell me, friend ropemaker,
is there any one who can braid a ladder
of sand and dust?

Spain
your envy was mightier
than your honor
and better you have guarded the axe
than the sword . . .
Under its edge
has been made dust
the Ark
the race
and the sacred rock of the dead;
the chorus
the dialogue
and the hymn;
the poem
the sword
and the craft;
the tear
the drop of blood
and the drop of joy . . .
And all will be made dust
all
all
all . . .
Dust with which nobody
nobody

THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

will ever make
either a brick
or an illusion

Leon Felipe wrote "The Axe" when he had first returned to Mexico after Spain's final agony. It seemed to him that Spain was lost forever, and that the Spaniard in exile, unlike the Jew in the Diaspora, had no faith in his own election to sustain him, no mission and no possession left to him, unless he could squeeze from dry, pain-seared eyes a tear in which there might be hope not of Spain's but of man's redemption. In a public address on the occasion of the poem's publication, there is a moving suggestion—which we do not propose now to expound further—of this as Spain's continued mission in exile. And in the midst of the overwhelming sorrow there is, if not a note of hope, yet of defiance of the forces of destruction which have triumphed in Spain. Embedded in the discourse are several fragments of verse, one dealing with his own poetry, from which we have cited the line about shoes for all; one addressed to all Spaniards; one addressed to Franco:

Yours is the treasury
the house
the horse
the pistol.
Mine is the ancient voice of the land.
You remain with everything
and I naked wandering through the world . . .
but I leave you mute . . . MUTE!
And how are you going to gather the wheat
and feed the fire
if I carry off the song?

The confused voice with which Spain speaks today suggests that the poet may have been right.

End #4

THE LIBRARY

Trotsky on Stalin

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

IN ALL literature there is no more dramatic relation between author and subject than in this biography of Joseph Stalin by Leon Trotsky.¹ It is like Robespierre doing a life of Fouché, Kurbsky of Ivan the Terrible, Muenzer of Martin Luther, Sathanas of the Archangel Michael . . . with the world still beset with controversy as to which was Prince of Heaven and which Lord of the Powers of Darkness.

The hero, or anti-hero, of this biography has already after his own fashion done a life of his biographer: in the purge trials; in the burning of a succession of official party histories and the ultimate dictating of his own; in the retroactive editing of his past and Trotsky's on a scale possible only to the master of a state which possesses a monopoly alike of the produc-

tion and distribution of goods and of the production and distribution of ideas. In Stalin's history of the Party Trotsky is drawn as "Judas Iscariot" betraying Lenin, opposing the Revolution of 1917 with which he somehow got identified, attempting to surrender the new Soviet state to Germany early in 1918, directing the bullet which struck Lenin down later in the same year, trying his hardest to lose the Civil War, and thereafter engaging in "the betrayal of state secrets and the supply of information of an espionage character to foreign espionage services, the vile assassination of Kirov, acts of wrecking, diversion and explosions, the dastardly murder of Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev and Gorky — all these and similar villainies over a period of twenty years."

Trotsky's *Stalin* is only fully understandable when we bear in mind that it is Trotsky's rejoinder, his last word in defense of his own career and in

STALIN: *An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence* by Leon Trotsky. Edited and translated from the Russian by Charles Malamuth. \$5. Harper.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE has known personally both Trotsky and Stalin as well as other Soviet leaders, and has made three visits to Russia totaling more than two years. He also established and directed the Tass Bureau in Mexico. At present Mr. Wolfe is writing a triple biography of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin to be published under the title, *Three Who Made a Revolution*. He is also the author of *Diego Rivera: His Life and Times* and other works on Latin America.

indictment of his powerful antagonist. A good part of it is chapter and verse refutation of Stalin's official and originally anonymous *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Many arid pages are devoted to a detailed re-examination of the actual record, a resurrection of suppressed and flouted documents, an interminable going over the lists of committees in charge of this and that to show that they did not always consist of Lenin and Stalin alone, that Stalin's name was as a rule not even in second place, that often it did not figure in the list at all.

"History is becoming clay in the hands of the potter," exclaims Trotsky. But how different would his tone have been, how much more scornful and devastating his invective, had he known that he was quarreling not with the will-less potter's wheel, but with the potter himself. If he had lived until January 20, 1946, he would have learned from the columns of *Pravda* that Stalin is himself the author of this strange work of historical falsification, endless self-quotation and self-glorification, and that the anonymous *History* first published in 1938 will soon appear as Volume XV of Joseph Stalin's sixteen-volume *Collected Works*!

Read thus together, both Stalin's *History* and Trotsky's biography of Stalin take on enormously more meaning, tension and intellectual excitement. Many an obscure passage, so trivial-seeming that one wondered why Stalin even put it into a book, suddenly reveals itself as a cover for

something far from trivial. Those episodes and passages in which Stalin's undocumented assertions seem wildest and most nonsensical turn out to be the places in Trotsky's book where the documents speak most eloquently. Even as these two men were polar opposites bound to each other by antagonistic energies in a single, highly charged magnetic field, so their two books are inseparably bound together as polar complements of each other.

II

As befits a volume thus conceived in controversy, the manuscript of Trotsky's *Stalin* has had a stormy history. Some of the source material was lugged by its author across Siberia to exile in remote Alma Ata, then to Turkey, Norway, France, Mexico, as he was driven from land to land. The book was written in a semi-fortress home in peaceful-seeming Coyoacan, behind heavily barred doors, guarded by Mexican police and pistol-carrying disciples, beneath specially constructed turrets on which machine guns were mounted. Work on the later chapters was pressed unremittingly in a conscious race with death, after the home had been broken in by Mexican Communists disguised as police, the bed where Trotsky and his wife had been sleeping a moment before riddled with machine gun bullets, his grandson Seva wounded and his secretary-guard, Sheldon Harte, carried off and murdered. "Stalin

"strike again," said the author, knowing his subject and knowing how anxious the latter was to prevent his giving his testimony to the world.

A few months later, the long arm of the GPU reached again into his home, by guile this time, and plunged a short-handled alpine pick into his pulsing brain. "On August 20, 1940," writes translator-editor Charles Malamuth, "Trotsky was struck a mortal blow on the back of his head with a pickaxe and his brain wrenched out while he was reading a manuscript. . . . That is why this and other portions of this book remain unfinished."

Seven chapters (out of twelve), and all three appendices, had been completed, translated, and the translation checked by Leon Trotsky. Thereafter the translator, whom Death had transformed into editor, constructed the remaining five chapters out of notes, hints, work sheets, and unfinished fragments. Even if the author had lived to finish it, the work would have suffered from a certain imbalance since Trotsky was more interested in the formative period that made Stalin's character, and in the devices by which he rose to power, than in the uses he made of his power once it was complete and all opponents eliminated. But the pathetic ending of the manuscript in the middle of a sentence adds to the imbalance.

The later chapters, reconstructed like a broken mosaic by Charles Malamuth, are a marvel of patient care and insight. Yet the scope and the sparkle

and polish that Trotsky was wont to give to his finished work are lacking. Here and there the connective passages supplied by the editor — always scrupulously marked off by square brackets — reveal Malamuth's prejudice in favor of democracy rather than Trotsky's prejudice against it. To Trotsky's wife and political heirs a few of these interpolations seemed so alien to the spirit of the original that they were preparing to bring suit to enjoin Harper from publishing, when suddenly the publishing house itself decided that it was not "timely" to let the American people know all they could possibly learn about the man who had just become our ally. So, while Ambassador Davies and others of his school were painting Joseph Stalin as a gentle, pipe-puffing soul at whose feet dogs loved to lie and on whose knees children loved to coo, this well documented, revealing picture was withheld from us for four long years. Whatever its deficiencies, it would have been worth a thousand Davies and Durantys in those war years. This incident, and many like it, should make us reconsider the system of "voluntary censorship" with its amateur judgments by countless censors who are without responsibility to the citizenry and beyond the reach of public protest.

Nor does that end the vicissitudes of the ill-fated work. On page 399 Trotsky wrote:

The part of the Oppositionist writings that I managed to bring out with me at the time of my expulsion to Turkey is now

in the Harvard Library and at the disposal of all those who may be interested in studying the record of that remarkable struggle by going to the original sources. [Italics are mine.]

Alas, poor dead man, unable to defend his will! At this writing the Harvard Library has clapped a twenty-five year seal upon these documents — strange fate for the papers of one who once electrified the world by broadcasting the secret treaties of his country and its allies in the midst of war. It is to be hoped that Harvard will soon follow the example of Harper's in giving the American people the right of access to such important material concerning an ally with whom we must cooperate in peace as in war.

III

Leon Trotsky was a born writer (his earliest underground name was *Pero* — the Russian word for "pen"), with a strong sense of literary form and a fastidious pride in every line he wrote. Doubtless he would have worked hard to make this book, so important to him, more nearly equal to his best. But, in any case, the finished portions betray that it would have sagged far below his masterpieces, *The Year 1905* and *The History of the Russian Revolution*. The completed chapters are inferior, too, to the finished portions of a life of Lenin, likewise interrupted by death. This *Stalin* is not done — to put it mildly — *con amore*, but as a disagreeable duty by one with an

obvious distaste for the machinations and falsifications which he feels obliged to follow with such painful and painstaking detail. The very grossness of Stalin's invective has impelled Trotsky, himself an undoubted master of powerful invective, to assume an unwonted dry and colorless restraint. Moreover, he is haunted by the fear that the unthinking and unconcerned will attribute his book to hate rather than a desire to restore the erased outlines of historical truth.

At times grudgingly, at times freely, Trotsky concedes to Stalin whatever strong points he can: "indomitable will (a will that always immeasurably surpassed his intellectual powers); firmness of character and action; grit; stubbornness; and to a certain extent even his slyness . . . ruthlessness and conniving, attributes indispensable in the struggle" with an enemy class; "personal courage; cold persistence and practical common sense."

But the mainspring of Stalin's personality Trotsky finds to be "love of power, ambition, envy — active, never-slumbering envy of all who were more gifted, more powerful, of higher rank than he."

Trotsky proves from incontestable documents that up to 1917 Stalin was not regarded as a leader, hardly even on a provincial scale, but as a second-string lieutenant, "a small time propagandist and organizer"; that in the fateful year 1917 when all the other leaders "went around with cracked voices" from addressing mass-

meetings Stalin proved lacking in the fire and eloquence to stir the people; that "he emerged from the Civil War as unknown and alien to the masses as he had from the October Revolution." Stalin's secret and spectacular rise to power, Trotsky maintains, "began only after it had become possible to harness the masses with the aid of the machine." Through it all Stalin remained "what he is to this day, a mediocrity, though not a nonentity," with an inherent political "caution" in making up his mind, an utter "lack of initiative, daring and originality . . . never anticipating anything, never running ahead of any one, preferring to measure ten times before cutting the cloth. Inside this revolutionist always lurked a conservative bureaucrat."

In this psychological analysis there are some major difficulties which Trotsky never succeeds in surmounting. How did this incurable "mediocrity" rise to the position of most powerful single individual on the face of the earth? This is a problem comparable to the one so many analysts of Hitler have left unsolved: after they have exhibited the Dictator of Berchtesgaden as ignorant, psychopathic, a mediocre misfit in private life, they are at a loss to explain what forces elevated such a man to leadership of a great and cultured nation. Trotsky rightly shifts his ground from the psychological to the sociological, but his sociological schemata hobble his analysis rather than guide it. As Trotsky sees it, "Thermidorean reac-

tion" was inevitable in Russia unless its revolution spread to the West. Stalin was "the best possible expression of this bureaucratic conservative reaction" and his rise to power inevitable, too. ("Lenin's recovery could not, of course, have prevented the superseding of the Revolution by the bureaucratic reaction. Krupskaya — Lenin's wife — had sound reasons for observing in 1926: 'If Volodya were alive he would be in prison now.'")

But how can one lead a struggle against reaction under the slogan that reaction is inevitable? How unleash the resources of moral condemnation upon a phenomenon as natural and unavoidable as an earthquake? Clearly it is one of the secrets of Trotsky's defeat in the struggle with his antagonist, as it is one of the deficiencies of the present book that its author's mind was paralyzed by this self-disarming dogma of "inevitability."

Akin to it is Trotsky's underestimation of the capacities of the man with whom he had to deal. Trotsky's Jewish heritage as a descendant of "the People of the Book"; his Marxist heritage as a disciple of the greatest sociological thinker of modern times; his literary heritage as a lover of the Russian tongue and master of the written word; his revolutionary heritage as the pre-eminent tribune of the people, able by flaming eloquence to stir the masses, hearten them to struggle, lift them outside their petty personal concerns to the level of action on the arena of history — all these combined to make Trotsky set the highest pos-

sible value upon ideas, originality and theoretical clarity in their formulation, exactness in their expression, eloquence in writing and in speech, contagious personal magnetism and attractive force. In these respects Stalin always was and remains to this day what Trotsky calls him: a gray and colorless mediocrity. But as the builder of a political machine, or, if not as builder, then as master of the art of winning such a machine once opportunity offered and of utilizing it for his purposes, as a manipulator of men and a master of the art of disposing of his forces, Stalin has had few equals. Certainly, Trotsky was not one of them. All his life, when he was apart from Lenin, he proved unable to build a machine. When he entered Lenin's machine, he had no talents for taking possession of it.

If he had lived until 1946, could he have continued to call the master of the greatest state machine in history a mere "mediocrity"? Could he have continued to insist that this dictator was "lacking in initiative, originality, and daring" and "ever prone to take the path of least resistance" while Stalin was surprising his hesitant, would-be allies by making a pact with Hitler to win without war a fifth of Europe; while he was contriving to hold the same gains with Allied sanction when Hitler had broken the pact; while, all through the war and the peace which followed, he was continuing to make gains and to face his Allies with a dizzying succession of audacious *faits accomplis*?

IV

The central problem of this book and of Stalin's career is one which Trotsky repeatedly touches on, yet leaves unsolved. It is the problem of Stalin's relation to Lenin: to Lenin's, or we may properly say Lenin's and Trotsky's Revolution, and to Lenin's Party machine. "Stalin," writes Trotsky at one point, "represents a phenomenon utterly exceptional. He is neither a thinker, a writer nor an orator. He took possession of power not with the aid of personal qualities, but with the aid of an impersonal machine. And it was not he who created the machine but the machine that created him." What was there in that machine which could create a Stalin? The author nowhere in these pages asks the question clearly or clearly answers it.

Yet there was a time, back in 1904, when Trotsky rose to the heights of brilliant prophecy, and warned Lenin that the machine the latter was creating (undemocratic, centralized, ruled and directed from above, naming professional agents to run each local organization, which nominees would in turn assemble in convention to confirm the Central Committee which had named them) — that such a machine would inevitably breed personal dictatorship.

"The organization of the Party," warned Trotsky, "will take the place of the Party itself; the Central Committee will take the place of the organization; and finally, the dictator

"take the place of the Central Committee."

Why is it that in the present book Trotsky nowhere ventures to recall this brilliant example of scientific prophecy, so painfully verified by history? There are moments when that insight hovers on the threshold of consciousness. "In this connection," writes Trotsky at one point, "it is rather tempting to draw the inference that future Stalinism was already rooted in Bolshevik centralism, or, more sweepingly, in the underground hierarchy of professional revolutionaries." "Rather tempting" — but Trotsky refuses to be tempted.

When Trotsky and Lenin joined forces in 1917, it was on the basis of a political *quid pro quo*. Trotsky accepted once for all Lenin's machine, and Lenin accepted Trotsky's conception of the nature of the Russian Revolution. As Trotsky accepted Lenin's undemocratic machine, Lenin accepted Trotsky's no less undemocratic idea, first formulated in 1905, that the Russian Revolution might dispense with democracy and leap right over to a minority dictatorship by a single minority party acting in the name of a minority class.

An undemocratic machine to seize power and make an undemocratic revolution! That combination contained a mighty potential for totalitarianism: for a one-party dictatorship which would drain the soviets of their political content as parliaments of the working class; for a Central Committee dictatorship which would drain

the Party of its political content as forum for planning and discussion; for personal dictatorship which would drain the Central Committee of its political content as leading body of the Party. Even as Trotsky had predicted in 1904, so with the fatality of Greek tragedy did the drama unfold, until it ended for Trotsky with a pickaxe in the back of the brain.

But there was a complement to Trotsky's warning of 1904, a warning and prophecy uttered at the same time by Lenin against Trotsky's concept of an undemocratic revolution. Wrote Lenin against Trotsky in 1905: "Whoever attempts to achieve socialism by any other route than that of political democracy will inevitably arrive at the most absurd and reactionary results, both political and economic."

Also a brilliant foreseeing! But in 1917, when Lenin accepted Trotsky's concept of the Russian Revolution and Trotsky accepted Lenin's concept of the Party machine, they compounded each other's errors and raised the totalitarian potential to the second power. There was a world war on, and both men had reason to hope that a spread of the Russian Revolution to all warring countries might save Russia from the consequences which each of them had foreseen by halves. But in place of the World Revolution . . . came Stalin! That is the real meaning of Trotsky's "inevitability." Like a cuttlefish in a cloud of ink he shies away from its implications wherever they suggest themselves in these

pages. For he approaches Stalin as a loyal Leninist and Bolshevik, which reduces him, despite his angry scorn, to a species of loyal opposition. He dare not subject Lenin's machine to a real re-examination, that machine which lent itself so easily to the "usurpation" of "the driver's seat" by a totalitarian dictator; which even "created" that dictator; which, once such a man was in the driver's seat, became the juggernaut we know. And he dare not re-examine the seizure of power by a minority party in the name of a minority class or a fraction of that class, in November 1917. Only with this in mind can we understand how he can still describe the Russian totalitarian state as "a workers' state" albeit with "monstrous bureaucratic distortions." Only thus can we understand why he says that state ownership of all property, of the means of production of goods and the means of production of ideas, ownership by the state of the food, the jobs, the bodies and the minds of its subjects, is still "a progressive force."

The real deficiency of this book lies in the unconscious limitations that Trotsky has put upon his task of re-examination of the work of a lifetime. Those limitations reduce him from

the role of a genuine critic to the role of a pretender denouncing "a usurper."

As a psychological and personal study of the dictator who was "created by the machine" and of the stratagems by which he contrived to "usurp the driver's seat," Trotsky's *Stalin* is sometimes brilliant and at all points highly informative and revealing. No one who would understand the character and actions of the man who wields greater power than any other on earth today can afford to miss this book. But those who would understand the most important problem of our time — the problem of democracy versus totalitarianism in a world that is moving everywhere towards greater collectivism and greater state intervention — will have to go beyond its pages. They provide only raw materials. For Trotsky is so contemptuous of democracy that he can think of nothing more devastating to say of the master totalitarian of today than this:

"A plebian democrat of the provincial type, armed with a rather primitive 'Marxist' doctrine — it was as such that he entered the revolutionary movement, and such in essence he remained to the very end. . . ."



End #5

THE LIBRARY

China's Fate

BY BERTRAM D. WOLFE

BOOKS on China have a way of flowing in two divergent channels that have no point of contact with each other. On the one hand, there are the works of scholars — dependable, illuminating, and little read except by specialists; on the other hand, we have books by reporters and special pleaders — brash and arrogant, misleading, but popular in form and intended for wide distribution. The latest example of the former is the new edition of Kenneth Scott Latourette's already classic *The Chinese, Their History and Culture*,¹ and of the latter, *Thunder out of China*, by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, which is a Book-of-the-Month Club selection.²

Like most of the books of the second type, the new White-Jacoby work bears certain telltale stigmata: to wit, the Communists are "not really Communists" but "agrarian democrats"; they have no connection

with Moscow but make their own line; the ousting of the Japanese is made to seem all important to the integrity and independence of China, but not the ousting of the Russians; American troops should be withdrawn from Manchuria, but the Russian troops can stay in Port Arthur and Dairen for the ninety-nine years of their leasehold and the authors will do their demure best not to notice it.

A more serious difference between the two types of book is that the scholarly work is likely to recognize the Chinese Revolution as an attempt to transform China in terms of its own heritage, while the journalist's report ignores China's past and right to a development of her own, and treats the Chinese Revolution either as an obligation to "catch up" with Western civilization and Western institutions, or as an unduly slow and belated replica of the Russian Revolution. Formulas and prejudices and prescriptions are laid down for 400,000,000 people without so much as a

¹ \$7.00. Macmillan.

² \$3.00. William Sloane.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE came to know personally a number of the Russian and Chinese Communist Party leaders referred to in this article during his visits to Moscow in the years 1924, 1928 and 1929. He is at present writing a triple biography of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin.

hint that theirs is the largest body of mankind under one civilization in the world, a civilization that counts its years in millenniums of continuity whereas we or the Russians count in mere centuries. Neither humility nor knowledge is there to prompt the authors to ask what it is that China can and should — and doubtless will — preserve of its ancient heritage. Or what it can teach the West, whose physical and spiritual eruption into this mighty land has started it on one of the cruelest and most grandiose processes of transformation in the whole history of man.

Here is a people that traces the outlines of its present culture back beyond the second millennium before Christ; that in comparative homogeneity of blood and language and outlook and government has organized a larger number of human beings for a longer period than any nation in Europe, or all of them together, or than India, or Egypt, or America. The Chinese invented the art of writing while Rome was a barbarian village. They invented paper, printing, the compass, gunpowder (with the quaint notion that its highest use was in celebrating festivals!), while Western Europe, which was to make such startling and disturbing use of these inventions, was made up of nomadic tribes ranging the forests. They developed a great network of canals dug by the state (such as Peter the Great was to initiate in the eighteenth century and Stalin in the twentieth), somewhere in the dim past of the

Han dynasty before the Christian era, and lesser canals and irrigation and flood control works even earlier.

The Chinese discovered the laws of soil conservation, irrigation and intensive agriculture, and printed treatises thereon, a thousand years before the Germanic tribes learned to domesticate plants and animals. Even today, lacking our tools and science, a Chinese peasant gets a larger yield out of an acre of land than an American farmer, not to speak of a Russian *muzhik*. Contrary to the deluge of reports by our writers, which speak of "feudalism" and the need of "breaking up large estates" in China, there are almost no such estates in the Western sense of the term or in feudal dimensions. The Chinese abolished feudalism and hereditary aristocracy before the West had even devised those institutions. Some time before the third century B.C., they began to substitute for rule by hereditary lords a system of administration by a scholarly civil service based upon competitive examination and recruitment of the ablest, regardless of birth or status.

The chief agrarian problems of this overwhelmingly peasant land lie in the very success of this reform, which abolished feudal tenure and primogeniture and caused the land to be endlessly divided and subdivided. Not large estates, but little pocket-handkerchief farms too small to sustain a population which is denser in many rural areas than in the thickly populated cities of other lands — that is the basic agrarian problem of China.

Statistics vary from region to region, as does fertility, but more than 50 per cent of the farmers own their own land (even in our wealthy Iowa, more than 50 per cent are tenants), and the average size of a farm is estimated as four to five acres, which means that some large families have mere vegetable gardens of less than an acre to live on.

The area of China is approximately the same as that of the United States or the continent of Europe, including Russia; yet it has sheltered and supported (very badly, to be sure, during this recent fearful cycle of wars, invasions, civil wars and social transformation) a population nearly four times that of the United States, or approximately the same as that of all the busy countries of Europe put together. In that pressure of population on resources; in the eruption of the Western powers into China with the aid of superior material force; in the further weakening occasioned by civil war; in the need for industrialization and the acquisition of the military and mechanical aspects of the invading civilization in order to oust the invaders and restore China's dignity and independence — here lie the real problems of the Revolution. But no one of these makes it desirable for China to reject wholesale her remarkable ancient heritage — to throw out, as the saying goes, the baby along with the bathwater.

The very age of Chinese civilization, its early superiority and high achievements have tended to delay

and slow up the rate of change, and now make change more difficult, more necessary, and more sweeping and unsettling. Dr. Sun first became aware of the need of revolutionizing China when he saw the French slicing off its south lands, the Russians and the Japanese contending in the north over Manchuria, Mongolia, Korea and the Liaotang Peninsula (Port Arthur), and England and Germany cutting spheres from its central coastline. "The rest of mankind is the carving knife and the serving dish, while we are the fish and the meat," he cried in anguish. "We have the greatest population and the oldest culture. . . . But we have only familyism and clanism, there is no real nationalism. In spite of four hundred million people we are but a sheet of loose sand."

"Nationalism, Democracy, People's Livelihood" — these were Dr. Sun's famous "Three Principles of the People."³ The first two were to give the people the same stake in the fate of the nation as they had in that of the clan and the family and the village. And as for "People's Livelihood," it was the old Confucian formula as to the true purpose of government, but it needed a new implementation through modern industry, enlarged productivity, improved transportation, and new methods of increasing and distributing wealth in a country in which "there are not

³ *San Min Chu I*. (The Three Principles of the People.) Last Lectures by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Translated into English by Frank W. Price. Ministry of Information of the Republic of China.

rich and poor; only poor and less poor."

"The purpose of my Three Principles," said Dr. Sun in lectures delivered while cancer was eating at his liver and he knew his time was running out, "is to elevate China to an equal position among the nations, so that she can permanently exist in the world."

While this attempt to save and transform a great nation is going on, the least that can be expected of allegedly sympathetic, or even reasonably informed and moderately humble reporters, is to recognize, along with the scholar Kenneth Scott Latourette, that "the Chinese culture whose disruption the present generation has witnessed, and the civilization of the West which brought about the revolution . . . are *both* notable achievements of the human genius, and it would be difficult to decide which is the more admirable."

And to recognize further, with the same author, that whatever its difficulties in meeting the needs of a modern industrialized and centralized state, "China's political structure has endured longer than any other ever devised by man, and, measured by the area and the number of people governed, was one of the most successful in history."

II

When the historian of the future looks back upon our epoch, the men who may well loom largest are three

born within a half decade of each other: Lenin (1870); Gandhi (1869); and Sun Yat-sen (1866). Despite profound differences, these three will together be seen to have led one of the greatest movements in recorded history: the reawakening of the East. For thousands of years before Christ, China, India, and other empires of the nearer East were far ahead of the Western World. For a brief period in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D., Russia, too (not the recent Russia centering around Moscow, but the older Ukrainian Russia centering around Kiev and deriving its civilization from Baghdad and Byzantium), was ahead of northwestern Europe. But thereafter, for three-quarters of a millennium, the current of historical dynamism shifted to the Atlantic seaboard, thence overseas to America, and ever westward until it had circled the globe and reawakened the slumbering East.

It was at this moment that the three were born who were destined to lead the great Eurasian plain of Russia with its over 150,000,000 people; the subcontinent of India with its 350,000,000; and the subcontinent of China with its 400 or 450,000,000.

It is impossible for a contemporary to give final judgment on the comparative greatness of these three. Will it correspond to the moral energies they released? Then the order of precedence may be: Gandhi, Sun, Lenin. The numbers they set in motion? That would make it Sun, Gandhi, Lenin. The power concen-

tration they built up within their own lifetime? That would put Lenin in first place.

Coming as I did to a recent book on the life of Sun Yat-sen⁴ after prolonged preoccupation with the life of Lenin, I was struck by their differing approaches to the question of power as a key to the profound differences in rationale, in temperament and in "style" between the two men.

After being aroused by the slicing off of a piece of China by France in 1885 and after declaring war on the degenerate Manchu dynasty in 1895 for not being able to resist further encroachment by Japan and Russia, Dr. Sun engaged in no less than eleven fruitless insurrections before that of 1911 enabled him — to use Lenin's words — "to take power." Then his first proclamation to the people ended with words Lenin could never have uttered: "I, Sun Wen [a variant name of Sun Yat-sen], solemnly declare that I will resign as soon as these things have been accomplished." And resign he did, much sooner than he had promised. Within a month in fact, he had ceded the presidency to another because he thought it would prevent needless bloodshed.

A fool? The tragic decade and a half that remained to him almost made it seem that that surrender of power had negated his lifetime of effort. Local warlords sprang up; would-be emperors; *coups d'état*; attempted restorations. More than once

he fled the country and returned to start fresh uprisings. In 1921, elected president once more, his actual sovereignty was soon reduced to the deck of a single battleship and the command of two hundred sailors under his young chief of staff, Chiang Kai-shek. Yet that renunciation of power, that scrupulous attention to means employed, that touch of "Chinese style," had won him such prestige that his opponents, with guns trained upon his battleship, found it necessary to parley and offer life in return for the legal sanction that would come from his resignation. He answered:

In the age of tyrants, emperors could die for their country. Shall not presidents be allowed to die for their republic? . . . Only if the rebels are severely grief-stricken, shall I open negotiations with them.

In the end they were "grief-stricken" and the influence of Dr. Sun grew, so that at his death in 1925 his armies were already gathering under Chiang Kai-shek for the long-dreamed-of sweep to the north (1926-28) which was to lay the foundations for a united China and begin the expulsion of the invaders and their puppets, and the subjection of the local warlords.

Refusal to treat with rebels until they are "severely grief-stricken" cannot be dismissed as a mere idiosyncrasy of Dr. Sun's. That there is something profoundly Chinese about it was demonstrated afresh in 1936, when his successor, Chiang Kai-shek,

⁴ *Sun Yat-sen, A Portrait*, by Stephen Chen and Robert Payoe. \$3.00. John Day.

finding himself kidnapped by one of his subordinates, the young Manchurian warlord, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, refused to treat with his captor, demanding that the latter either slay him, or repent and sue for pardon. In the end, the young marshal humbly followed his late captive to Nanking to ask for punishment at his hands. From the "face" or prestige which Chiang won as a result of his conduct in that episode, no less than from his victories in the famous March to the North of 1926-28, came the authority which enabled him to unite all China, including hostile warlords and hostile Communists, in the eight terrible years when China had to suffer more and fight longer than any other country engaged in the late World War.

III

With the names of Gandhi, Lenin and Sun, three other names are intimately associated. Only time can answer fully the question: to what extent do Nehru, Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek represent continuity, to what extent departure from the aims and ideals of their respective "masters"? Though the evidence is not all in, it is already possible to say that Chiang is much closer to Dr. Sun than Stalin to Lenin; perhaps, too, than the socialistic and pro-industrialization Nehru is to the Gandhi who wished to exclude modern machinery from India. One has only to compare Chiang Kai-shek's wartime

speeches⁵ with Stalin's⁶ to see how much further the latter has departed from the outlook of his predecessor than Chiang from Sun Yat-sen's. Chiang's speeches, like Dr. Sun's, are grave and sententious, permeated by the ancient Chinese virtues of propriety, justice, loyalty and conscientiousness, quietly hopeful in the midst of apparent hopelessness, always concerned with the defense of Chinese integrity not only against the invader of the moment but against all invaders, and with resistance as but one phase of reconstruction. There is in them no single utterance which would have stuck in Dr. Sun's throat, as innumerable utterances of Stalin during the war would have choked Lenin. Certainly we cannot imagine the Chiang of these speeches addressing any words to the ruler of Japan such as Stalin did to the Nazi leaders during the period of the pact with Hitler for the partition of Poland: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented in blood, will long endure." (Telegram from Stalin to von Ribbentrop on Stalin's birthday. The "blood," of course, was Polish blood.)

The historian of the future could determine the extent of Stalin's rupture with the early anti-imperialism of Lenin by comparing Lenin's words on the Far East in 1904-05 and in 1917 with Stalin's words and deeds in present-day China. Thus, when the

⁵ *The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-45*. \$7.50. John Day.

⁶ *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, by Joseph Stalin. \$1.75. International Publishers.

Tsar lost Port Arthur in the War of 1904-05, Lenin wrote an article beginning: "The proletariat has every reason to rejoice. . . ." How strange this sounds placed alongside Marshal Stalin's "Victory Address" of September 2, 1945, when Manchuria again fell into the Russian sphere, along with Northern Korea, Dairen and Port Arthur:

The defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 left grave memories in the minds of our peoples. It was a dark stain on our country. Our people trusted and waited for the day when Japan would be routed and the stain wiped away. For forty years have we, men of the older generation, waited for this day. . . .

Or the historian could compare Marshal Stalin's actions in Persia, Turkey, East Prussia and China with the bitter attack of Lenin on the Kerensky government in July 1917, because it had not repudiated the Tsarist claims "or even published the secret treaties of a frankly predatory nature, concerning the partitioning of Persia, the robbery of China, of Turkey, the annexation of East Prussia. . . ."

Indeed, the true metal of many a more subtle book than that of White and Jacoby is revealed by the simple acid test of an author's attitude towards the Tsar's seizure and Stalin's re seizure of Port Arthur. Here, for instance, is Foster Rhea Dulles' account of the two events.⁷ The original act:

Russia exacted leaseholds at Port Arthur

and Talienwan, the very territory from which she had warned Japan three years earlier, as part of her program to make Manchuria a Russian sphere of influence.

And the reassertion of the Tsar's claim by Stalin:

The concessions China had made were important and far-reaching. They did not, however, involve the sacrifice of sovereignty, which had characterized those exacted by Tsarist Russia. The treaty as a whole was a further guarantee of China's political and territorial integrity.

We wonder how Mr. Dulles would like to test that theory of Chinese sovereignty by trying to fly in a Chinese government plane over the guns of the fortress of Port Arthur!

The White-Jacoby book employs a cruder form of double standard: it explains away all the virtues of the Central government that have to be admitted, and explains away all the deficiencies and vices of the Communists which cannot be ignored. However, the trusting reader does not have to wait for these curious exercises in apologetics in order to know whom to applaud and whom to hiss. As in the stock-company melodrama the villain is known by his oily black moustache and the hero by his honest, blond, smooth-shaven features, so the authors give you a key as they introduce each character: "A slim, cold-eyed Chekiang youth named Chiang Kai-shek"; "his brittle wife, Mrs. Chiang"; "a gimlet-eyed character called Chiang Ting-weng." And on the other side: "Mao Tse-tung, a round, unlined, curiously serene face, more vivid and more given to broad smiles

⁷ *China and America, The Story of Their Relations Since 1784*. \$2.75. Princeton.

than the disciplined countenance of Chiang Kai-shek"; "Huang Chen, the ruddy-faced, hardy defender of the North"; "the handsome, dark-eyed insurrectionary of the North, General Chou En-lai."

One is never in doubt for a moment, unless one doubts the integrity of authors who would use such devices on their readers.

IV

Are the Chinese Communists really Communists or something else? Do they have an organic tie-up with Russia? Do they practice terror and one-party dictatorship where they rule? Are they a Russian fifth column for the disintegration of China? When they call for the withdrawal of American troops, who are temporary and want no territory in China, do they also call for the withdrawal of Russian troops, who are permanent (ninety-nine years) and have taken territory? These are the questions which books of the White-Jacoby type neither clearly ask nor honestly answer.

The Chinese Communist Party was originally organized by Russian agents with Russian money (Vytinsky, Litnovsky, Malin, Borodin and others). After its formation in 1921, Moscow allotted it a monthly subsidy of \$12,000 American. It joined the Kuomintang on Russian orders, split the Kuomintang in two on Russian orders, withdrew from both sections on Russian orders, attempted insurrections in Shanghai and Canton under

the direct leadership of Russian and other Comintern agents. Thus the Canton uprising of 1928 was directed by the Russian (Georgian) Lominadze, the German Heinz Neumann, and the onetime Hungarian Minister of War Pogany (pseudonym: John Pepper). The military command of the insurrection was in the hands of a Russian officer, Vytinsky.

The Sixth Congress of the Chinese Party (in 1928, the last time that this "democratic" party ever held a congress) was actually held in Moscow. Stalin personally decided the main questions. It was always in Moscow that its leaders were selected, trained, removed, purged. Chen Tu-hsiu, its leader until 1928, was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Li Li-san was his chief assistant. Both were removed on Stalin's order in 1928, and replaced by the present leader, Mao Tse-tung. Chen was expelled and Li Li-san was kept in exile in Moscow for over fifteen years. All of the Party's leaders have been, and still are, commuters between Moscow and China. All this is a matter of record.

For a number of years this Party tried to base itself on the Chinese working class and to set up a proletarian dictatorship. Finally defeated in Canton in 1928, the Communists fled to Central China. That is why they became "agrarian Communists," i.e., tried to set up peasants' instead of workers' soviets. When they could no longer hold out there, they fled to the Far Northwest, to be nearer to Rus-

sian-dominated Mongolia and Turkestan and the Russian border. This forced march to the Russian border is what is described by White and Jacoby as a virtual "severing of ties" with Moscow!

The Communists' arrival in Yen'an coincided with a turning point both in their own history and in the party line. By now they had become an independent organization; their ties with Moscow were nominal.

While the Comintern was introducing its new line of "popular front" governments, support of democracy, and "collective security," and while Japan and Russia were engaged in undeclared border skirmish warfare, the Chinese Communists received instructions to propose to the Central Government a united front in the latter's struggle against Japan. Here is an authoritative summary, from the *China Year Book, 1938-9*, of some of the Communists' written proposals of 1937:

1. The Chinese Soviet Government shall henceforth be known as the Government of the Special Area of the Republic of China, which shall be under the control of the National Government and the National Military Council.
2. In their territory, a democratic system shall obtain. . . .
3. All activities to overthrow the National Government shall cease. . . .

The government accepted these proposals, designated the Chinese Red Army as the Eighth Route Army, admitted the Communist Party into an Advisory Grand Council of all political parties. But the armies never

obeyed orders, the Party never abandoned its one-party government, never permitted the Central government to publish or distribute its press in Communist territory (though the Communist press was permitted in Chungking). Instead, in confidential instructions to its functionaries, the Party explained:

To establish a democratic republic is the present strategy of the Chinese Communist Party, and its tactics are to cease civil wars and to cooperate with the Kuomintang . . . for the present circumstances require a temporary compromise. . . . To give up temporarily the revolutionary régime is merely a change of name and a preparation for a greater victory in the future. . . . Our compromise is designed to weaken the Kuomintang, and to overthrow the National government. . . . In reality, the Red Army should maintain its independent existence. . . .⁸

However, the Communists did cooperate with the Central government in fighting the Japanese . . . but only until Stalin signed the pact with Hitler in 1939. Thereafter, the Chinese Communists, like all Communist Parties, praised the pact, denounced England and the United States as imperialist warmongers, and limited their military activities to trying to capture territory from the National government. Early in 1941, when the Russians signed a similar pact with Japan, the Chinese Communists approved this, too, even though the pact recognized the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo (*i.e.*, Manchuria).

⁸ *Present Strategy and Tactics of the Chinese Communist Party*. Yen'an 1937. Further extracts from this book can be found in the *Congressional Record* for July 26, 1946, "Extension of Remarks of Clare Boothe Luce."

That is the true measure of their "independence" from Russia, and the test of where their true loyalties lie.

Once more, when Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941, the Chinese Communists ceased their attacks on the Chinese government. But late in 1943, when Stalin felt that in the end the war would be won, the Russian press resumed its attacks on the Chinese government, and the Chinese Communists did the same.

The rest of the story — our shameful secret agreement at Yalta to hand over predominance in Manchuria, Northern Korea, Port Arthur and Dairen to the Russians; the moving of the Chinese Communists into Manchuria under the protection of the Russian troops, and the subsequent struggles and negotiations — is too recent to need repeating. Russia intervened hastily in the war in the East, after Japan asked it to use its good offices for peace, precisely in order to move into Manchuria. The Chinese government was thus caught by surprise, with its best armies outside the country, loaned to us for the Burma campaign. Transporting them to occupy territory over which the Russians have by treaty recognized their authority, that is the pitiful extent of our so-called aid to our ally whose troops we had previously taken to Burma. And already Mr. Truman has made the same shameful mistake in China, of refusing to sell arms to a government we legally recognize, which Mr. Roosevelt made during the Spanish Civil War.

Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, his wife, Teng Yung-chou, Chen Shao-yu and other Communists, who were admitted by Chiang Kai-shek into the advisory People's Political Council, continue to take their orders from Moscow.

The first two are still shuttling back and forth, and Li Li-san, purified of political heresy by fifteen years of exile in Moscow, has been sent by the "non-existent" Comintern back to China, as Dimitroff has been sent to Bulgaria and Togliatti to Rome, with the latest orders. Indeed, the constant demand of Mao and Chou for the withdrawal of our temporary forces from China and their tomblike silence on the presence of a vast permanent Russian army of occupation speak for themselves. It is not hard for the least informed American to judge between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek on this simple and all important basis: the one stands for the unity and territorial integrity and independence of China; the other is a puppet of a foreign power, which today as in the times of the Tsars stands at Port Arthur and Dairen, is infiltrating into the richest province of China, Manchuria, and has even gone beyond the Tsar in lopping off Mongolia. "The purpose of my Three Principles," said Dr. Sun, "is to elevate China to an equal position among the nations, in international affairs, in government, and in economic life, so that she can permanently exist in the

world." Today, as when he pronounced them, these words are valid still.

So far, China's nationalism has been a benign nationalism, an awakening of national self-consciousness and the desire for national freedom. But if Russia's return to the seizure of treaty ports, spheres, concessions, extraterritoriality, and foreign policing armies, is imitated by the other great powers (*facilis descensus Averno*, how easy is the relapse into imperialism), then will this nationalism be exacerbated by another half century of struggle until it becomes chauvinism? Then, equipped with modern arms and modern industry, China's 400,000,000 — perhaps reinforced by India's 350,000,000 and other peoples of Asia — will give that lesser peninsula called Europe, even including Russia, cause to tremble.

Or will this mighty land, demoralized and torn by its fifth-column puppet army and puppet government, be absorbed into the Russian orbit which already stretches from the Baltic-Trieste line to the Pacific? Will the United States be so parsimonious and so timorous in its legitimate help to the ally that suffered most in the late war that it repeats the error it made in Spain, thus making another world war an increasing certainty? Will the government ever get the


rails laid down which the Communists keep blowing up, so that industrialization of China and an increase of "the people's livelihood" become a reality? Will the Civil War be terminated by the Communists' consenting (with Russia's consent) to become a political party, like any other, taking its chances with the vote of the people in a unified China able to settle issues by the methods of democracy, free from the arbitrament of guns?

Despite all the deliberate fog spread by books like *Thunder Out of China* these issues are so simple and so overwhelming that there can be no real doubt as to the desirable outcome. And any honest history of China's forty centuries, like Latourette's, encouraging us to take a long view of this people, that has successfully surmounted foreign invasion and domestic discord for four thousand years, will give hope that the profound transformation the country is going through "will prove the birth pangs of a new and greater China." In that case, China will succeed in incorporating the best features of Western institutions and industry with all that is worthy in its ancient heritage, contributing therefrom to the West as well. For the revolution Dr. Sun dreamed of can be summed up in the Pauline motto: "Prove all things, and hold on to that which is good."



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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COMINTERN

by **BERTRAM D. WOLFE**

IN THE endless stalemate of the third year of World War I, the Russian Revolution and its offspring, the Communist International, seemed to millions to be man's best hope. They would provide a people's road to peace and freedom. No more wars would be fought for markets and profits (no one thought then of wars fought for naked power). Man would no longer be subject to his own creation, the machine. A new type of humanity would develop, free from the need of policing or compulsion; the state would wither away; man himself would become the measure of all things and his dignity and freedom and further development the test of each act and institution.

Attracted by that bright promise

amidst the murk of war were the best, the most generous-visioned; those most impatient with a world of monstrous evil and most ardent in their love of equality, freedom, brotherhood, justice. These turned their faces towards the new light in the East. Braving innumerable perils, breaking their way through walls of bayonets of the *cordon sanitaire*, they put gifts of courage, devotion, intelligence, dreams at the service of the world revolution.

Since then a quarter century has elapsed. The revolutions that were to have constituted "the final conflict" have all ended in defeat or, worse, in miscarriage. There has been a second war, more terrible and more nearly total than the first. The model anti-imperialist revolution which began bravely by renouncing all "tsarist booty" has ended by seizing it all back again, and more. The upheaval which was to have made "every cook

BERTRAM D. WOLFE has known personally Stalin, Trotsky and a number of other Soviet Communist leaders. He has visited Communist Russia three times, in 1924, 1928 and 1929, spending a total of more than two years time in the country. A longtime student of Communism, he is at present engaged in writing a "triple biography" of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, to be called *Three Who Made a Revolution*.

a master of the affairs of state" has made the state the master of the affairs of every cook. The new order that was to have brought growing equality and freedom moves visibly towards ever greater inequality and ever more atrocious unfreedom. In the form of forced labor it has restored slavery on a scale unknown since the Pharaohs built the pyramids. The state which was to have withered away grows each year more distended, more completely master of thought as well as action, its police more numerous and ruthless, its personal ruler more absolute. It is the individual whose stature has withered while the state has swollen to totality: "All for and through the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state." And wherever its "liberating" armies have appeared, there it has begotten a puppet total state in its own image, ruled by its secret police and by obedient Comintern agents who have somehow survived the defeats, the purges, and the transformation and "dissolution" of the International.

That voluntary association of free and rebellious spirits has developed with a strange and tragic fatality into the monstrous opposite of all its founders dreamed of. The founders themselves are gone, their very names besmirched, often their lives taken by the agencies they created. The brave new parliament of fighting and thinking representatives has long since ceased to debate issues or decide them by collective wisdom. One infallible, omnipotent *Vozhd* (Leader), thinks

for all and decides for all. Theirs but the task of discussing how best to carry out his will, how to sense it, courtier-like, when it is cryptically expressed or before it is expressed, how to distribute the blame among themselves when the infallible (as in the Stalin-Hitler pact) has been in grievous error. Such monolithic conformity — that of a piece of granite and not of a living body of men — has made debates and congresses even more superfluous. And one day in 1943, the "best disciple" who so solemnly over Lenin's dead body had proclaimed: "We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin, to devote our lives to the enlargement and strengthening of the Communist International," decreed that body's dissolution without so much as consulting its parties.

What were the causes, what the stages of this startling transformation? Has the International really been dissolved? What has happened to the men who brought it into being? How do those agents of the Comintern who have survived defeats, disillusion and purge now operate? How does a Duclos, who knows nothing of America or of English, get the power to make the American Communists interrupt their unanimous hosannas to Earl Browder and just as unanimously expel him as a renegade and agent of Wall Street? What are the threads that connect Manuisky (the Russian overseer of the Comintern who replaced Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev) with his instruments and agents in other lands: with Pieck

and Ulbricht in Germany, Thorez and Duclos in France, Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Togliatti in Italy, Tito in Yugoslavia, Mao Tze-tung in China? (Like Manuisky, they too have replaced the original founders of their parties.) What was the effect of the purges upon the functioning of the Communist International? What mechanism now spreads the deadly infection of this "dissolved" and disintegrating organism? What is the real nature of the body which has disappointed so many hopes for the future of those who brought it into being?

Pattern for World Revolution, by "Ypsilon" [\$3.50. Ziff-Davis], is an attempt to tell the inside story of the rise and fall of the Communist International, to analyze the process of its metamorphosis, and to answer the above questions. It is an amazing, colorful, incredible and deeply moving story. Amazing and incredible because the truths of our day — crown jewels used to finance revolutionary parties; a bomb planted in the Sophia Cathedral; purge of all the Russian founders save one who died too soon; German Communists as trustees in Hitler's concentration camps; slave labor in the name of workers' rule — are all stranger than the wildest imaginings of fiction. Deeply moving because the authors are men who have given the best years of their lives and the deepest of their loyalties to the Communist International — all the more moving because they strive to preserve an air

of detachment and to keep tight rein on their emotions as they tell the wild and strange truths that have no need of emotional embellishment to stir the reader.

This is an "inside job," a story told by men who not only gave their hearts and minds to the International on the day it was founded but who fought in its battles, served in its secret apparatus of agents and directors, carried out its dangerous and difficult missions in many lands of Europe, followed its development and degeneration with the anguish of men following the disintegration of their own spirit. Even now, after their separation from it, they have never lost touch with its affairs: they follow the latest actions of a Dimitrov, an Ulbricht, a Duclos with the intimate insight and sense of involvement of men whose being is so largely interwoven with the fate of the organization they served so long. Because it is an inside story, there are revelations in it that no mere documentary study like Borkenau's *World Communism* can possibly give. Neither Souvarine nor Angelica Balabanoff, who left the Comintern much earlier and watched its degeneration from afar, nor Kravchenko and Barmine, to whom it was never much more than a resounding name, can possibly give such insights or tell such strange tales. The historians of the future will more frequently consult this book to get a key to the most dynamic force of our time than they will any other work so far published.

The signature, "Ypsilon," is of course a pseudonym. In view of the fate of others who have tried to tell us the truth concerning an instrumentality which set out to serve, then to master mankind, the anonymity is understandable. Moreover, it has a further appropriateness, for these were not top leaders but agents who, in the words of Auden, "made it their mature ambition to think no thought but ours, to hunger, work illegally, and be anonymous."

There are two authors. Without seeking to violate their anonymity, it is easy to deduce from the test that we are hearing from men who were young when the Communist International was born. They joined immediately in the formation of their respective Communist Parties; before long were sent as delegates to Russia; knew the Comintern when its offices and congresses were inside the Kremlin; lived with other representatives in the fabulous Hotel Lux and witnessed its Decameron episodes of political intrigue, personal quarrels, love affairs; participated in the sessions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International; served on committees to supervise and guide Parties; went on difficult missions to various capitals in Europe; formed part of that camaraderie of Moscow agents with whom they exchanged ideas and accounts of their adventures.

One of the authors is of a more

reflective type, with a gift for turning a good metaphysical phrase and a desire to give their whole experience philosophical meaning; the other is more earthy, more proletarian, apparently more "Left" in the traditional sense of that term. They have tried hard to re-examine their old viewpoints, but here and there they still cling unconsciously to unexamined fragments. Thus, when they tell how the Comintern made the blunder of supporting Pilsudski in 1926 "against the *reactionary* peasant government of Witos," a little further thought would have shown them that it was Pilsudski who represented reaction. One of the authors, who seems to know the Balkans exceptionally well from first hand, contributes a fantastically false picture of Tito's rise to power as a "*sans culotte* revolution" gone wrong, a picture which, by the time of the Stalin-Hitler pact and Tito's rise through Great Power manipulations, had become a complete anachronism.

One of the writers seems to have a special love for Prague, a mellow memory of its beer and lovely landscape and *Gemütlichkeit*; an intimate mixture of amused disdain and affection for the old Czech leader Smeral (who could not save his party from ruin because he had taken a solemn oath to Lenin "never to go against the Bolsheviks"); and an unlimited admiration for that sterling character who may yet save Czechoslovakia if Czechoslovakia can be saved: the Good Soldier Schweik.

Thus a detective armed with the weapons of textual criticism might gradually reconstruct a fair profile of each author. What is important, however, is not their identity, but the patent fact that they were on the inside of so many happenings, committees, congresses, missions, and are able to give accounts of things which hitherto could only be conjectured vaguely even by those who, like the reviewer, have followed the doings of the Comintern most closely.

Several other agents of comparable rank have contributed to "Ypsilon's" account their own reminiscences. There are sections from the "Journal of Comrade X," who spent long years in Moscow, followed closely the controversies in the French, German and Russian Parties, saw the purges from close up, and was intimate with Bukharin, the Comintern's leading theoretician after Lenin's death and the author of its program. And there are other sections from "The Memoirs of Comrade Y," a German of socialist parentage, who became a confidential financial agent for the International, his introduction to his task being a glimpse of "a blinding hoard of riches — golden thrones . . . heaps of precious stones, ikons laminated with gold and studded with jewels. . . ." His experiences in financing Parties, attempting to check on defalcations, watching the use of money to overcome political differences and the degenerative effects of subsidies on Parties which should have depended upon and been under

the control of their own members, are among the most illuminating pages.

Though the two directly responsible for the book now live in the United States, they, as well as "Comrade X" and "Comrade Y," seem to understand little about America. An unconscious feeling of European superiority and belief in the universality of formulas derived from the European scene have prevented them from realizing that underneath the struggle of personalities in the American Communist Party at one time lay real issues concerning dual unionism, attitudes towards a third party or farmer-labor party, efforts to discover the ways in which the American economic, political and social structure differed from that of Europe. Their remarks on Latin American Communism are even less illuminating. But the American fellow traveler they seem to have met and argued with and learned to understand: many will blush as they come upon their naked images in *Pattern for World Revolution*.

III

Most sensational and most illuminating for the future historian is "Ypsilon's" play-by-play account of the desperate "game of poker" played by the Soviet Red Army and the German Army. The game began in 1921 and thereafter was played for high stakes with varying turns of fortune. When the Allies in 1921 delivered an ultimatum to Germany

to close down German aviation factories and other war industries, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, ambassador in Moscow, General von Seeckt, head of the Reichswehr, and Walter Rathenau, Foreign Minister, secretly proposed to set up arms factories in Russia, furnish the technical know-how, the engineers, and instructors for the Red Army, in return for the secret delivery of a portion of the output to the German Army. The Russian negotiators were Trotsky, as head of the Red Army, some members of his staff, Chicherin as Foreign Commissar, and Radek as expert on Germany and unofficial propagandist for both the Foreign Office and the Comintern. The negotiations began, of course, only after they had received the approval of Lenin:

Chicherin was aware that Brockdorff-Rantzau had come to Moscow in order to prepare Germany's revenge against the Allies. Brockdorff-Rantzau was equally aware that the Soviet Government regarded Germany as only a springboard for world revolution . . . Rathenau dreamed of a reconciliation of Germany with the West as soon as the West saw that it was threatening to play with Moscow. . . .

Radek played the part of his life. With the heads of the German bourgeoisie he negotiated a pact of friendship . . . with the heads of the Communist Party the means to bring the same government down in the shortest time. With the Chairman of the German General Electric he discussed the improvement of German-Russian business relations. With the Communists he went into the chances of a general strike in Germany. With General Seeckt he conferred on how to expand the secret military connections between Ger-

many and Russia . . . with his comrades how to break the power of the German army. . . .

A desperate poker game indeed, with the stakes the European Heartland, the fate of Germany and Russia. With tenacious skill and intimate knowledge the authors trace the varying fortunes of the opposing gamblers: how the Russians took a high trick at Genoa and the Germans (Rathenau's faction) at Locarno; how von Seeckt made good his threat that he would not permit the victory of the Communist Party in Germany; how Stalin forced the German Communists to remain passive and fight the Socialists rather than the Nazis from 1929 to 1933 because he gambled on the German generals' preventing Hitler from taking power; how Hitler purged General von Schleicher and Stalin Marshal Tukhashevsky, largely as a sequel to this secret game; how Stalin nearly lost everything in playing what he thought was the trump card of a pact with Hitler; how he continues the game now with a superior hand in the form of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei*. And the League of German Officers headed by Reichswehr Marshals von Paulus and von Seydlitz and other General Staff members. No one who would understand the last two decades can afford to miss this account.

IV

Many strange and exciting adventures are scattered like brilliantly colored beads throughout the book, but all

are strung on a somber central thread: the story of the rise and fall of the Comintern. Now in retrospect that story has about it the foreknown and inevitable fatality of a Greek tragedy.

The Comintern was born in the minds of two people simultaneously: Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. The former represented a band of conspirative professional revolutionaries, nurtured in the Russian underground, where doctrinaire splits concerning how the masses should be approached and organized came naturally, there being no mass parties in Russia. His whole life was founded on the belief that the masses could be directed, commanded, manipulated by resolute leaders. And behind him, after 1917, was all the prestige that comes from success. But Rosa Luxemburg came from a mass party and had a different attitude. She longed for a new International organization as passionately as Lenin, but thought of it as being organized at the end of a long process of convincing and winning the masses.

When Lenin issued his call for the Comintern in December 1918, Rosa Luxemburg's fight for the soul of the masses had just begun. She warned of the consequences and resolutely opposed the immediate founding of a new International. However, none of the leaders of the newly formed Communist Party of Germany, even then engaged in a revolutionary struggle, felt able to leave for Moscow. In place of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxem-

burg, Leo Jogiches or Paul Levi, they sent young Eberlein with categorical instructions to vote no. By the time the meeting was held in the Kremlin three months later, all the great German leaders except Levi lay dead. The "Congress" consisted of Russians, delegates from the Russian-influenced borderlands, miscellaneous war-prisoners without mandates from their countries and only one accredited representative from a mass party, young Eberlein, who abstained from voting. Lenin had his way: a Russian organization with international aspirations was formed. Lenin tried hard to keep the Russian Party merely "the first among equals" but the fatal flaw was in the foundation. Every step taken to build the edifice deepened and widened the crack.

When we realize this, all the amazing stories fall into position as part of a picture: the crown jewels and subsidies that corrupted Parties already infected by blind worship of success and power; campaigns led independently of the masses who should have controlled them and provided the funds, after being convinced of the rightness of those campaigns; the splitting of Party after Party as the great mass parties tried to join the Comintern; the selection of pliable if discredited instruments like Cachin, who had been pro-war, rather than Loria, who had been anti-war, in France; the ousting of Serrati and the splitting of the Italian movement, so timed as to leave it defenseless before Mus-

solini; the premature hardening and enlargement of the split in the German working class, which paved Hitler's road to power; the "Bolshhevization" of the Parties after Lenin's death, making them caricatures of the Russian Bolshevik Party; the transmission of the Russian factional struggles to all Parties and the selection of leaders not on the basis of their position on the questions of their own land and working class but on their attitudes towards Zinoviev or Trotsky or Stalin; the growth of personal and police dictatorship in Russia (which the authors do not analyze) and its spilling over into the Comintern until it ends with the blood purges of the leaders of the Polish and German and other Parties, men who were refugees, "guests of honor" and members of the "General Staff of the World Revolution" on Russian soil.

All of the episodes, taken one by one, seem dramatic, or amusing, or grotesque. But as they fall into a pattern, they take on the qualities of a nightmare. The "Pattern for World Revolution" turns before our eyes into the fearful pattern of the world that besets us now.

V

"When Lenin founded the Communist International," write the authors, "he stated his objective clearly and unequivocally: world revolution." But:

Stalin dissolved the Communist International in an atmosphere of vagueness

and ambiguity. In the dissolution decree one will seek in vain for an unequivocal statement. The successor of the Comintern, the Stalintern, tiptoed from the dissolution decree into the arena of world politics as it behooves the illegitimate child of the totalitarian transformation of the Russian Revolution. Totalitarian transformations usually have no program of their own. Fundamentally they are a process of disintegration, dissolving all order of society, consuming the political, historical and moral traditions of a country, reproducing them in distorted form, robbing them of their real content. . . .

In this process, Stalin transformed himself from a professional revolutionary into a totalitarian leader who has become a substitute for program, thought, and doctrine. Revolutionary manifestoes are no longer issued by the Russia of the 1940s. The fundamental political method is no longer that of frontal attack but of encirclement of the enemy. Its first task is not to carry to victory a political philosophy of its own, but to destroy its real or supposed enemies. . . .

Stalin's foreign policy rests upon one principle — the destruction of the principles of all others. Notwithstanding that it announces no principles of its own the Stalintern has grown at a speed far greater than ever experienced by Lenin's International.

After this introduction the final section of their book — after the grimmest and most grisly — recounts the dispatch of the surviving agents of the purged and "dissolved" Comintern from Moscow to the various capitals and cabinets of the world: Gottwald to the premiership in Czechoslovakia; Dimitrov and Kolarov to the dictatorship of Bulgaria; Pieck and Ulbricht to Germany; Thorez to France; Ercoli-Togliatti to Italy; Rackoczi (alive because he was

in a Hungarian jail when all the old Hungarian Communist leaders were killed by Stalin) back to Hungary; Bierut (formerly known as *Bienkovsky* and *Rukowsky*, whence the Bierut) and Radkiewicz, both directly from the ranks of the GPU, where they had conducted the purge of all their former Polish Communist superiors, to the posts of premier and security commissar in the land whose very citizenship they had renounced.

These men too were originally idealists and lovers of liberty. But with a relentless clarity fitting to the inexorable process which they are describing, the authors trace their degeneration into puppets and police agents who can swallow even the purges and the Stalin-Hitler pact while all who could not were themselves purged.

How will it all end? We can only give the last word to the authors themselves, for the process continues and the answer still lies in the out-

come of the history we are even now making:

The Stalintern rests on force, suppression, and despair — not on hope and expectation. It is an end in itself. It does not represent a socialist alternative to the breakdown of a capitalist order of society. It is a form of disintegration of human society. Because it has no ends beyond itself, the Stalintern will ultimately end in the extinction of the Communist Parties that compose it. Those which operate within the physical and geographical proximity of Stalin's empire will be transformed into mere appendices of the Russian State apparatus. The contradiction between obedience to the requirements of Moscow and the conditions essential for their political existence in their own countries will defeat the others.

If, on the other hand, the crisis in Russia proper results in convulsions threatening the European and Asiatic expansion of Moscow, the likelihood is that then the parties of the Stalintern will vanish into the dark more quickly than they rose into the limelight of recent events. . . .

They conclude: "The Stalintern has no future, and will produce no successors."


PEASE ORIGINS—11

TO CASE: Not long ago, in a learned journal, this verb was listed as a "new word," and authorities were cited for this definition: "To study or plan (a crime, especially the setting of a crime) so as to preclude accidents." In the citations quoted, law-enforcement officers are supposed to be speaking, and perhaps the word means this to them, but to criminals it means simply to look at, to watch, or to look over. As a matter of fact, it is a very old word. It derives from the practice in some gambling houses of maintaining an employee to check on those who are playing faro-bank. This man is called a "case-keeper," and generally sits on a high stool overlooking the layout. He has charge of a tabulator resembling an abacus (or "case"), which he uses to keep tab on the cards which have been drawn and played, thereby protecting the house from any clever gentry who might cut into its "legitimate percentage."

DAVID W. MAURER

End #7

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DISSENTING OPINION ON TOYNBEE

by **BERTRAM D. WOLFE**

LIKE rumors of a new-found civilization, the name of Toynbee has been bobbing up in historico-philosophical writing with ever-increasing frequency. In 1934 the first three volumes of his *Study of History* were published in this country, and in 1940 three more. After an interruption for wartime service, he is now at work upon the final three volumes of a study that has apparently been massively conceived and fully planned from the outset. The aim is as large as the scope: an empirical-interpretive examination of all known civilizations, living and dead, to discover their natures, the laws of their birth, growth, decline and death, to reveal their meaning, if meaning there be that outlasts their rise and fall, and to wrest from them answers to the unresolved questions of our own time.

In this age of one-sided specialization, the audacity of the effort is enough to compel our admiration. Mr. Toynbee enumerates and examines in some measure 26 civilizations,

including in that number five arrested civilizations and ignoring abortive civilizations. . . . Of these twenty-six, no less than sixteen are dead and buried. The ten survivors are our own Western Society, the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Near East, its offshoot in Russia, the Islamic Society, the Hindu Society, the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, its offshoot in Japan, the three arrested civilizations of the Polynesians, the Eskimos and the Nomads.

He moves confidently among the ruins of Aztec, Inca and Maya, Sumeric, Babylonian, Indic, Sino-Egyptiac, Syriac, Minoan and other vanished or moribund civilizations, drawing even on Eskimos, Polynesians and Desert Nomads in support of some of his conclusions. Of the "ten survivors," he finds that the Polynesians and Nomads are in their

BERTRAM D. WOLFE is a regular contributor to *THE AMERICAN MERCURY* and many other magazines. He is at present engaged in writing a history of the Russian Revolution in the form of a "triple biography" of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin.

last agonies; that seven out of the remaining eight are in the throes of assimilation by Western civilization; that one, the Eskimo, was arrested in its infancy; and that the remaining six "bear marks of having already broken down and gone into disintegration." That leaves only one civilization, our own, concerning which this judge, tentative and troubled, withholds his verdict. For that he has three more volumes.

Yet innumerable obiter dicta suggest that he finds our civilization at, or just over, the crucial divide, standing in mortal danger of losing its soul, but worthy of being placed on probation and given a little more time to repent and be saved. No wonder that many, in our time of uncertainty and peril — or, in Toynbee's phrase, our "time of troubles" — are anxiously awaiting the pronouncement of the final judgment.

II

The present one-volume abridgment of the *Study of History* [\$5.00, Oxford] is a remarkable achievement in its own right, and comes as a boon to those who might not be able to afford the time or cost of the six-volume work so far published, or who might lose themselves in the maze of innumerable illustrations, often from generally unknown fields, of every proposition advanced. The condensation is by D. C. Somervell, a fellow historian and, it would appear from this labor of love, a devoted disciple. "I made this abridgment," writes

Mr. Somervell, "for my own amusement, without Mr. Toynbee's knowledge and without any idea of publication." But Mr. Toynbee, who had long been pressed with demands for an abridgment, was delighted with the result. His original argument is presented almost entirely in his own words, and in a manner which preserves method, atmosphere, texture and proportions. Moreover, and this is most remarkable, the felicity of style and the likable qualities of the author's personality are undiminished.

Even in condensation, one cannot but be struck by the amazing wealth of illustration from such varied and often recondite fields. Mr. Toynbee, who is Director of Studies in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Research Professor of International History, seems to be a whole institute of historical studies in his single person. He acts at home in places where most historians scarcely dare to tread. "What, for example, was the effect of the *Clades Alliensis* upon the fortunes of Rome? . . . What the effect on the fortunes of the Osmanlis when Timur Lenk took Bayezid Yilderim captive on the field of Angora? . . . How were the Apostles affected by the abrupt withdrawal of their Master's presence so soon after it had appeared to be miraculously restored?" Why did the golden age of the Danubian monarchy coincide with the apogee of the Ottoman Empire and why did the former share the latter's fate in the moment of decline? How much pressure stimu-

lates a civilization to grow? How much is so much that the growth stiffens into catalepsy? And how much is too much, so that the civilization succumbs? All these questions are taken at random from within a few pages of one another. Any specialist may challenge, indeed many will challenge, both facts and conclusions in particular fields, but who save a Spengler or a Hegel would venture thus to embrace the whole human spectacle? The grandeur as well as the manageability of this great mass of materials comes from the fact that Toynbee is interested in no lesser events than the rise and fall of civilizations: "What we propose is to do for civilized societies something of what anthropology is doing for the primitive species."

III

The "intelligible units of historical study" for Toynbee are not periods or separate nations, but societies or civilizations. Such civilizations issue suddenly by mutation out of primitive societies, or they issue by contact or descent out of earlier civilized societies. But all such civilizations are comparatively recent phenomena in human history, the earliest having originated no more than six thousand years ago. Thus, they are so nearly contemporaneous with one another, differ so strongly from primitive societies, and have so many things in common, that Mr. Toynbee proposes to treat them as "philosophically contemporaneous members of a single

species" in order to extract their common features and deduce some general laws concerning their birth, the process of their growth, breakdown and disintegration.

Following an extremely inadequate concept of Bergson's, our author distinguishes civilizations from primitive societies by selecting as differential the fact that primitive societies are static and "caked in custom" and look backward towards great leaders of the past or towards the old men of the group as the repositories of unchanging wisdom, while civilized societies are dynamic, tending to follow creative personalities in their midst. "A society can be called a civilization as soon as these acts of initiative (by creative leaders) and this attitude of docility are both found together." Toynbee seems a little uneasy when he first advances this criterion of Bergson's. He realizes that primitive societies, too, must originally have been dynamically progressive, indeed, must have made greater advances in the rise of "sub-man to man" than any advanced civilization has yet achieved. Actually, here and elsewhere Toynbee swallows Bergsonian metaphysical distinctions without adequate empirical test. The "basic distinction" is taken from degenerate, pseudo-primitive societies "as we know them" in their last agonies or petrefactions. Indeed, Toynbee himself finds in the course of his "Study" that civilizations in their last agonies may also look backward and become "caked in custom."

However, he needs Bergson's suggestive if inadequate criterion for his purposes, and so, after a few hasty reservations, he moves on as if it were adequate and fully proved. But we soon forget the fatal flaw in the foundation as we watch the magnificent edifice he proceeds to construct upon it.

Why do civilizations arise, is Toynbee's next question, and how do they grow? He finds the answer in life's way of presenting man with perpetually new challenges: a change in environment, a blow from without, a crushing defeat, a constant pressure, a serious privation. Sometimes a group fails to meet the challenge, is checked, stiffens, perhaps is overwhelmed and swept away. Sometimes, however, its élite, or a creative leader, devises an adequate response, gets it accepted, and growth begins. Such are the "virtues of adversity" that without a challenge there is no growth. But such the perils that too much challenge or inadequate response spells stagnation or death. Nor is success itself more than momentary. Each successful response has its perils. The devices used by the creative leader to get his response accepted are themselves perilous. Success, too, goes to the head and causes idolization of a given person, institution or technique. At the same time, life continues to present new challenges. Even the successful responses themselves give rise to new challenges, to which there must be devised new responses. Thus growth itself is an

endless and endlessly hazardous chain of challenge-and-response, until an expanding civilization fails to meet a new test adequately. Then growth is arrested and breakdown begins.

Mr. Toynbee is no mechanical determinist. Neither growth nor breakdown is entirely inevitable, though he ascribes more inevitability to breakdown, once it has begun, than to growth. All life is an "ordeal" but the human spirit is endowed with sufficient spontaneity, inventiveness and freedom to meet the ordeal, when it is not too severe, in ways which occasion the growth of the spirit. There are endless perils in being born to civilization, and endless perils inherent in the processes of growth themselves. These act as brakes on growth but as accelerators on breakdown.

However, society is no biological organism, fated by irreversible physico-chemical-biological reactions to inevitable senescence and death. With each new challenge, the ordeal is renewed afresh and the fate of society is once more in the unskilled yet potentially creative hands of the individuals composing it. Mr. Toynbee moves uneasily in this open field of free indeterminacy. The ordeal is continuous, the chances of meeting it adequately are less so. Again and again, he relapses into an unconscious "Calvinism" with the assumption that a given step is fatal, so that, once taken, it causes a society to pass its apogee, whereafter it can only hope to achieve minor rallies, prolonged pe-

trefactions and static epilogues. Probably this is not so much inherent in his metaphysical theories as in the fact that he is considering mostly civilizations that have broken down or perished. Moreover, he tends to place breakdown very early, at a time when most historians have seen a "Golden Age." Thus, having placed Roman society as a mere sub-phase of the Hellenic civilization, the Roman Empire itself becomes but a phase of the Hellenic world's decay, an Empire "already doomed before it was established because the establishment of this universal state was nothing but a rally which could delay but not permanently arrest the already irretrievable ruin of the Hellenic Society." Similarly, the Chinese civilization had its "time of troubles" (the first sign of breakdown or end of growth) in the two and one-half centuries following the death of Confucius in 479 B.C., its rally in a universal state (a rally occurring, according to Toynbee's scheme, only as a phase of breakdown) in 221 B.C., its *Voelkerwanderung* or barbarian incursions in 300 A.D. Viewed in the perspective of this schema, it seems like a mere afterthought to note that the Sinic civilization is with us yet! When Toynbee does note it, it is but to observe that China has virtually succumbed to Western civilization. It does not occur to him to question whether China may not be borrowing some of our perilous technology in order to defend its own Sinic soul against our incursions.

IV

Indeed, this brings us to a second fatal flaw in the foundations of the Toynbeean edifice: his attitude of misprision, not to say contempt, for technology and economy, the productive processes by which man masters nature and thereby alters his own nature. We get an early hint of this in his reduction of beneficial technical progress to a single one of its forms: "etherialization." Again his "proof" is to quote a bit of dubious metaphysics, this time from Gerald Heard:

We are leaving the ground, we are getting out of touch, our tracks grow fainter. Flint lasts forever, copper for a civilization, iron for generations, steel for a lifetime. Who will be able to map the route of the London-Peking air express when the Age of Movement is over, or today to say what is the path through the ether of the messages which are radiated and received?

And suppose Mr. Toynbee had asked Heard about buildings of concrete? About the rope bridges of the Incas and the steel bridges over the East River? Whether iron is really more durable than stainless steel? To "say what was the path through the air" of the smoke messages of the ancient savage? To compare the number of durable buildings and underground structures in a modern city with a Mayan temple group surrounded only by long-vanished huts of twigs and grass? But Mr. Toynbee has need of Heard's "etherialization," as we shall see, to soar above the common concerns of pro-

ducing and reproducing the conditions of life and mastering the environment, both natural and social, as he has need to discount man's mastery of nature as a criterion of his humanization (a mastery, by the way, which contains the great secret of his growth from sub-human to human).

Progress, according to Toynbee, is the achievement of creative individuals. Their creative inventions he finds to be invariably the product of a process of "withdrawal-and-return," withdrawal for the purposes of contemplation, reflection and personal enlightenment or transformation, and then return for the purposes of enlightening their fellow men. It is instructive that Toynbee does not make this merely one of the processes of creative growth but the exclusive process, and that he illustrates it from parables of Plato and Paul, from the life of Christ, from the lives of Benedict, Gregory, the Buddha, Mohammed, and the exiled Machiavelli and Dante.

Since all growth originates with individuals and at best is readily communicated only to small creative minorities, the problem is how to convert the rest of society, the mass of men who remain forever essentially on the level of "the primitive." Theoretically, this may be done by a process of saintly contagion or direct sharing of the withdrawal experience, but few indeed are those capable of becoming disciples. Generally and on a mass scale, these few, *i.e.* this

creative minority, must employ "mimesis" or "drill," a procedure which communicates only the externals. And mimesis or drill, being mechanical, contains a fearful peril to the soul of a civilization, easily corrupting those who employ it as well as those upon whom it is exercised. Once more the processes of growth are pregnant with the perils of decay. Moreover, it now becomes clear why Mr. Toynbee is as neglectful of political techniques and the hopes and promises of democracy as he is of scientific techniques. At bottom, they too are "mechanical."

v

Thus, for three reasons, Toynbee is more deeply and extensively preoccupied with breakdown than with growth: first, because the civilizations he deals with (all but one) are either dead or dying; second, because the very tests he gives of breakdown suggest, somewhat hesitantly, that our own civilization has already climbed over the great divide; and third, and emotionally most important, because his inquiry is intended to culminate with a demonstration that civilizations do not always perish utterly but often bequeath to their successors something exempt from the process of decay. That something is not to be confused with the "cumulative heritage" which is the hope of those who believe in the possibility of earthly progress. Nor does it come from the high tide of any earlier civilization. No, it is a product of the period of decline itself. Though that

"something" has appeared in inferior form during the decline of other civilizations, it has reached its highest possible form only in the decline of the "Hellenic" and "Syriac" civilizations, which, while dying, begot and bequeathed to our own, something which is the author's most cherished possession and which provides the basic metaphysical framework of his historical investigation. But let us not run ahead, for Mr. Toynbee not only uses the fourth, fifth and sixth volumes (from page 244 on in the condensed version) to outline this conception, but he has three more volumes in which to develop it fully.

VI

While growth has about it a sort of lawless and unexpected spontaneity of invention and leads to infinite variety in solutions and civilizations, Toynbee finds that disintegration has about it a compelling trend to regularity and uniformity, to lawfulness. "As differentiation is the mark of growth, so standardization is the mark of disintegration." Creative individuals still exist, but their ability to solve their problems in and through society seems to diminish. Now they either seek to escape from an intolerable present by imaginary solutions, or they seek to save their own souls (withdrawal without return), or they devise mere "mechanical" solutions — devices of law and administration or "universal states" — which serve merely to retard and mitigate the processes of disintegration. In place of

creativity comes "abandon" or the rigid self-control of stoicism; in place of the vital élan which accompanies growth, there develops the "sense of drift" and the "sense of sin," or that disguised form of drift, inexorable determinism. In lieu of truly creative solutions come time-arresting or time-vaulting utopias, dreams of an impossible return to the golden age of the past ("archaism"), or an impossible leap into a golden age of the future ("futurism").

All of these devices are but eddies in the downward course of the stream of doom — that is, all but one! True, archaism may be spiritualized into the expedient of "detachment," a withdrawal into the fortress of the soul, an abandonment of the world. But this gives us naught beyond the feeble consolations of philosophy. (Significantly, Toynbee never uses the term philosophy in any other sense!). Futurism, however, contains within itself the possibility of its own "transcendence" for it may be spiritualized into a hope for the coming of God's kingdom on earth, thereby becoming that action of the soul which produces "the higher religions." The "logical conclusion" of the detachment of philosophy is suicide, or, in religious form, *karma*. But the logical conclusion of the "transfiguration" of futurism is . . . the Christian religion, which proclaims a God who has voluntarily abandoned a detachment which it was clearly within His power to enjoy and has instead submitted to man's fate

and, in its most anguished form, to man's agony, for "God so loved the World. . . ."

VII

In a revealing personal statement, cited on the jacket, Mr. Toynbee writes: "I see things from the point of view of an Ancient Historian, looking at the modern Western World from outside." One feels the aptness of this remark in little things and in big; in his casual rejection of modern art as mere "promiscuity" (he cannot conceive of "borrowing" without losing one's own soul); in his virtual writing off of the Orient as having begun to commit suicide by accepting certain Western techniques; in his rejection of the gradual secularization of knowledge since the Enlightenment and of the modern basis of toleration ("this attitude of mind which sterilized fanaticism at the cost of extinguishing faith has lasted from the seventeenth century into the twentieth and . . . is beginning at last to be recognized for what it is . . . the supreme danger to the spiritual health and even to the material existence of the Western body social"); in his pronouncement of secular humanism ("that modern Western process of evicting God to make room for Law") as something which "may be written off as exceptional or even pathological" — and we might multiply indefinitely the instances.

The Russian intelligentsia are to him a species of intellectual "Quis-

lings" — the word is Somervell's in a footnote! — because they sought to borrow from the West. He comes to this conclusion not merely because he rejects the possibility of real borrowing without loss of soul, but because he has simply overlooked the fact that along with the Westernizers there were the Slavophiles. In general, a "treason" is ascribed to all modern intellectuals, following Benda, but it began "centuries earlier, when the 'clerks' repudiated their clerical origin by trying to shift the rising edifice of our Western Christian Civilization from a religious to a secular basis." Hence, we are not surprised when, in another connection, he compares all Western religions for the measure of their comparative vitality, and finds that "unquestionably Catholicism is the most vigorous . . . and in the Church of England, we should unhesitatingly assign the palm of superior vitality to the Anglo-Catholic variety of Anglicism. . . ."

It is useless for the various specialists to criticize his applications of his formulae to their special fields, for it becomes clear in Volumes IV, V and VI that his "empirical method" of studying history is only a pretense, an unconscious tribute to the secular, rational scientific method which at heart he rejects. As early as page 223 (of the abridged version) we find him forgetting his recognition of the plurality and diversity of growth to speak of "the goal of human endeavor." By page 243 this becomes:

The several climbers (*i.e.* civilizations) are

all engaged in an identical enterprise . . . the same goal . . . The underlying unity is apparent . . . The seeds sown are separate seeds, and each seed has its own destiny . . . Yet they are all sown by one Sower in the hope of obtaining one harvest.

On page 417 he discovers "the *anima naturaliter Christiana* in the bosom of primitive man." On page 433 he finds that revolution is a species of Satanism working against the cosmic order. Next he finds that "mankind cannot exist without an Orthodoxy," without a personal God, who must be a jealous God to win out. By page 524, his "empirical study of history" has either been forgotten or has so far confirmed him in his belief that "we" (the editorial we) may . . .

allow ourselves to hold that this spiritual reorientation was a discovery of the One True God, and that a human make-believe about the future of This World had given place to a divine revelation of an Other World. . . . It remains for us to note some of the principal stages in the accomplishment of this immense feat of spiritual reorientation. Its essence is that a mundane scene which was once looked on as a stage for human actors, with or without superhuman backers, is now regarded as a field for the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God.

It is not my intent to challenge this beautifully phrased, deeply held and manifestly comforting belief. All I wish to assert is that a careful reading of this *Study of History* reveals that it is not, as it professes to be, an

empirical study at all, and that, essentially — without the charms of style and the amazing counterpoint of erudition — one could make Dr. Toynbee's findings by first setting down his prior version of the Christian creed and then weaving in and out through the pluriverse of history in quest of applications, illustrations, and confirmations.

Nor do I wish to warn the reader away from what is really a masterpiece of Christian historical apologetics and exegesis. Quite the contrary, it is a richly rewarding book, nobly and grandly conceived, challengingly and beautifully presented. For those who do not know that growth is a constantly new response to a constantly new ordeal, uncertain and fraught with its own perils, there is many a keen home thrust and thought-provoking lesson.

The more history the reader knows, the more challenges to thought and question he will find on every page of this book. For what Mr. Toynbee has written is perhaps the most engaging, and certainly the most erudite Christian interpretation of history that has ever been written. My only wonder is that those who have universally acclaimed it have not been more aware of that fact, or at least more specific in pointing it out and more sensitive to the manifold errors of selection, and interpretation which spring from the theological bias of Dr. Toynbee's *Study of History*.

Encl #8



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sir: Mr. Bondy has taken upon himself the thankless task of trying to justify a fundamentally dishonest book. White and Jacoby wanted to serve as apologists for Chinese Communism, yet cover themselves against the charge that they were doing so. Hence it is easy for Mr. Bondy to pick out "cover-up" sentences. But Mr. Bondy is too honest to let it go at that, wherefore his letter is largely self-refuting and confirmatory of my main points. Thus White and Jacoby could quote the Chinese Communists as saying that they are "Communists in the full sense of the word," because all Communist Parties have gone through that same recent change of line, the latest turn ordered by the "dissolved" Comintern. That statement was the analogue of the American Party's "break with Browderism."

But my main point, that the Chinese Communist Party is *organically tied up with Moscow*, and not an "independent organization," is confirmed by Mr. Bondy, who agrees with me and not with White and Jacoby. He calls them "naive." Having carefully studied the structure of their book, I would use a harsher term.

So do Mr. Bondy's figures on agriculture tend to confirm my main point and not refute it. My point was that it is not large estates and the need for redivision of the land that is the key to China's agrarian reconstruction, but that division and redivision of the land into "pocket handkerchief farms" is China's main problem. This has since been confirmed afresh by joint reports by Dean Claude Hutchison's American mission and the Chinese Department of Agriculture:

"Population pressure has led to the division of the land into small holdings on which many peasants find it difficult to feed their families, let alone supply food for the cities. . . . The average Chinese farm for all China is said to be almost five acres, but there is only one fifth of ~~acre~~ available per farm inhabitant (compared with thirty acres per farm inhabitant in the United States)."

That is why we can have, and do have, a higher farm tenantry percentage than China, and yet have food aplenty, whereas in China 45 per cent own their own land, an additional 25 per cent are part owners and part renters — and yet misery is universal. The mission recommended plans to increase the yield 50 per cent, to improve roads and marketing, flood and drought control, credits, etc., but *all of these recommendations require a period of peace and reconstruction.*

It is not my desire to endorse everything the Central Government has done, is doing or will do. I know too well that war brings forth profiteering, corruption, brutality and evil, that civil

war compounds those evils and endless war multiplies them endlessly. But it is my contention that the Central Government under Chiang Kai-shek represents an attempt to preserve the integrity and independence of China, and, when peace makes it possible, to undertake its reconstruction and democratization. The Communist Party represents an agency of a foreign power, interested in keeping China in turmoil and chopping off pieces. And the Communist Party, once it got into a coalition government or into sole power, would aim not at democratization but at a permanent police state in peace time, at forced labor, at totalitarianism, and, above all, at subordination to, then annexation by, Soviet Russia.

It approved the seizure of Manchuria by Japan when Russia's relations with Japan required it. It is the beginning, together with the army of Soviet Mongolia, a squeeze play upon Inner Mongolia. And, with Russian encouragement, it is trying to detach Manchuria.

The future of China, the future of Asia and the world, depend on China's integrity and independence. Peace, reconstruction, roads, railroads, dams, are China's main needs. Only such a program can end the mass starvation and unite the country with something more than "a rope of sand." Not Chiang, but Sun Yat-sen originally developed the railway and road plan, and even resigned his presidency to become Minister of Communications. But then, as now, foreign interference, civil war, attempts at regional secession, compelled him to abandon construction.

By January, when my article was published, a third of China's railways had been torn up, and half her highways were unserviceable. Since then the Communists have continued to derail trains, burn boxcars, conscript peasants to burn ties, blow up signal apparatus, and reduce bridges and rails to twisted masses of wreckage. With every broken road and rails and bridges and flood bars, famine increases, and the burden upon children yet unborn becomes greater. Even in peace the reconstruction of such a poor country is a fearful labor.

Mr. Bondy has ventured to mention the "anguish of Sun Fo." In January, as my article appeared, Sun was making one more appeal to the Communists to agree to peace. When the appeal failed, he had this to say in his anguish:

"The Communists are blackmailing the country with the threat of (renewed) civil war. They do not care how much suffering they cause the people." (See the *New York Times* for January 19, 1947.)

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

Brooklyn, N. Y.



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
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THE CASE OF HARRY HOPKINS

by **BERTRAM D. WOLFE**

WHO was Harry Hopkins? I have just gone through nearly a thousand pages of his memoranda, state papers, autobiographical fragments, and broadcasts from the center of the whirlwind, all edited, glossed, interpreted and rounded out by the professional writing of his friend and admirer, Robert E. Sherwood. [*Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History*, by Robert E. Sherwood. \$6.00, Harper.] I have learned that he wore a battered hat, was an ulcerous type, had a frail body, a salty wit and an ardent and indomitable will; that he liked race tracks and night clubs; that he was brash, self-confident, ill-informed, quick to learn and a quick thinker; that he lived through the troubled war years on injections, protein concentrates, packets of pills and borrowed time; and that, slumped sick and exhausted in the bottom of a plane seat, he flew to Moscow, London, Teheran and Yalta, where his wisdom or lack of it contributed

powerfully to the making of the present "peace." Yet I still do not sense the living man or find properly estimated his rôle and place in history.

This is due to the failure in writing and thinking of Robert Sherwood. A dramatist, he does not know how to develop his protagonist's character through the latter's speeches and actions. A stylist, his style bogs down in a mass of undigested papers and his own too uncritical admiration for his hero. This Pulitzer Prize winner permits himself such rhetorical horrors as "essential essence" and "Stalin was not talking through his own or anyone else's hat." Wherever the Hopkins notes are set side-by-side with the Sherwood interpretations, it is Sherwood who is stale, flat and unrevealing. Thus when Hopkins was worrying about the effect of his divorce upon his Presidential aspirations, Sherwood writes that Hopkins was consoled by President Cleveland's having survived "a damaging scandal." But a photostat illustration shows that Hopkins actually wrote the words: "Cleveland — bastard." Again, Sherwood tries to explain Hopkins' Socialist vote in 1917: "Hopkins

was disgusted with both the Democratic and Republican parties, the latter having also rejected [fusion candidate] Mitchell, and he supported Morris Hillquit, the Socialist." But, when questioned in the Senate as to why he "registered and voted Socialist," Hopkins answers more vividly and more truthfully: "I was then profoundly moved by a desire . . . to see the United States kept out of war."

This last "difference in style" carries us close to the heart of the defects in Sherwood's portrait. Having gone from poetry to politics on the issue of bringing the United States into the Second World War, the author cannot understand how anyone could have been anti-war in either conflict. He sets out to "shield" his hero from the "charge," documented by the Hopkins papers themselves, that Harry Hopkins was by conviction a liberal pacifist, who played a leading rôle in the second war only because he was convinced that his "chief could do no wrong."

11

Sherwood's political illiteracy makes the first 219 pages of his book, on the New Deal, singularly unilluminating. Hopkins was first of all a New Dealer, by training and fanatical conviction a social worker who had got his hand on the spending levers of government. But Sherwood joined the Roosevelt entourage only when the New Deal was being converted into a war-spending project to aid the Allies.

For the earlier phases he shows little understanding. They were to him only and exclusively a series of devices for getting the unemployed back to work. Here too, Hopkins' own notes prove more critical of "leaf-raking" and "boondoggling" than do his biographer's pages.

When Ickes says that government spending should result not merely in relief jobs, but also in roads built, dams constructed, irrigation projects, reforestation, and other long-term capital gains for the money paid out, Sherwood takes Hopkins' part against Ickes. But when Hopkins secretly converts WPA to military purposes, Sherwood defends this as readily as the boondoggling, without ever noticing the difference in meaning and basic direction. One looks in vain for any critical estimate of the monopoly-encouraging features of NRA, the pig-killing and plowing-under aspects of AAA, the higher nonsense of currency manipulation, which sought to cure an economic fever by tampering with the thermometer. For that matter, one looks in vain for any understanding of the positive and permanent achievements of the New Deal: social security, bank deposit insurance, stock market regulation, government concern with the problem of full employment. Each of these requires a balance sheet of pluses and minuses. Hopkins' last notes suggest that if he had lived to do his own autobiography, he might have attempted it. But Sherwood stands as uncomprehending before the New

Deal as GI Joe before the Sphinx in Egypt.

Unconsciously, Sherwood reveals what is wrong with Part I of his book when he entitles Part II: "1941 — More Than Mere Words." To him Hopkins' mighty prewar labors and huge expenditures in WPA are . . . "mere words." Only with lend-lease and wartime negotiations does it seem to him that his hero has got down to business.

But his hero thought differently. After Roosevelt's reelection in 1936, Hopkins told members of his staff as they were driving out to the race track: "Boys, this is our hour! We've got to get everything we want — a works program, social security, wages and hours, everything. Now or never . . . a complete ticket to provide security for all the folks of this country."

For some New Dealers, the war and its automatic full employment came as a welcome relief from the unsolved problems of the New Deal. But for Hopkins it was an annoying, if inescapable, interruption. And, a few days before his death, one of the last memos he dictated for his intended biography concerned itself with the peacetime employment of the returning soldiers. It called for social insurance and public works, but it wisely warned against the dangers inherent in these measures: "It would be a terrible day for America if the rest of us did not want to earn our living by work, or could not. . . . I would hate to see the backbone of full

employment ever be public works for the sake of providing the employment. . . ." Thus the model grows too big for the pen of the artist who is sketching him!

III

"A welfare worker from the Cornbelt," Sherwood calls his hero, "who tended to regard money, his own as well as other people's, as something to be spent as quickly as possible."

Under the New Deal, Hopkins directed the spending of some \$9 billion. Then he moved into lend-lease, where he played a deciding rôle in the manner of spending some \$60 billion! Once more, as in the fight with Ickes, he was in too much of a hurry to get the spending started to stop and consider fully what long-term value would be received, *i.e.*, to consider what kind of peace agreements would come from the spending.

When Hopkins flew to Moscow, he had only one idea: to find out what the Kremlin wanted and to give it as quickly as possible. "Mr. Hopkins is in Moscow," Roosevelt informed the astonished Stalin, "for discussions on how we can most expeditiously and effectively . . . render assistance to your country." Not a word about war aims! Nor about Stalin's disgorging his conquests in Poland, the Baltic countries and the Balkans, which he had just got by dividing Europe with Hitler. "I told him," Hopkins adds, "that my mission was not a diplomatic one in the sense that I did not propose to make *any formal*

understanding of any kind or character."

[My emphasis — B. D. W.]

Stalin was prepared for anything but this. Having tried to divide Europe with his brigand-partner and then been double-crossed, he fully expected to have to give up his booty and to change sides so far as programs and objectives were concerned, before he could get the aid he desperately needed in his struggle for survival. Especially aid from the United States, which was not even at war, for Hopkins' visit was a full five months before Pearl Harbor. A hard bargainer, he was not used to people with so little sense of political realities and power levers. "Even with its very life in danger," writes Sherwood, summarizing the uncomprehending Hopkins, "the Soviet government appeared to be more anxious to discuss future frontiers and spheres of influence than to negotiate for military supplies." But Hopkins and Roosevelt refused to be tempted!

When Stalin recovered from his astonishment, he asked for 20,000 anti-aircraft guns, a million rifles, and machine guns, planes, aluminum and high octane gas. Being pressed further he added trucks and tanks and jeeps, boots and food, and a billion dollars. Ultimately he received \$11 billion in lend-lease, without ever being asked to do anything but fight for his existence, in a fight forced upon him by Hitler. Naturally, with such "negotiators," he soon concluded that he could keep what he had gained from Hitler, and even enlarge upon it.

He alone seemed to realize that peace is the continuation of the war out of which it issues, and that, by the military and political decisions of the war itself, the peace was being made piecemeal. When Churchill finally woke up, a trifle late, and began to demand that the Anglo-American troops jump from North Africa to the Balkans, it was Hopkins and Roosevelt who preened themselves on blocking Churchill. So little did Hopkins, and so little does Sherwood, understand the meaning of this conflict over "strategy," that the word "Balkans" does not even figure in the index of this book. Yet the situation would be vastly changed today if we had gone into the Balkans instead of Sicily.

IV

How different was the attitude of Hopkins and Roosevelt towards Great Britain! With Churchill they kept making conditions and arguing over India and Egypt, colonies and trusteeships, Imperial Preference and post-war trade. To be sure, these were legitimate concerns, but not such a warrant giving them priority over the freedom of the lands to be liberated, which was the very heart of the war itself.

And the Roosevelt-Hopkins treatment of China is enough to move the thoughtful reader to tears. From these pages emerges a picture of neglect, under-estimation, miscalculation and blind folly. For ten years there was no aid because, to use Sher-

wood's own words, "we were attempting to appease Japan." Then no aid "because of distance," though we were pouring billions into distant Russia. Then because apologists for the Chinese Communists had persuaded our officials to withhold lend-lease as a means of forcing the Central Government to enter into what would have been a suicidal coalition with the Communists. And finally, because the appeasement of Russia had taken the place of the appeasement of Japan. "The awful demonstration of the difference between reality and promises," wrote T. V. Soong in desperation, "is underlined by the swiftness with which it is announced that deliveries of aircraft are being made to the Soviet Union. . . . I have now been in the United States over fourteen months pleading for planes. . . . In the fourteen months not a single plane." Sherwood portrays Hopkins as "deeply concerned" about this failure of ours to keep our promises. Yet, two years later, when Mme. Chiang adds her pleadings to those of Soong, Hopkins can think of nothing other than to urge Roosevelt "at least to see her" and let her "get everything off her chest. . . ."

v

The story of Hopkins and of Roosevelt comes to a climax in their meetings with Stalin and Churchill at Teheran and Yalta. Through Sherwood's apologetic pages obtrude the outlines of political unpreparedness, ineptness, and a callousness to the fate

of lesser allies that borders on outright betrayal.

At Teheran, Stalin showed that he had not, even then (this was at the end of 1943), lost his admiration for Hitler and his "methods."

He said that Hitler was a very able man.

He did not share the view of the President that Hitler was mentally unbalanced, and emphasized that only a very able man could accomplish what Hitler had done in solidifying the German people, whatever we thought of the methods. [Official Summary by State Department translator.]

Thus warned on how Stalin believed in "solidifying" the people or peoples over whom he might rule, his partners proceeded to give him ample scope to try out his "methods." Churchill implied that he would be glad to give away a slice of Turkey. Roosevelt, not to be outdone, handed out a generous portion of China. ("It was Roosevelt who mentioned the possibility that Russia might have access to the port of Dairen in Manchuria. . . . Stalin immediately expressed the opinion that the Chinese would object to this proposal, but Roosevelt said he thought they would agree to having Dairen made a free port under international guarantee.") Once more the surprised Stalin was not slow to take the hint. At Yalta he was ready to demand what at Teheran his dear allies — no less the allies of China — had so kindly suggested. "And then," continues Sherwood, "there was an agreement on the frontiers of Poland . . . with the evolve-

ment of a formula much like that which was eventually adopted." Here the "credit" goes not to Roosevelt but to Churchill!

Between Teheran and Yalta there occurred the four-day war between Russia and Bulgaria. It should have taught Roosevelt a lesson, but he was so preoccupied with keeping the story from the American people, lest it shock them into an awareness of the problems of an alliance with a totalitarian power in the shaping of the coming peace, that he drew no lessons himself. Sherwood still does not know the story, or does not care to tell it. "By October 1," he writes casually, "both Finland and Bulgaria had quit the Axis and the Red Army had occupied both countries." Not another word! Except that Churchill began to worry about the outlines of the peace, and Hopkins began to worry lest Churchill's talks with Stalin on this question might appear to represent also the thought of the United States.

Since the American people still do not know the story of Bulgaria's four-day war with Russia, it might well be summarized here. Until September 1944, Bulgaria was at war with the United States and England, but not with Russia. On September 2, it overthrew its pro-Hitler government. The new democratic government severed relations with Germany, offered unconditional surrender to England and the United States, and prepared a declaration of war on Germany. The Allies, as a matter of courtesy, notified their partner, Sta-

lin. On September 5, he declared war on Bulgaria, whereupon Bulgaria immediately asked him for peace terms, and the Red Army occupied Bulgaria. The men who had led the democratic resistance, Mushanov, Dimitrov, Petkov, have since been convicted and either escaped (Dimitrov) or been executed (Petkov). Thus, in September 1944, months before the Yalta Conference, Stalin showed in action what he meant "liberation," and by the "cooperation between the United Nations in setting up democratic governments."

VI

But at Yalta, in February 1945, Hopkins and Roosevelt again gloried in defeating Churchill's proposal for a military expedition across the Adriatic into the Balkans. Thus left without support, Churchill tried to bargain with Stalin as one imperialist trader with another: Poland in exchange for Greece, and share-and-share alike in Yugoslavia — all this without Poles, Greeks or Yugoslavs being represented at the conference. What happened to this deal is by now a matter of painful history.

It was Roosevelt, intent on getting Stalin into the war with Japan, who made the proposals for selling China down the river. "It is quite clear," writes Sherwood, "that even before Teheran, Roosevelt had been prepared to agree to . . . most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far East. . . . Roosevelt said that he would send an American officer to Chung-

king to inform Chiang Kai-shek of the agreements. Stalin insisted that these agreements be put in writing and that they contain the statement: 'The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.' Thus, without China being represented or consulted, Russia was brought into Manchuria, into Port Arthur and Dairen, and into Northern Korea; and thus the great flanking operation was begun which has, even as I write, resulted in the loss of Mongolia, all of Manchuria and North China, imperiling the very existence of the Chinese Central Government.

When Roosevelt ran for reelection he was not well. He returned from the wearying Yalta Conference a sick man indeed. Yet a few months more, and he was able to perceive, only too clearly, the terrible outlines of the coming peace, as it was shaping up in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Poland. On the last day of his life, he dispatched a famous warning to Churchill that England and the United States must be firm in their relations with Stalin. But his death left the sick-unto-death Harry Hopkins to make the last trip to Moscow alone on behalf of the still uninitiated Harry Truman. The account of those negotiations is too painful to bear retelling. Hopkins by now knew that the peace would be a "great headache," but he was no match for Stalin, and he possessed no power lever to use in a tug of war

with the most powerful ruler on earth.

That picture does more than all of Sherwood's analysis to answer the question which we posed at the beginning of this article.

Who was Harry Hopkins? He was the twentieth-century version of Jackson's kitchen cabinet. Linked to the President by their common element of physical infirmity, by his worshipful devotion, by his dedication to the New Deal, by a common unpreparedness for the working out of a foreign policy, he was the personal representative of a President who unconsciously drifted into the rôle of an undemocratic "Chief of State," secretly, privately and personally negotiating with two other Chiefs of State. "Churchill," says Sherwood naively, "was constantly reporting to and consulting the War Cabinet in London, addressing his communications to Clement Attlee . . . whereas Roosevelt was completely on his own." Unconsciously, Roosevelt fell into the trap of using the Russian *Vozhd's* (Leader's) method of negotiation. This guaranteed that Teheran and Yalta would be corrupted with secret agreements, that both political parties, and even our State Department, would be uninformed, that Truman would inherit a covert mess which only the dying Hopkins could conceivably uncover for him. And Hopkins himself was only partly informed, without legal political status, and virtually on his deathbed. Sherwood closes his book with a plea for the right of Presidents

to have "personal friends and advisers." This right is unquestioned, and given the enormous powers of our President, inescapable. But the duty to work with and through his State Department, the Senate, and, in times of "national unity," through the leadership of both parties, is no less inescapable. Many of the same mistakes might have been made, but it is the theory of democracy that in the long run collective wisdom, working through duly constituted institutions, is superior to the private and secret negotiations of a "Chief of State" working only with his own

personally selected admirers and private advisers.

As we close Sherwood's book, it is impossible not to admire the courage and loyalty of Harry Hopkins, the unselfishness with which a man always near death's threshold drove his exhausted body and spirit in the great enterprises of lend-lease, war planning and peace negotiations. But it is impossible not to conclude that Roosevelt-Hopkins negotiations with Stalin present a model of how the head of a state that would remain democratic should not negotiate with the head of a totalitarian state.

AFTER READING AN AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF A SAINT

BY CHARLES ANGOFF


The learned pharisee has spoken
And once again embalmed the good saint
For show and safe-keeping in the gilded halls of orthodoxy.

High priests chant the name
Of the lowly one who would not be of their kind;
Embroidered linen and ermine,
Incense and the sound of chimes
Surround the patient bones of him
Whose church was the desert,
Whose only hymns were the hush of the forest
And the sweet babble of children and birds,
And whose only God was
The glorious mystery in them and the most distant star.

Lepers, paupers, and all those heavy-laden,
Behold the blasphemy upon your lonely saint!

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POLITICS AND FICTION IN MEXICO

by *BERTRAM D. WOLFE*

WHAT the Mexicans call "The Revolution" began in 1910 without a conscious program, as a culmination of countless grievances and types of opposition to the three-decade-long dictatorship of President Porfirio Díaz. What began in 1910 as a mere renovating outbreak to make way for youth and end perpetual reelection, loosed obscure forces that could not be contained again or given fulfillment during the next 40 years. The Revolution is still going on, trying to work out its program and come to self-understanding. Those who would fully understand it in its aspirations, elemental flareups, raw violence, perennial hope and perennial betrayal, can find no better guide than the Mexican novel.

From the outset, painters laid aside their brushes and writers their pens to enter the fray. Being artists, they continued to observe what went on around them with a deeper vision than other men. Some of the writers

put their pens to military-political use, served as literary aides-de-camp of the various guerrilla chieftains, sought to give program and meaning to the formless struggle, adapt the prevailing ideologies of our day to the Mexican scale and scene, voice the inarticulate hopes of the peons and peasants who made up all the armies. These writers meant every large and shining word they put into their manifestoes and programs. That earnest sincerity eventually gave the best of them a standard of comparison between their dreams and the recalcitrant realities, and their habit of organizing their impressions against a background of strongly felt values made them aware sooner or later of the fact that "the revolution" has not necessarily triumphed because "the men of the revolution" have won the perquisites of place and power.

Guerrilla warfare and civil war — region against region, tribe against tribe, band against band, family against family, brother against brother — are a brutal and terrible business at best. The "Federals" raid the village and carry off the cattle,

the chickens, the able-bodied men, the nubile girls; and then the "Revolutionists" come and "liberate" the town, consuming and carrying off whatever crops, cattle, men and girls may have escaped the vigilance of the "Federals." The place changes hands a third and a fourth time, until it is swept cleaner than a wheat field by a locust plague. All this is intensified by the natural poverty of an arid land, by the breakdown of all restraints and standards save the standard of force and temporary possession, and by a deep cult of violence and death in the Mexican makeup.

The *caudillos* (chieftains, bosses, leaders, heads of military bands), lacking as they did any clear or deep-rooted philosophy of society and government, were easily seduced by the privileges of power into believing that the "revolution was the government" and the government the revolution — as soon as their side had triumphed. As "generals" in the field they had "confiscated" enemy property, made forced levies upon those who had goods or money, issued new-printed pesos over their own signatures, provisioned armies with whatever they found in their paths, acquired estates for themselves and their followers by "agrarian expropriation," carried off everything movable.

As victors, these same *caudillos* had their self-designated generalships confirmed, their confiscations legalized, acquired governorships, cabinet posts, presidencies, prestige, laurels,

power and wealth. Many of the writers, especially those who entered into the battle of words when the battle of the camps was nearly at an end, were carried along into the new bureaucracy as state-designated labor leaders and political leaders, as congressmen, senators, heads of civilian departments like education, hangers-on and subsidized propagandists for the real wielders of power. But the only indispensable virtue of the artist, sincerity to the truth of his own vision, caused many of these, too, to forfeit their privileges and comfortable stipends, in a land where no man can make a living by creative writing alone, for the sake of setting down truthfully what they had felt and seen and experienced. Others were freed from their silver chains by the whirling buzz saw of Mexican political fortune, and, after beginning by telling the truth concerning the *caudillo* who had replaced their own chieftain, ended by telling the truth about their own camp and the whole sweep of events. It is at least poetic justice to be able to record that the time-servers, and those skilled in holding on despite change of régime, have not in general been able to write any of the good books that have come out of the Mexican Revolution.

II

Of all the guerrilla chieftains, the fascinating and alternately attractive and repelling figure of Pancho Villa made the greatest appeal to intellec-

tuals. His audacious and stormy career, his spectacular victories, his humble outlaw origin and deeds of Robin Hood largess, his ferocious animal cruelty, his loyalty to men nobler than himself, his touching humility before the unfathomable problems of power, his baiting of the Yankees to the North, his martyr's death in treacherous ambush, seem made to order for the hero of a Mexican folk ballad. Social illiteracy, orgies, sporadic cruelty did not make his figure less attractive to Mexican men of letters. Martín Luis Guzmán, one of Mexico's greatest prose writers and today the editor of *Tiempo*, made his reputation as the novelist-laureate of Pancho Villa's life and miraculous deeds. With a mixture of fascination and fear, Guzmán served for a time as Villa's "Secretary" in the field. ("We were fleeing from Victoriano Huerta, the traitor, the assassin, and we were going by the very force of life and all that was most generous in it, to fall in with Pancho Villa, whose soul was not so much a man's as a jaguar's, a jaguar at the moment tamed to our purposes, what we believed to be our purposes, a jaguar over whose flank we passed a caressing hand, trembling lest he thrust into it his claws.") Out of this experience he produced two of the masterpieces of the literature of the Revolution, the story of his own life in those storm-tossed years and the story of the life of Pancho Villa.

The first, *El Aguila y la Serpiente*

(1928), translated into English as *The Eagle and the Serpent* (1930), is true autobiography: what happened to Guzmán and his friends after he joined and tried to make sense out of, or give direction to, the blind events of the Revolution. Pancho Villa is at once the hero and the anti-hero. The story is told with a novelist's skill for plot structure and selection of representative detail, and a novelist's talent for bringing men, scenes, events, motives and meanings to life. Its real theme is "the tragedy of the Revolution: the moral impossibility not to be with the Revolution and the material and psychological impossibility of attaining by means of it the aims which it set for itself." It has in it the smell and crepuscular melancholy of the Mexican plateau, "the silence that grows out of the barking of dogs and the distant sadness of muted yet audible singing." It is filled with savagely exact characterizations of chieftains and generals, with scenes of impulsive cruelty and impulsive generosity, with battles, plundering, abductions, executions. No one who has read it can ever forget such episodes as Pancho Villa at the telegraph office, repentantly trying to get the telegrapher to cancel after lunch the orders to execute captives that he had issued before eating. Or of his aide, Rodolfo Fierro, giving 300 prisoners a chance to run to a fence and jump over it — to safety — while he, single-handed, with an assistant to reload his revolvers, kills each fleeing man before

he reaches the barrier. Or the picture of his men "kindled by the racket of the firing, the accuracy of Fierro's marksmanship, the lamentations and frenzied actions of the dying, greeting with shouts of joy the spinning of the bodies as they fell, shouting, roaring, gesticulating with laughter as they fired at the heaps of human flesh wherever they noted the least sign of continued life."

Guzmán's other work on Villa is offered in the guise of an autobiography of the chieftain himself: *Las Memorias de Pancho Villa, Según el Texto Establecido y Ordenado por Martín Luis Guzmán* (*The Memoirs of Pancho Villa, According to the Text Established and Arranged by Martín Luis Guzmán*). It is a novelized or imaginary autobiography in which the Villa he knew so well recounts the story of his own life and apologia therefor in such language as he might well have used if he had lived to dictate his memoirs to his one-time literary aide-de-camp. When finished it will be a six-volume work, of which four volumes have already been published, and is likely to compete with *The Eagle and the Serpent* for the place of Guzmán's masterpiece.

In between his labors on the life and deeds of Pancho Villa, Guzmán turned his attention from the military encampment to the presidential palace and corridors of the Chamber of Deputies, for a close-up of the "men of the Revolution" after they reached the precarious summits of power. His *La Sombra del Caudillo* (*The Shadow*

of the Chief) is a vivid and terrifying account of political intrigue, demagoguery, treachery, disloyalty, ambush and assassination: a behind-the-scenes picture of a presidential "election."

As in the other works, it is difficult to say where history leaves off and novel begins, for it is a novelized version of an actual "election" of the late twenties, so thinly disguised that it is impossible for the Mexican reader to keep the real names of the personages out of his mind as he reads. In it are revealed the mysterious and quivering springs of Mexican politics: the scarcely-tamed bandits turned governors and political apostles; the mouth-filling revolutionary slogans and party labels with no social content behind them; the "laborites," "agrarians," "progressives" and "revolutionaries" who devote their words to the masses and their deeds to the pursuit of their own interests; the politician-orator who has never been able to say four words together even in the privacy of his own home, or of a brothel, except in the tone and with the bearing of an orator; the generals who pledge themselves in strict confidence to both rival chieftains at once, while they continue to measure the time to jump and the advantages accruing from betraying one or the other of the two candidates they daily embrace; the voice of the crowd and the street, cynical, skeptical, malicious, which spreads rumors, stirs ambitions, plays on weaknesses, arouses passions, speculating all the

while on the pleasurable prospect of witnessing a bloody and thrilling spectacle, akin to that of the bull-fighter finishing off the bull.

III

If *The Shadow of the Caudillo* shows the Revolution as it looks from the summits of power and *The Eagle and the Serpent* shows it as seen from the stage point of leadership in the field, it is to Mariano Azuela's *Los de Abajo*, 1916 (translated as *The Underdogs*, 1929), that we must turn for a picture of the Revolution as it looked to the obscure local leaders and the fighting, suffering anonymous rank and file, who came from the depths of Mexican society. This series of intermittent struggles of over three decades plowed up the depths of peasant, peon and Indian society, appealed to the down-trodden illiterate mass who supplied the troops of all bands, intoxicated them with promises not really meant and often not fully realizable without a long prior course of economic, political, social and cultural transformation. To the lowly and the humble the Revolution was a release from enforced humility, a chance placed in the hand, a chance to "plunder the plunderers," an escape from simple, monotonous and unrewarding toil to stirring adventure, and a comradeship of danger and death in the field that was to the Mexican temperament as exciting as an endless fiesta. But even the wildest and most intoxicating fiesta palls in time. What began as a bitter hatred and a flaming

hope degenerated into a senseless marching and counter-marching, advancing and fleeing, starving and surfeiting, killing and being killed, for a succession of victorious leaders who were quick to forget the humble on whose backs they had climbed to power. Mexican family ties are notoriously loose and there were women to be had everywhere on the route of march, but sometime a man wanted a home and children, a piece of land to settle down on with dog and horse and rifle, a settled, stable and dignified existence, a chance to live the new way of life that the Revolution perpetually promised and perpetually used as tocsin to sound the cry of betrayal and summon anew into the field. In lean, nervous, staccato prose, in campfire-lit flashes and gunfire-lit charges and flights, a prose as stark and episodic and violent as the deeds it portrays, Mariano Azuela, military surgeon turned novelist, records the scenes of battle, march, camp, deserted and gutted home. The terrible power of the account is heightened by the Homeric impartiality and tight restraint, which forces the reader to react with the greater intensity because the author has held his own feelings back. Sacrifice and suffering, death and debauchery, anguish and orgy, heroism and hope, bewilderment and violence and despair succeed each other through the pages of this, the Revolution's outstanding masterpiece and true image. Its very inconclusiveness is the inconclusiveness of the Revolution itself, which

could destroy and raze and sweep away but so far has been unable to build the new life with the promise of which it summoned the lowly to leave the narrow circle of their common days. Through it all rings the unanswered question: *What for?* The hero is not an individual but, as in so many revolutionary novels, the entire folk.

IV

One of the undoubted achievements of the Mexican Revolution has been the gradual, sporadic, but ever more substantial redistribution of the land. This, and the accompanying cult of the redemption of the Indian at the bottom of the social pyramid, has represented not a step towards a socialist or post-capitalist society but rather a reversion to primitive, pre-conquest subsistence agriculture. In time this reversal may well lead to a new fusion of the Iberian and Indian culture strains and a greater well-being and power over his own destiny for the tiller of the soil. But how has this great, uncompleted and unintegrated reform worked out so far in practice? Here, too, the novel gives a disturbing but truthful answer. In the thirties, with the active civil war a romanticized, receding memory, we can watch the growing disillusion of the younger novelists.

Thus, Gregorio López y Fuentes's novel of Zapata's rebellion, *Tierra* (*Land*, 1933), ends with the assassination of Zapata (which took place in 1919). But the Indians still possess the

land they have seized and their buried rifles to protect it. To them Zapata is living still and will return to lead them in time of need, so that the novel closes on a note of hope. Two years later the novelist jumps a decade to examine the fate of the "redeemed" Indian in his own time. *El Indio*, 1935 (translated into English with the same title in 1942) is a frightening picture of exploitation and betrayal by politicians who rise to power with promises of redemption on their lips.

The same theme is handled with still greater power by Mauricio Magdaleno in his *Resplandor*, 1937 (translated into English as *Sunburst*, 1944). Again the protagonist is not an individual but a community, a wretched, pestilential handful of huts of Otomi Indians on a barren, highland slope. Its personages are members of "a race sick from centuries of humiliation and bitterness," a village which has learned to circumscribe suffering only by narrowing the horizon of expectation. Centuries have passed over this mangy village, régimes have come and gone, battles been fought with its inhabitants as cannon fodder and pitiful prize. Of late, bad has become worse, thanks to the destructive phase of the revolution and the ravages of cumulative degradation. The great estate in the bottom lands that exploited these humble peons has closed down since its owner was slain in a revolutionary foray; the eroded upland barren has ceased to bear at all, poisoned by outcropping lime; the

very lime has ceased to fetch a price and the reptiles and birds which might have been spared have sought less inhospitable places. Even God is leaving, for the parish priest can no longer endure the spectacle of misery and continue to preach resignation. All that remains are fragments of broken-down Indian superstitions, which, though a succession of signs and omens nourish the sudden sunburst of hope, prime mover of the tragic events of the novel. An orphan boy from their village, taken away by a "revolutionary" governor to get an education, now according to the voice of rumor and the signs of witchcraft, is about to return as their redeemer. His visit as gubernatorial candidate is a veritable festival of rejoicing. From their lack they scrape together the means for a reception such as they might give to their patron Saint Andrew himself if he were to visit their village. They sacrifice, to the candidate's casual lust the most beautiful of their maidens, the witch doctor poisoning her betrothed to safeguard the life of their Redeemer. From his demagogic speeches they glean that the rich bottom lands will become theirs and that he will build them a dam to banish sterility and starvation forever. But the old estate is reopened as an "experimental station," the overseer reappears in the guise of a revolutionary bureaucrat managing the station, the *hacienda* commissary once more binds them in debt peonage in the form of "cooperative credits," the old servile labors are extracted

without even the old miserable compensation since "now they are working for themselves and for their future." Tyranny is even greater than of old because henceforth it will operate in their own name. Still they cling to the desperate hope that it is the local tyrants and not the Governor, "their Governor!" When at last they comprehend the full depths of their betrayal and essay a pathetic rebellion, an avalanche of punitive cruelty descends upon them to teach them their place in "the new order." Dumbly they watch at the end while the Governor selects one of their children once more to go to the city to be educated so that he may be their "Redeemer."

It has remained for a woman novelist, Magdalena Mondragón, to write the parable of the present ebb-phase of the Mexican Revolution in *Yo como Pobre* (translated as *Some Day the Dream*, 1947). This is at once the most unusual and the most Mexican of Mexican novels of the Revolution, in its episodes, in its approach to life, to sex, to politics, to civic corruption, to Mexico itself, and, above all, to death. Its protagonist is a community of sorts, a group of people born and raised on the edge of Mexico City's outlying garbage dumps. They subsist and procreate in crude huts of mud and salvaged tin, surrounded by unwholesome vapors and refuse. They make their living by rushing to each cart as it discharges its detritus, to sort therefrom bits of rag, metal, paper,

partly rotted foodstuffs, which they use or sell. Their efforts to earn a living during the rainy season, when the refuse is too soggy to yield much, carries them into the city itself, as street sweepers, garbage collectors, prostitutes, beggars. Their dream — a government subsidy for a cooperative for the commercial exploitation of the city's wastes — takes them into trade unionism, cooperation, politics, which prove to be other forms of waste and corruption. An occasional windfall gives them entry into cheap dance halls, sidewalk "restaurants," cantinas, lockups, hospitals, morgues. An epidemic among their sickly children brings sanitary authorities and clergy to their dump, and culminates in their collective celebration of the greatest of Mexico's fiestas, joining death and revelry.

Thus all of Mexican life is reviewed in a fierce parable in which Mexico itself, the city this time, not the countryside, is a wasteland and abode of stinking corruption. Life is sustained only by the animal will to exist, by pitiful dreams, flashes of hope amidst hopelessness, gleams of sentiment, solid bonds of love, pity, charity. But always the corruption, by its sheer cumulative weight and ubiquity, overwhelms everything, except the determination of these dwellers in the wasteland to cling to life to the end and to celebrate death with the proper joyousness. There is a continuous strain of poetry and there are

moments of wayward beauty in this novel, even as the ravine of the La Morena dump sprouts wildflowers amidst the refuse. The poetic feeling embraces the rare, the absurd, the shocking, the iridescent sheen on the surface of corruption, the violence and cruelty and death that are at the heart of life.

The reader will make a mistake if he lets himself be repelled by maggots in the first line or the vultures perched on roses that adorn the jacket. For along with the stark poverty in its original title and the corruption which is symbolized by its setting, the "dream" of the translated title is in it too; even as, in the very bitterness of the indictment, one can sense the author's love for her land and her people.

Indeed, it is the real source of passion in all these novels. If the reader will read those available in English translation — *The Eagle and the Serpent*; *The Underdogs*; *El Indio*; *Sunburst*; *Some Day the Dream* — he will get a truer picture of the Mexican Revolution than from all the reportorial books and sociological studies that have been published on it. This is the deeper insight. And, if the verdict of the Mexican novel on the present state of the Mexican Revolution seems gloomy and bitter, it is not cynical or utterly despairing, for it is set down with honesty and supported by the unstated premise of a still-living hope.

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intolerable: U S immigration statistics confirm his picture. It may be that fundamentally Russians and Americans are too alike to accept each other's rival solutions to the problem of human and social relations. Both peoples are historically pioneers, frontiersmen, restless and anarchic individualists; but they have chosen diametrically opposite ways of harmonizing their instincts to the life of a community - the Americans by allowing them to cancel out in free play, the Russians by enslaving themselves to mass tyranny. These speculations carry the argument unwarrantably further away still from Mr Burnham's book, but they suggest at least one heartening conclusion. It is that insofar as the prospect of destroying Soviet tyranny rests in understanding the minds of its principal masters and victims to-day the Americans are the most naturally qualified people to achieve it.

MARX ON THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Bertram D. Wolfe

In the Soviet Union there are four avowedly Synoptic Gospels: the words of the Master Marx, and the commentaries of the Three Apostles, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. By virtue of a Quarternian Mystery, the four are one and besides them there is none. All cumulative experience, all recorded history, all the scientific investigations of a half century, or a cycle of centuries, in Genetics or Philology or Music, can be whisked away in the thunderclap from a single quotation from any one of the four, or buried under a hail of quotations from all four at once.

Where all utterances large and small, profound or casual, serious or jesting, ill-tempered, sanguine or dyspeptic, are alike erected into a sacred canon, quotations can be found to fit any need, annihilate any questioner, and, the day after tomorrow, prove the reverse of what was proved today. This quotational shock treatment and chain reaction, once started, can no longer be stopped. One quotation calls for another, until the Scripture is gradually reduced to a rubble of fragmentary texts bearing little or no relation to the original structure of thought. There is a curious hide-and-seek censorship in which one utterance is roared into the public's unresisting ear while another utterance is carefully concealed as if it did not exist.

In recent years, the years of the late Stalinist dispensation, there is a whole body of Marx's writings which is buried many feet below the level of the embalmed body of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. This body of the sacred text is literally never unwrapped or exhibited for public contemplation or veneration. For all practical purposes it has been expurgated and its author posthumously purged, for it deals with Russian aggressive expansion over Europe and Asia, with Russian 'Asiatic backwardness and bar-

barism', with the aggressive imperialist nature of Panslavism, with the threat to democracy and socialism that comes from the spread of Russian absolutist state institutions and Russian imperial power. Instead of citing them, explaining them, or explaining them away, the Fourth, and by his own admission, the greatest of the Four Apostles, has preferred to bury them twelve feet or more under the earth.

As a historian of the Russian Revolution, I have increasingly been forced to adopt the 'archæological' method to excavate the true outlines of an event or an idea from under the debris of quotations, falsifications and apologetics. Knowing that Lenin was in the habit of 'consulting with Marx', as Krupskaya has reported, wherever a new situation required him to do some new thinking or dig up some new quotations, I thought it might be useful to follow the Leninist method in order to see what Marx might have to say that would seem apposite to the problems of Turkey and Russia, Iran, the Dardanelles, the Truman Plan. I had barely scratched the surface of Marx's letters to Engels and Marx's and Engels's jointly written articles (signed by Marx alone) for the *New York Tribune*, when I found that there were whole arcana of Marxian utterances on these subjects - on each and every one of them, from the Dardanelles to the Truman Plan.

Marx on the Dardanelles.

The Dardanelles [wrote Marx in the *New York Tribune* of April 12, 1853] are from the nature of their locality even more important than Gibraltar . . . The narrowness of the strait is such that a few properly erected and well-armed fortifications, such as Russia once in possession would not tarry to erect, might defy the combined fleets of the world. . . . In that case the Black Sea would be more properly a Russian lake than even the Lake of Ladoga, situated in its very heart. The resistance of the Caucasians would be starved out at once; Trebizond would be a Russian port; the Danube a Russian river. . . . When Constantinople is taken the Turkish empire is cut in two . . . Macedonia, Thessaly, Albania, outflanked and cut off from the main body, will not put the conquerer to the trouble of subduing them; they will have nothing left but to beg for mercy and for an army to maintain internal order.

But, having come thus far on the way to universal empire, is it probable that this gigantic and swollen power will pause in its career? . . . With Constantinople she stands on the threshold of the Mediterranean; with Durazzo and the Albanian Coast she is in the very centre of the Adriatic . . . Flanking the Austrian dominions on the north, east and south, Russia will count the Habsburgs [i.e. Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.- BDW] as her vassals. . . . The broken and undulating Western frontier of the Empire, ill-defined in respect to natural boundaries, would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Dantzic, or perhaps Stettin, to Trieste. As sure as conquest follows conquest and annexation annexation, so sure would the conquest by Russia be only the prelude for the annexation of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and for the ultimate realization of the Slavonic Empire which certain fanatical Panslavistic philosophers have dreamed of . . .

But let Russia get possession of Turkey and her strength is increased nearly half, and she becomes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such an event would be an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary cause. The maintenance of Turkish independence, or, in the case of the possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the arrest of the Russian scheme of annexation, is a matter of the highest moment. In this instance, the interest of the revolutionary democracy and of England go hand in hand. Neither can permit the Tsar to make Constantinople one of his capitals, and we shall find that, driven to the wall, the one will resist him as determinedly as the other.

So, too, I found in Marx's correspondence to the *New York Tribune* warnings about 'hundreds of Russian agents perambulating Turkey and the Balkans'; about the use Russia was making of the Eastern Orthodox Church and clergy; the imperialist use she was making of Panslavist ideology 'to unite all branches of the great Slav race under one sceptre and to make them the ruling race of Europe'; her use of 'insurrections more or less directly urged on by Russian gold and Russian influence'; Russia's ability to work out a 'well-defined Eastern policy' while the Western powers 'grope in the dark' because Russia herself is semi-Asiatic 'in her condition, manners, traditions and institutions'. And Marx has discovered, no less, the germs of the new rule for the Balkans which makes loyalty to Russia the test of loyalty and treason to Russia the test of treason. Of Prince Menshikov, the Molotov or Vyshinsky of his day, Marx writes in the *Tribune* of June 9th, 1853:

What Prince Menshikov now demands is ... that the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as the Metropolitan Archbishops [throughout the Balkans - BDW] shall be immovable, unless proved guilty of high treason - against the Russians! - and then only upon the consent of the Tsar ...

We did not start this game of quotations, but since more than one can play at it, it would not be hard for Tito either to find a veritable atom bomb of quotations in these pages to blast Stalinism by quotation shock treatment out of the tabernacle where the sacred writings are kept.

Almost one hundred years ago, it would seem from his news letters, Marx had discovered what is in its present phase known as 'the cold war', namely that glacial expansion of the Russian state over Europe and Asia by a combination of penetration, invasion, puppetry, insurrection, and the activity of its agents in every land. Marx felt that if this autocratic regime continued to spread, democracy, socialism, and Western civilization were alike doomed. But he did not have too high an opinion of Western diplomacy and Western resistance. In the bourgeois camp of free-trade England he found appeasers. He was unsparing in his irony concerning the ease with which particularly Englishmen and English news-

papers were taken in by mere professions of peace by a dictator bent upon seizing as cheaply as possible the fruits of war.

In all essential points [he wrote in the *Tribune* of April 19th, 1853] Russia has steadily, one after another, gained her ends thanks to the ignorance, dullness, and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of the Western Governments.

No pacifist, Marx looked with disdain upon the peace-at-any-price camp in the West:

One thing must be evident at least [he wrote], that it is the stockjobbers and the peace-mongering bourgeoisie, represented in the British government by the oligarchy, who surrender Europe to Russia, and that in order to resist the encroachments of the Tsar we must above all overthrow the inglorious Empire of those mean, cringing and infamous adorers of the golden calf.

What scorn Marx directed towards the fatuous optimism of the London *Times* concerning the peaceful intentions of the Autocrat:

The Tsar has declared for peace [*The Times* is happy to state . . .]. The Tsar has expressed 'pacific' sentiments by his own lips . . . He will allow the other powers to occupy themselves with conferences provided they allow him meanwhile to occupy the principalities . . . (*Tribune*, October 4th, 1853). How does it happen [he had written four months earlier] that the poor *Times* believed in the 'good faith' of Russia towards Turkey and her 'antipathy' against all aggrandizement? Peter proposed to raise himself on the ruins of Turkey. Catherine proposed dismemberment . . . Nicholas, more moderate, only demands the *exclusive protectorate* of Turkey. [Now extended to the exclusive protectorate of all the 'People's Democracies' - B D W]. Mankind will not forget that Russia was the *protector* of Poland, the *protector* of the Crimea, the *protector* of Courland [The Baltic Provinces - B D W], the *protector* of Georgia, Mengrelia, the Circassian and Caucasian tribes. And now Russia the protector of Turkey!

As to Russia's lip service to anti-imperialism and its declared 'antipathy to aggrandizement,' Marx offered in the same article:

the following facts from a mass of the acquisitions of Russia since Peter the Great. The Russian frontier has advanced:

Toward Berlin, Dresden and Vienna about . . .	700 miles
Toward Constantinople	500 miles
Toward Stockholm	630 miles
Toward Teheran	1,000 miles

Of course, poor Marx is out of date, and the reader will have to add the additional mileages in each of the above directions and the mileage toward Hong Kong and India that stretches across two continents.

And, of course, 'conditions have changed' since Marx's day. One would have to note that Russia has since had a revolution which made its effete empire into a new, dynamic and energetic state machine; that the revolution grew into a counter revolution, and that the state which was to wither away became the total state. One would have to note that the

third of the Four Apostles, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, seized power under the sign of anti-imperialism, renouncing Russia's claims to Poland and the Baltic Nations, to the Balkans and the Dardanelles, to Northern Persia, Manchuria and the lands traversed by the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

The Provisional Government [Lenin wrote indignantly in July 1917] has not ever published the secret treaties of a frankly predatory character, concerning the partitioning of Persia, the robbing of China, of Turkey, the annexation of East Prussia, etc. . . . It has confirmed these treaties concluded by Tsarism, which for several centuries has robbed and oppressed more peoples than all other tyrants and despots together . . . disgracing and demoralizing the Great-Russian people by transforming them into an executioner of other peoples.

Yes, times have changed, and are changing still even as I write. The now not-so-provisional government of the Fourth and Greatest Apostle is bent once more on the 'partitioning of Persia, the robbing of China, of Turkey, the annexation of East Prussia, etc.', and 'is disgracing once more the Great-Russian people and demoralizing them by transforming them into an executioner of other peoples.' Times have changed so much since Lenin wrote his 'Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism,' that it would not be amiss for a Fifth Disciple to arise to write a new work to be entitled: 'Imperialism, the Final Stage of Communism.'

All I have sought here is to rescue from undeserved purge and oblivion some of the earnest words of the First of the Apostles and the Founder of the Faith. A quotation from Marx, in Russia, is supposed to be enough to settle anything, to make or break a theory, a proposal or a man. Am I stretching things when I suggest that the author of this now sacred text loved freedom and hated tyranny; believed deeply in democracy, political, economic and social; feared and opposed bureaucracy and slavery and personal, arbitrary rule; cherished all that was best in Western civilization and wished to build upon and enlarge it, not undermine and destroy it; feared the glacial spread of the even then too brutal, too dynamic and too total Russian Empire and insisted that it could and must be contained or both democracy and socialism would be lost.

If at the outset [Marx wrote in the *Tribune* of December 30th, 1853] they (the Western Governments) had used a manly style of language, adequate to the position they hold, and the pretensions they set up before the world, if they had proved that bluster and swagger could not impose on them, the Autocrat would not only have refrained from attempting it, but would have entertained for them a very different feeling from the contempt which must now animate his bosom. At that time, to show that they seriously meant to preserve Turkey intact, and were ready to back up their intention with fleets and armies, was the sure means of maintaining peace.

Could it be that Harry Truman was reading the unexpurgated Marx when he penned the Truman Doctrine?

Or that Karl Marx was anticipating the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine when he wrote:

It is cheering to see the American intervention in Europe beginning just with the Eastern question. Besides the commercial and military importance resulting from the situation of Constantinople, there are other important considerations making its possession the hotly controverted and permanent subject of dispute between the East and the West - and America is the youngest and most vigorous representative of the West. (*Tribune*, August 12th, 1853).

Whatever we make of these quotations, this much at least is clear, that Marx does not belong to the 'peace camp' of the aggressively expanding total state, nor to the concentration camp system that accompanies its expansion. His voice is stifled and his writings purged and perverted in the land that professes to worship him. When such words can be freely printed in Russia again, then mankind will know that Russia is then more free. In the meanwhile, a closing prophecy from Marx, the chief of the Apostles:

With a worthier and more equal social status, with the abolition of caste and privilege, with free political institutions, unfettered industry, and emancipated thought, the people of the West will rise again to power and unity of purpose, while the Russian Colossus itself will be shattered by the progress of the masses and the explosive force of ideas. There is no reason to fear the conquest of Europe by the Cossacks. The very divisions and apparent weaknesses which would seem to render such an event easy, are the sure pledge of its impossibility.

GRAHAM GREENE: II. THE LATER NOVELS

Derek Traversi

With the publication of *Brighton Rock* in 1936 the problems behind all Graham Greene's writings are, for an attentive reader, sufficiently defined. The main concern of his later novels is the attempt to resolve these problems, themselves the product of barely definable personal tensions, through their relation to objective religious beliefs. The introduction of these beliefs, however, though presented as a solution to the author's difficulties, raises in turn a further problem of its own: the problem of the relationship in a work of art between subjective experience and objective belief. This relationship is necessarily double in its nature and implications. Whilst it is true that the possession of such belief offers the artist a possible means of transcending the closed circle of his own subjective impressions, it is equally true that it is only through these impres-

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OPERATION REWRITE

THE AGONY OF SOVIET HISTORIANS

By Bertram D. Wolfe

FOR over two decades, Soviet historiography has been in steadily deepening crisis. Histories succeed each other as if they were being consumed by a giant chain smoker who lights the first volume of the new work with the last of the old. Historians appear, disappear and reappear; others vanish without a trace.

Originally, only party history was subject to rigid prescription. Then Soviet history was added. Latterly, the area of command performance and commanded conclusions has spread outward to America and Asia and the wastes of Antarctica, backward to the Middle Ages, to Byzantium, to the shadowy origins of the Slavs and the pre-dawn of the Kievan state, to China's earliest culture. One day a given statement of events or interpretation is obligatory. The next it is condemned in words which seem to portend the doom of the historian who faithfully carried out his instructions. If it is a pronouncement of Stalin which he is following, all the more severely must he condemn himself—of course, without involving the Leader in his "self-criticism."

Often the central personages of an event become *unpersons*, as if they had never existed. The Civil War must now be rewritten as if there never had been a War Commissar named Leon Trotsky. The Soviet theatre, once the subject of so many histories, is historyless once more, until somebody contrives to write a new version without a trace of the great innovator-director, Vsevolod Meierhold. On February 15, 1951, *Pravda* accomplished the feat of "commemorating" the tenth anniversary of the Eighteenth Party Conference, in which Voznesensky delivered the main report, without so much as mentioning the name of the reporter!

Today the Balkarians are missing from Volume "B" of the new edition of the "Great Encyclopedia;" the Volga Germans have become an *unpeople*; and the Crimean Tartars, having been expelled from their centuries-old home to a region under the Arctic Circle, have had the place names of their former habitations extirpated, and are now being subjected to the shrinking of their

historical rôle in the Crimea to the point where they are gradually becoming an *unpeople*, too.¹

During the past spring even objects began to become *unobjects*, as *Pravda* and the regional press from February to May reported a grim and thoroughgoing purge of scores of local and national museums all the way from Lithuania to Kazakhstan. The Lithuanian museums were rebuked for failing to show the influence of Great Russian culture and the struggles and longings of their peoples for the extinction of their independence, while the Kazakh museums were condemned for the nostalgic splendor of their daggers, guns, harnesses, bridal costumes, and for failing to display any objects showing Great Russia's civilizing influence and the "progressive" character of her annexation of Kazakhstan.

It would require many volumes to give an account of this continual retroactive rewriting of history. The present article aims to give some notion of the scope of this vast *operation palimpsest*, to seek the "line," or rather some of the fragmentary and frequently contradictory lines, discernible in the revisions; to seek the reasons, or a rationale, for what seems to contain an element of the personal and irrational as well; and to ask what these tamperings with the historical record portend concerning the present and immediate future intentions of the régime. History has become a "weapon," an arm of propaganda, the essential function of which is the justification of the changing policies of the Soviet Government through reference to the "facts" and "documents" of the past. The penchant for making every change in foreign relations or domestic policy historically retroactive serves as a vast though distorting glass through which the observer may see these policy changes magnified. It is that which makes *Voprosy istorii* (*Questions of History*) undoubtedly the most interesting and revealing of all present-day Soviet publications.

Macaulay once said that his idea of hell would be to have to listen to fiends endlessly misquoting history and be unable to correct them. But in the Soviet Union, the historian himself must do the misquoting. His own point of view is neither consulted, nor, except by the accident of coincidence with the line of the moment, ever likely to find expression. The textbook writers and lecturers under the limited absolutism of the last Tsars could easily be identified as liberal and democratic, as in the case of a

¹ Cf. *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, June 4, 1952.

Platonov, or as conservative and monarchical, as in the case of an Ilovaisky, or as Marxist, as in the case of a Pokrovsky. But under total state absolutism, history, as all of culture, has been "nationalized" and there are no individual viewpoints or private judgments or pluralistic approaches. Tarlé, specialist on Napoleon, is ordered to rewrite his principal work in such fashion as to "prove" that Napoleon himself burned Moscow (no doubt to make it untenable as his winter quarters!). The liberal-democratic Vipper, who first wrote on Ivan the Terrible in the early years of the century, is charged with bringing his book of 1922 "up-to-date" and glorifying the protagonist.

From my experience as a student at Moscow University in 1939-41 [writes S. V. Utechin] I know that the late Professors K. V. Bazilevich and S. V. Bakhrushkin held a negative attitude towards the present régime. Yet in their volumes we find no traces of views different from those professed by Stalin. Thus the personal political opinions of the authors do not necessarily coincide with, and may even be contrary to, the views expressed in their books. These reflect not their political biases . . . but their understanding of the party line.³

As the great editing process embraces more and more of the remote corners of the earth and earliest past, there are no longer safe and neutral topics. Nor does the historian enjoy the right to pick his period and theme, nor the right of silence where he cannot in good conscience speak. As in music the politician-critic or the Supreme Critic in the Politburo tells the composers what and how and in what style to compose, so in history. *Voprosy istorii* bristles with menacing strictures upon historians for picking remote, neutral, sharply delimited or apolitical subjects; for neglecting fields which have been given priority in Party directives and the Historical Plan, for drawing their own conclusions or failing to find in the materials the conclusions predetermined for them.

It is suggestive both of the hazards in the field and the real feelings of the historians that, despite urgings, dangled prizes and repeated threats, no one has yet been found to complete a single volume or a single serious article in the field of the history of the Party and the régime, though Stalin himself first suggested it in 1931, has ordered it at regular intervals since, and forced it into the place of top priority in the Five-Year Plan for Soviet Historians adopted in 1946. Fifteen years after the task was first as-

³ S. V. Utechin, "Textbooks on History. Soviet Studies," Vol. iv, No. 1.

signed by the Dictator, the lead editorial in *Voprosy istorii* (No. 8, 1949) warned that the failure to produce the ordered works creates a "completely impermissible situation" which "it would be completely wrong to look for objective circumstances to explain." This stubborn silence, continuing up to the moment in which I write, constitutes the most eloquent page in present-day Soviet historiography.

II

In the twenties, not a politician but a professional Marxist historian, M. N. Pokrovsky, was the virtual dictator in Soviet historiography. He represented a consistent general line ("history is politics projected into the past") and made life difficult for fellow historians who did not accept it. But he held to professional standards, had regard for documents and evidence, though at times he wrestled mightily with them to compel them to yield what he sought. And as a historian he had enormous prestige, which was further enhanced by Lenin's preface to his "Short History of Russia," praising it warmly and insisting that it become a textbook and be translated into other European languages.

But in 1931 his excessive respect for the facts of Party history came under Stalin's personal scrutiny. In 1934 he was posthumously purged—he had the luck to die in time—along with all his works and disciples. At about the same time, Ryazanov, Russia's outstanding Marxicologist, whose headstrong, self-directed devotion to Marxist documentary scholarship closely resembled Pokrovsky's attitude toward history, suffered a similar posthumous fate.

Pokrovsky was accused of being anti-national and anti-patriotic (he shared Lenin's internationalism and disliked Tsarist wars); of neglecting actual events, dates, facts, periods and personages in favor of generalized sociological schemata (until then considered a hallmark of Marxist historical interpretation); of being "anti-scientific" and "anti-Marxist"; of "underestimating" Lenin (he wrote: "Whenever Lenin differs from me I blindly accept his view; he can see ten feet deeper into the earth than any of the rest of us"); and of underestimating Stalin (which was undoubtedly true and the immediate though not the only explanation of his downfall).

At first it seemed to historians that a new line might emerge which would put pluses where he had minuses, and offer them

considerably more freedom for examination of sources without regard to Marxist interpretive schemata. But alas, life was not to be that simple. Though Pokrovsky had been condemned for neglect of concrete historical facts, ere long *Voprosy istorii* (No. 12, 1948) was to give warning that "the proper historian" must be free from "objectivism" and from "an exaggerated attachment to facts," and at home in the citation and application of the "theoretical generalizations" and dictates of the Party line. Now it was not a single, simplistic, recognizable line like Pokrovsky's, but a continuous bombardment by *ad hoc* fragments of lines, changing with each political shift or change in mood, frequently internally contradictory, constantly being altered and even suddenly reversed.

Apparently these fragments issue from Stalin's latest pronouncement or some earlier one exhumed from context after four decades, or from the quotations from Lenin or Marx or Engels which adorn their promulgation. But study of such texts will not help the historian, nor is there any real defense in an umbrella of quotations, for in any vast and historically evolved sacred scripture you can find quotations for any side of anything. To quote yesterday's Stalin may today be "talmudism and scholasticism." The historian must divine the Dictator's coming pronouncement, for his latest word is always the last word in history even though Marx, Engels, Lenin and yesterday's Stalin all be united against it. A sudden reversal in Stalin's relations with Germany or England or America is pushed backward retroactively so that the present enemy is absolute evil, and though yesterday an ally, must always have been an enemy. All books, articles and documents that testify to the contrary must be consigned to the Orwellian "memory hole" to be consumed in flames, or must be "rectified" and brought up to date without any mention of the fact that there was ever an earlier version.

Not only changes in relationships, strategy and tactics, even changes in the Dictator's awareness of the nature of his own régime, or his subjective identification with some deed of a figure of the past, say an Ivan IV or a Marshal Kutuzov, can require a complete retroactive revision of the figure thus honored. Such revaluations cannot be deduced by the historian from a study of sources, but only by sensing the reactions of the Dictator whose attitude toward history has been summed up by Orwell in the formula: "Who controls the present, controls the past."

Stalin first entered historiography through the field of personal and party history. In January 1924, one week after the death of Lenin, he chose the occasion of a Memorial Address to predate by some four years the beginning of their personal acquaintance.⁹ At the time it might have seemed merely a faintly ghoulis example of the natural human inclination to reshape the past nearer to the heart's desire. But when one remembers that Lenin had just called for the removal of Stalin as General Secretary, and when one contemplates the subsequent revisions that carried Stalin from "loyal disciple" to "best disciple" and then "only loyal disciple," and on to "faithful companion-in-arms" (*soratsnik*) and "wise guide and counsellor" and more than equal partner, one cannot but be struck by the meticulous attention to detail and long-range planning implied in this first little retouching of history.

A Napoleon, a Trotsky, a Thucydides, a Xenophon or a Josephus may wait to turn his energies into the writing of history until defeat has deprived him of the opportunity of making it. But Stalin engaged in writing history as one of the means by which he climbed to power. That explains the ruthless political utilitarianism, the pugnacious factionalism or *partinost* which he has impressed upon it. That is why first "rotten liberalism" and then "objectivism" were to become the gravest of historiographical crimes. History was one of the "weapons" with which he fought his way to power, and he enlarged the scope of his revisions with every increase in the actual power drawn into his hands.

There was much to revise. First there was that personal symbol of the Revolution and the régime: the duality-unity, *Lenin-Trotsky*. Mountains of books, newspapers, pamphlets, decrees and documents had to be consigned to the "memory hole," mashed to pulp, or brought out in "corrected" editions, in order to substitute for *Lenin-Trotsky* a new duality-unity, *Lenin-Stalin*.

Then there were the other close associates of Lenin, glorified as "Old Bolshevism" in the struggle with Trotsky, and then themselves destroyed. To obscure all traces of their actual deeds and substitute nameless and monstrous evils that would justify

⁹ For the evidence, see the writer's "Three Who Made a Revolution." New York: The Dial Press, 1948, p. 424-7.

their murder is another task that Stalinist historiography has never ceased to concern itself with. With notable impartiality Stalin has barred foreign and domestic accounts, pre-Stalinist Bolshevik histories, Stalinist histories written to order by Khrushchev, Popov and Yaroslavsky, the footnotes to the Second and Third Editions of Lenin's "Works," the "Great Encyclopedia," and all the telltale passages in the letters, writings and speeches of Lenin, and of Stalin himself. There is a mass of Lenin-Trotsky correspondence at Harvard that can never be published in the Soviet Union. There is Lenin's "Testament." Typical of Stalin's self-censorship is his omission from his "Collected Works" of his tribute to Trotsky published in *Pravda* of November 6, 1918, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

For the foreign observer, the most important document that Stalin has omitted from the corresponding volume of his "Works" is a letter he wrote Lenin in 1920, criticizing the latter's "Theses on the National and Colonial Question" because they failed to provide an intermediate or transitional form for the annexation of new Soviet states, like a "Soviet Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania," which have never formed part of the old Tsarist Empire and therefore may object to immediate incorporation in the Soviet Union. This early foreshadowing of the future "People's Democracies" can be found, however, as a footnote to Lenin's "Theses" in the Second and Third Russian editions of his "Works," Vol. XXV, p. 624.

The present writer was in Moscow during the first six months of 1929, when on central command every periodical and paper in the Soviet Union broke out with a picture of Stalin on the front page. This was the beginning of the Stalin cult. At first it seemed to me wholly "rational". Having just eliminated Bukharin, the last of the close comrades of Lenin, Stalin had now to become "Old Bolshevism." But a number of circumstances have since caused me to conclude that there is an irrational element also.

First, there was the fury of the purges, with the arrest, execution or reduction to unskilled slave labor of millions: the neutral, the indifferent, the innocent, the loyal, including entire technical, bureaucratic and military layers desperately needed for the enhancement of the very power of the state. It may be urged that such random terror was "needed" on the principle: "If you want to make your enemies afraid, begin by cutting off the heads of your friends." And that total state power in a populous state can

spend a few million lives on the process of completely atomizing society so that every particularized atom depends absolutely on the state and no man can depend upon any other. Still, it is hard to believe that so many millions were required, or that the state had so greatly to weaken itself technically in the process.

Second, there is the insatiable and unappeasable appetite of the dictator for the enlargement of the incense, the trembling obedience, the worship, to the point where he is now the "Coryphaeus" of all the arts and sciences (history of course among them), and is increasingly being endowed with the attributes of a living god.

Third, there was the unexpected discovery while going through the pages of *Zhizn natsionalnostei* (*Life of the Nationalities*—Stalin's personal organ when he was Commissar of Nationalities) that Stalin had retroactively inserted two minor "prophecies" into one of his articles when he included it in his "Collected Works." And more startling still, the discovery of an item headed, "Greetings to Comrade Stalin," with the following (slightly abbreviated) text:

The Conference of National Sections . . . sends you its greetings and declares its conviction that by following firmly along the path pointed out by you for the solution of the national question . . . we will create throughout the world a united, brotherly Communist family which we will teach to appreciate those great merits which belong to you—the leader of the oppressed peoples.

Here is the beginning of that *potok privetstvi* (flood of greetings) which has filled the columns of all the Soviet papers and journals for these many years. But the date was December 24, 1920! Lenin was still alive and in leadership, and, by general consent, it was Lenin who had pointed out the solution of the national question and who was the leader of the oppressed peoples of the world. Stalin was still outranked by five or six of Lenin's associates and had neither expropriated their deeds, nor executed them. Thus the craving for flattery and the need that "the world appreciate his great merits" preceded by almost a decade the "rational" motivation of the Stalin cult.

In 1931 Stalin issued his first public directive on the spirit of the new historiography, in the form of an angry open letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* (*Proletarian Revolution*) charging them with "rotten liberalism" for having printed a "discussion article" on the problem of why Lenin had continued to

admire Kautsky and the Orthodox-Marxist majority of the German Social Democracy until he was shocked by their stand on the war of 1914. *Bolshevik* (No. 22, 1931) published Stalin's Open Letter with its own appropriate editorial gloss, headed: "Give the Study of the History of Our Party a Scientific Bolshevik Footing!" All the earlier histories, from Shlyapnikov's to Yaroslavsky's and Popov's, were attacked. "There must be a thorough housecleaning in all book, textbook and journalistic literature dealing with the history of the Party. . . . The ruthless struggle against every manifestation of rotten liberalism must be intensified. . . . The significance of Stalin's letter far transcends the gateposts of history. . . ."

The Dictator next turned his attention to a close supervision of a new history of the Civil War which was to eliminate all trace of Trotsky—except as a secret agent of the other side. Then he began to dictate all the details of the now renowned "History of the Communist Party: Short Course." On January 20, 1946, *Pravda* reported that Stalin was himself the author of this strange work of historical falsification, endless self-quotation and self-glorification, and that it would appear as Volume XV of his "Collected Works."

But even Stalin's mighty name has not protected the "Short Course" from the ravages of retroactive obsolescence. Thus the first edition had substituted for a number of *unpersons* the new chief purger, Yezhov, as the "preparer of an uprising of the soldiers on the Western Front in Byelorussia."⁶ It soon developed that Yezhov was only 16 at the time, and, moreover, that the chief purger must himself be purged. Stalin's "Short Course" keeps appearing in revised editions as the greatest, dullest and most mendacious best seller in the history of literature. But he himself has streamlined the Great October Revolution further and further, until the latest version to appear, in the Chronology in the back of the corresponding volume of his own "Collected Works," actually reads:

Oct. 24 (Nov. 6, New Style)—Lenin arrives at Smolny in the evening. Stalin briefs him on the course of political events.

Oct. 24-25—Lenin and Stalin lead the October uprising.

Whether it be wholly "rational" in terms of the rationale of the total state and the absolute ruler, or whether there be also an irrational element, it should be clear that we are dealing with

⁶ New York: International Publishers, 1939, p. 224.

the most striking example in all history of a man who has succeeded in inventing himself. It takes total organization and total power—not propaganda skill, but the union of pen and sword in a single hand—to do so complete a job. Once the total state has concentrated in its control not only all the means of production of material but no less of spiritual goods—all the modes of expression, communication, criticism, thought, feeling, all cheers and boos, all love and hate, all paper, ink, type, loudspeakers, microphones, cameras, cinemas, montage and cutting rooms, theatres, walls, schools, churches, streetcorners, all books, magazines, newspapers, leaflets, caricatures, pulpits, chairs, lecterns, meeting halls, all import and export of and traffic in ideas—it becomes possible to reshape the public past nearer to the heart's desire. Having worked so efficiently in personal and party history, this spirit and method were now applied to general historiography.

IV

Since the beginning of the thirties, Stalin's policies have determined with steadily increasing rigor and detail the character of Soviet historiography. His letter of 1931 on "rotten liberalism," his brief dogmatic remarks of 1934 on what a Soviet history text and a modern history text should be; the successive liquidations of the two professional journals that preceded *Voprosy istorii*; the spiritual trauma of the purges—all serve as urgent reminders to the historian that "Stalin is the Creator of Soviet Historical Science" (title of article in No. 2, 1949). Yet, if we except his "History of the Communist Party," all his historical writings, directives and overworked *obiter dicta* which are supposed to serve as guides to historiography would not together make a single chapter. How, then, does the Soviet historian divine what is expected of him? And how shall the observer deduce from the twists and turns of the historiographical line what the real policies and intentions of the Kremlin are?

An especially revealing moment for the examining of these questions is the end of World War II. Dictatorship thrives on war, and total dictatorship thrives on total war on two fronts: against its own people and against the outside world. Hitherto it had offered three justifications for the cruelty, ubiquity and perpetual strain: 1, it was necessary to crush the enemy within; 2, to protect the land of Socialism from a completely hostile world; 3, and it was justified by the fact that it was already pro-

ducing an incomparably more glorious life than that beyond its borders. Now all three justifications were suddenly called in question, and the régime was faced with an acute, all-embracing crisis:

(1) The internal enemy had been officially liquidated some time ago, in the late thirties, when it was proclaimed that classes had been abolished, that Socialism had been achieved, that every one loved the Government and the Leader. The "Stalinist Constitution" was supposed to have institutionalized this new state of affairs.

(2) The theory that the Soviet Union was surrounded by a completely hostile world in which it could find neither friends nor allies but only enemies collapsed the day Hitler attacked and—perhaps contrary to Hitler's expectation and Stalin's—Churchill and Roosevelt called upon their peoples to give unstinting support to the Soviet Union. The Soviet people noted with warmth that they had friends and allies. They heard Stalin himself, on the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1941, proclaim that "England and the United States of America possess elementary democratic liberties . . . trade unions . . . parties . . . parliaments." They saw that the Kremlin was summoning them not to defend the dictatorship but the Fatherland and democratic freedoms. Confidently they looked forward to the dawn of a new day in return for their unstinting sacrifices.

(3) As in 1813, once more the many-peopled Russian armies entered the outside world, and felt its impact. The whole fictional world of evil and misery without, and of superiority and perfection within, fell to pieces. Either the dictatorship had to relax, or new enemies and new superiorities had to be synthetically created.

Out of this crisis came Stalin's address to his electors on the inseparability of war and capitalism and the need to continue the strain-and-storm tempo to prepare for future wars; Zhdanov's attacks on the permeation of the "world's most advanced" music, painting, literature and philosophy by "servility to everything foreign," "rootless cosmopolitanism," "kowtowing to the West," lack of *partiinost* and *ideinost* (party spirit and high level of ideas, literally *party-ness* and *idea-ness*); the "revival" of the Comintern; the rejection of Marshall Plan aid by Molotov who, while his régime hesitated, took 89 advisers to Paris, in the end only to advise him on how to say *nie!*

In June 1945, exactly one month after V.E. Day, *Istoricheski*

zhurnal (meaning, simply enough, *Historical Journal*), which had naturally been edited in the spirit of the Grand Alliance, was informed that it had been unequal to its tasks, had lowered the level of historical scholarship, and was forthwith liquidated in favor of a new journal to be called *Voprory istorii*, or *Questions of History*. The "questions" or "problems" it has had to handle were those of this spiritual reconversion and rearmament.

v

The first problem was to make the Soviet people forget their most recent and greatest experience. They must forget, or press down into the un verbalized, unthought, unfelt unconscious, the memory of the fact that their Leader had joined in a pact with Hitler, which touched off the war. Since the *Vozhd* had made one of the greatest mistakes in history, the extravagant cult of his infallibility and wisdom must now reach new and unheard-of heights. The memory of lend-lease, the memory of the titanic joint effort and the embrace on the Elbe, of England's valiant holding out alone during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact—so many memories had to be forgotten, or rather, transformed into their opposites.

A sample will serve. The collective history text on the "History of the U.S.S.R.," edited by Pankratova, in its 1945 edition quotes Joseph Stalin on the Normandy landing:

A brilliant achievement. . . . The history of war knows no other enterprise like it for breadth of purpose, grandiose skill, and masterful execution.

One year later the book had been replaced by a new edition in which the passage reads: "On June 6, 1944, Allied forces accomplished a landing in Northern France."

And the latest approved history text, that of textbook prize-winner, Shestakov, describes the Normandy landing in these terms:

England and the United States, in the course of three years of war, dragged out in every way the opening of a second front. . . . But when, after the gigantic victories of the Soviet Army, it became clear that the Soviet Union might alone defeat the enemy, occupy the territory of Germany and liberate all Western Europe, including France . . . in June 1944, the English and American armies left England and landed on the coast of Northern France.⁵

Every such revision of history has its *resonance effect*, spilling over into a score of unexpected places, reverberating backward

⁵ Moscow: 1951, p. 277-8.

into the past, so that the enemy of the moment must always have been the enemy. Especially must the high points of alliance and friendship be turned into sinister and hateful acts. And every such revision is the product of *multiple determination*. Thus the Russia-won-the-war-alone-against-a-Hitler-Anglo-American-Imperialist-conspiracy version of World War II inevitably reverberated into the hate-America campaign. But the latter campaign had many additional causes and implications.

It was the United States that had contributed the greatest help and evoked the greatest warmth. It represented the greatest power. Its productivity was the envy and admiration of the materialistic, technocratic official culture. Its conduct in the Philippines and Latin America, above all in war-ruined Europe (like that of Great Britain in India) was the startling refutation of the Lenin-Stalin dogmas of "monopoly capitalist imperialism" and of "capitalist encirclement." And the living refutation, no less, of the dogma that total statism was the most productive system. America represented the possibility of social reform without revolution ("reformism"), a land of plenty and freedom, visibly achieving an expanding economy and an ever greater measure of social justice and labor-farmer welfare, without the liquidation of entire classes.

The war ended with the Soviet Union as the only Great Power astride the Eurasian land mass, with a power vacuum to the west, and a power vacuum to the east of it. The United States represented the only possible obstacle to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Empire into both vacuums. America sought to restore a balance of power by restoring Europe, and—a little more hesitantly and uncertainly—by reconstructing and restoring a free Asia. Not only was its postwar use of its unprecedented power a reproach and a refutation. Increasingly, it was the main obstacle to the march of Soviet power to world conquest, as America moved from the blind illusions of the Grand Alliance to the sadder and wiser policy of "containment;" from containment to "defense of the free world from positions of strength;" and then to collective defense of Korea as a victim of aggression. The Truman Doctrine stood between the Soviet Union and the Dardanelles; the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact blocked the road to Western Europe; American troops formed the backbone of the United Nations armies holding the narrow waist of Korea.

The slow development of America's postwar policies began to

inspire hope in all those who dreamed of ultimate liberation. It offered refuge (a little too niggardly) to escaping fighters for freedom. And when it decided that it would not be a party to the forced repatriation of those who had escaped or been taken prisoner, it adopted—almost unwittingly—a policy which makes the Soviet armies and all auxiliary armies potentially unreliable. In this writer's judgment, the decision not to return the Chinese and North Korean prisoners by force will prove to be the turning point in the great conflict between slavery and freedom.

All of these elements, and others like them, enter into the calculations of the Stalin régime, but none of them can be so much as mentioned in overt expression. The vocabulary of *newspeak* and the "researches" and "documentation" of Soviet historians must be employed to make each of these look like its opposite, and to envelop the whole concept of America in hatred. It is sufficient to look at the list of books that are praised and awarded Stalin prizes, to see the volume and the titles of the articles in *Voprosy istorii*, or to note that the articles vilifying the United States are criticized only because they do not go far enough.

If it were an individual instead of the head of a great state and its passive members that were making these statements, ranging from assertions regarding bacteriological warfare to those about castration of colored peoples, we would regard it as pure pathology: loss of memory of recent events, loss of the reality principle, persecutory delusions. But there is "method in his madness," as proved by the fact that while Stalin's Ministry of Hate is filling all the earth with its roars, his Ministry of Love is cooing in a tiny whisper in the *Moscow News* . . . in English.

VI

No field of historiography is now exempt from this inexorable process of retroactive reëditing. The early Middle Ages must be revised to predate by three or four centuries the origins of a high Great Russian culture and of a centralized state. The Varangian theory has to be rejected, not on the basis of the evidence, but because it implies that the Great Russians did not know how to set up a powerful centralized state of their own, except by conquest from without. The new total state is very sensitive about this matter of a "centralized, powerful state." That which the democratic and earlier Marxist historians regarded as oppressive has now become "progressive." It is no longer permitted to sug-

gest that this great state arose in the course of the defense of the Eurasian plain against outside invasion, nor that bondage in its wide and sparsely settled lands arose through political imposition, so that the recruiting sergeant and tax collector might know where to find the peasant. Ivan the Terrible must become a progressive and heroic tsar because he enlarged the Russian lands, strove to take the Baltic, set up the *Oprichnina* which Stalin recognizes as an analogue of the G.P.U., purged his opponents and even faithful servitors and sons in ways which in his heart Stalin also recognizes, and because he completed the centralization of the state and the absolute power of its ruler.

Soviet Byzantine scholarship has to break with Western, in order to refute the idea that the declining Empire was "rigid, static and obscurantist," in order to show that the countries of southeast Europe, "which have embarked on the path of the People's Democracies," had an early, "progressive and original culture." Soviet historians must discover "the influence of the Slavs on the history of Byzantium." They must "expose" the Ottoman conquest of Byzantium in 1453 and show that "the Turkish assimilators are the most brutal of all assimilators who tortured and maimed the Balkan nations for hundreds of years." Indeed, "the very fact that the 1953 Congress of Byzantine scholars (on the 500th anniversary of 1453) is being held in the capital of Marshallized Turkey" is evidence enough that it will serve "American imperialist and Pan-Turkish aims." After all, Istanbul is but another name for Constantinople, and that for Byzantium, always the Tsargrad of imperial dreams, and the gateway, to boot, to the Mediterranean and the Near East for the Stalinist Empire.

If Turkey or Iran is slated as victim of the next forward move in the Near East, then Lenin's friendship with the new Turkey and denunciation of Tsarist aspirations in Iran must be buried seven fathoms under the ground. The influence of the high Iranian civilization upon the Tadjiks must be denied, or, as has actually been done, reversed. So must the influence of the Turks upon the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union. Only Great Russian influence remains, even if it has to be invented. Adding to the multiple determination of the process, there is the restlessness of these Soviet Iranian and Turkic Mohammedan peoples, the growth of their national feelings, the specter of Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Iranianism as possible counterfoils to Pan-Slavism.

The history of the Balkans and other "People's Democracies" is also being rewritten in the Soviet Historical Section of the Academy of Sciences, and particularly in the Slavic Studies Section. Bulgaria is getting a new look. Non-Slavic Albania has "longed for centuries for liberation from the Turkish yoke and has long sought the friendship which now binds it to the Soviet peoples." Rumania's animus toward old Russia is being retroactively transformed, and her language being considered for honorary Slavic citizenship. Tito has become the eternal traitor, and in 1941 was simultaneously serving Hitler and the Anglo-American imperialists.

Two successive editings of Czechoslovak history have been scrapped, and the third, only a year old, is already under fire. The Polish historians are in continuous torment. Poland's culture must of course be decisively influenced by the Great Russian, but not by Rome or the West, while all trace of Polish influence upon Great Russian culture is being deleted or equipped with a minus sign. "The task of scientific history is to relate events truthfully," the Poles are admonished by *Voprory istorii* (Nov. 4, 1949) "and to show that the responsibility for the policy of hostility toward Russia in the past rests not with the Polish people but with the governing classes." In all the partitions, the Russian share of Poland was justified.

To the "memory hole" have been consigned all the works of Marx and Engels on the menace of Russian absolutism, imperial expansion, Pan-Slavism, in favor of the restoration of Poland "with the boundaries of 1772," in favor of Shamil and Georgian independence. After 15 years of suppression, Stalin published his secret attack of 1934 on Engels' article "On Russian Foreign Policy." But Marxism is still needed as an ostensibly invariant philosophy to refer to in vindicating changing policies, so for the most part this censorship proceeds in absolute silence. With the retroactive purging of Ryazanov, no Marxist scholar dares continue the publication of these articles in the *Gesamtausgabe*.⁹

In 1934 Stalin could still rebuke a textbook for failing to brand "the annexationist-colonializing rôle of Tsarism . . . the Prison-House of Peoples;" its "counter-revolutionary rôle in foreign policy . . . as the international gendarme;" and for failing to show the influence of Western thought upon the democratic and Socialist

⁹ This autumn these suppressed writings will furnish material for a book, edited by Blahotock and Hooditz, entitled "Marx and Engels on the Russian Menace."

revolutionary movements in Russia. To quote the 1934 Stalin in Russia in 1932 would be to take one's life into one's hands.

Now Great Russian nationalism is inextricably blended with "Soviet patriotism." Internationalism is for use abroad, and is defined by Stalin as "unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union." At home it is "cosmopolitanism" and "servility to all things foreign." Nationalism of any other variety than Great Russian is "bourgeois nationalism" and is fatal. A Sosyura may not "love the Ukraine" except he remember to love above all its yearning for annexation and the Great Russian imprint upon its culture. With each revision, the Balkan states move longingly another step toward incorporation.

Each of the "autonomous republics" is rewriting its history, revising its poetry, remaking its memories. Heroes become anti-heroes (Shamil, Kennessary); insurrections against tsarism until yesterday celebrated are today execrated; epics become anti-epics ("Dede Korkut") or the versions that have lived so long in oral tradition and are the very national memory of illiterate peoples are purged and reissued in "new authentic texts."

The expurgation of the epic ["Manas"] should be strictly scientific and principled. It should take into account all the historical circumstances in the life of the people. This demands a suitable selection of variants, songs and episodes, a selection of which the fundamental principle must be the preservation in the epic of all the best elements inherent in the past of the Kirgiz people.¹

Even so did Orwell picture a functionary in his Ministry of Truth whose task was to "produce garbled versions—definitive texts they were called—of poems which had become ideologically offensive but which, for one reason or another, were to be retained in the anthologies."

Thus the great operation rewrite which began with Stalin's obliteration of his contemporary political and personal history and the invention of a new past for himself has spread outward through the boundaries of the Old Russian and the New Soviet Empires, and backward to the beginning of recorded time. The process is vast and all-embracing, even as the total state is total. But the immediate aims are simple enough:

To strengthen the power of the state over the minds of men and make it ever more complete and absolute.

To enlarge the power of the Leader and the cult of his infalli-

¹ *Liternostnaya Gazeta*, May 27, 1933, 2.

bility and grandeur by identifying him with every mighty tsar and military leader, with every hero of thought and deed, with the deepest historical memories of the people over whom he rules, for his omniscience, omnipotence, omniscience and infallibility are the very fulcrum of all the levers of totalitarian organization and power.

To destroy the critical sense, the historical perspective, the possibility of objective check or comparison from outside the system.

To "justify" the global ambitions and "demonstrate" the inevitable global triumph of the total state régime as well as its inexorably intensifying total organization within its own borders and its empire.

To strengthen its centralization by the increasing Russification and Stalinization of the "autonomous" units of the "federation" and the "sovereign People's Democracies" of the empire.

To root out all memories of comradeship with recent allies and as far as possible all friendliness and all common human fellow-feeling for the peoples who have been selected as the next victims and for those selected as the long-range enemy.

To counteract the war-weariness and the weariness with the unending internal war on the part of a people who have been kept unremittingly on the stretch for over a third of a century.

To provide, in the form of a synthetic national glory and glory of the state and system, *ersatz* satisfactions as a substitute for any real fulfillment of the revolution's promises.

To close the eyes of Soviet citizens and conquered subject peoples to the shabby and cruel realities that the régime inflicts upon them and to close their ears to the peaceful, friendly and attractive message of the outside, non-totalitarian world.

To prepare the next steps in the long-range aim: the total conquest of the world.

By an examination of each sudden historical revision or reversal one can deduce what the next tactical objectives of the Kremlin are, even though not the tempo of its moves—for into the actual moves themselves enter other calculations of power and of relations of forces that reside in the non-totalitarian world.

We can, however, deduce from the spirit and sweep of the new Soviet historiography that there will be no relaxation in the cold and not-so-cold war of the total state on its own people, on its neighbors, and on all the peoples of the earth. The unending war

of nerves of which the rewriting of all history is a significant segment grows sharper not gentler, more reckless not more cautious, more inclusive not less.

As long as all the more spacious cities of the world have not been reduced to slums and rubble, Stalin's 1947 address proclaiming the 800-year-old Moscow the only city of the world free of slums is in danger of objective refutation. As long as anywhere in the world there is more freedom, more happiness, more comradeship and love, or simply a higher standard of living and higher productive power, Stalin cannot make good his boast that the Soviet system and way of life are superior.

Indeed, as long as anywhere in the world there is a lone surviving copy of any document which he has consigned to the "memory hole," or a single historian writing and pursuing research in freedom from the "guidance and control" of the total state, there is always the danger that world history, Russian history, Soviet history, Party history and the personal history of Joseph Stalin may once more be reconstructed, and that History itself, embodiment of the human memory and consciousness of self, may revive out of the ashes of its works.

End #12

1931 accepted an invitation to the Soviet Union to work in one of the world's biggest institutes of theoretical physics. His achievements won him recognition both inside and outside the country. He founded and served as editor of its *Journal of Physics*. He planned to devote the rest of his life to the service of the new world of Socialism, equality, and freedom that he believed was abuilding. Then in April 1936 his wife was arrested, allegedly for hiding two pistols under her bed to kill Stalin and for smuggling fragmented swastikas into ceramic designs. Though no longer living with her, Dr. Weissberg saw the absurdity of the charges and attempted to help her.


"Your wife was arrested as an enemy of the people," they warned him. "By intervening in her behalf you are giving support to an enemy of the people."

"I'm certain she is innocent."

"Still worse! Now you're saying that we arrest innocent people."

And so the mad logic of the purges, which acts on the theory that whoever questions is an enemy of the state, that whoever is injured or made the victim of injustice must thereby become anti-state, that arrest makes a man guilty, that punishment must be meted out and a crime invented to fit the punishment and a confession extorted to fit the crime—this mad logic sucked in Dr. Weissberg, too. Having been arrested, he must have been a member and organizer of a nonexistent counter-revolutionary organization. "Who recruited you?" demanded his torturers endlessly. "And whom did you recruit?" He realized that this involved a chain reaction. Each man he might mention would automatically be arrested and would have to name others, who would be arrested, who would have to name others who would be arrested, in an endless chain. Even as he suffered and fought, "confessing" when the strain became intolerable and withdrawing his confessions each time the strain let up, his powerful mind was engaged in trying to understand what was happening, seeking to salvage his sanity and a modicum of his illusions concerning the regime.

The combination of Austrian citizenship, the letters from the world's great physicists, and the irrepressible strength and elasticity of his spirit saved him from death or breakdown. After three years in various prisons, years which saw his interrogators join him as victims, Dr. Weissberg, Jew and Communist though he was, was turned over to the German Gestapo as part of the "mutual assistance" program of the Stalin-Hitler Pact. He es-



caped to take part in another type of nightmare as a fighter in the Polish underground, but with a fine sense of literary form, he ends the present work at the moment when he is being handed over to the Gestapo.

Using his statistical training, Dr. Weissberg worked out a method of calculating the number of victims who were streaming into the prisons of the Soviet Union from the serial numbers on receipts issued to them for personal belongings. He cross-checked by statistics derivable from prison kitchens, and by reports from NKVD officials as they in turn landed in jail. Carefully allowing for a margin of error he arrived at a figure of nine million victims during the peak years of the purge.

This same intellectual curiosity and power of reasoning, observing, ordering, and generalizing was applied to every experience, every person he came in contact with. A phenomenal memory enabled him to reproduce the details of every conversation and argument. This gives his book much of the solidity and vital fulness of a great novel and the esthetic clarity of outline of a well-reasoned scientific theory. Weissberg is so completely absorbed with his experience, with the fate of every prisoner high or low, every jailer or inquisitor, and the fate of Everyman caught in the toils of a Kafka Trial multiplied by nine million, that every detail is as sharp as if the reader were living it himself. Only the last chapter, which attempts a theoretical explanation of the purges, is weak by comparison with the spontaneous fragmentary explanations that spring out of every page of the book.

In this reviewer's opinion "The Accused" will take a place among the great works of autobiography and eyewitness reporting of history. Thanks to a brave spirit and an unquenchable intellect, the over-all effect of the entrance into the inferno of the purges with Dr. Weissberg is one of deepened understanding and compassion and pride in the capacity of the human soul to resist torture and preserve its integrity.

Patriot or Spy?

MASTER SPY. By Ian Colvin. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 286 pp. \$3.50.

By LEO LANIA

THE Kaiser went, but the generals remained. For a while, right after the close of World War II, their careers as grave-diggers of the German Republic and their complicity in Hitler's crimes seemed certain to seal their doom. Alas, once more the German generals have proved indestructible. A few were executed by Hitler when they tried to save the sinking ship by throwing the mad captain overboard. A few were brought to trial at Nuremberg. But the vast majority survived the debacle of the Third Reich as easily as they did the wrath of their outraged victims. After a short outburst of moral indignation the world decided that the German generals were irreplaceable.

Stalin, in no need of justifying his complete lack of moral scruples, even uses former Gestapo chiefs and SS generals, and has made them honorary comrades. The West, plagued by a bad conscience, tries to rationalize its "realistic policy": "After all, the German generals were never really Nazis. In fact, they were victims of Hitler, opposed his plans of conquest, and most important, were first and foremost gentlemen."

This argument is now being propagated in books, plays, and films. Thus a legend has been created. It already has its mysterious and glamorous heroes. Rommel was the first, Canaris is the next in line. After the "Desert Fox," a very noble patriot, we are now introduced to the "Master Spy" whose patriotism led him to become "a secret ally of the British."

What kind of man was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris? What was his place in the recent history of Germany? Ian Colvin, a British newspaperman, deserves our gratitude for having asked these questions. He must be given credit for having written a fascinating book. As Berlin correspondent of the *London News Chronicle* from 1933 to 1938, Mr. Colvin made the most of the opportunity to study the workings of the Nazi Reich from close range. He had excellent contacts with certain German generals and aristocrats. He is not only a trained observer but also ex-

Leo Lania, who has covered Europe for American newspapers and magazines, is the author of "Nine Lives of Europe" and other books.

very much in evidence, take their stand upon the basic tenets of American political philosophy. The eighteenth-century concepts of freedom and equality, they argue, are as applicable today as when they were made the foundation stone of the Declaration of Independence; and they are as valid across the globe as on this continent. The task is to make them operative within the modern context. The inalienable right of a man to realize his potentialities, to fulfill himself, to enter upon his destiny is "the Proposition" upon which all else rests. To the extent that this is rendered meaningful in economic relationships the fabric of capitalism is shot through with the gold threads of spirituality and humanism.

What has actually happened to American capitalism becomes, therefore, of crucial importance. It is not necessary to maintain that the economic system conforms to everything Jefferson would have desired in a commonwealth; all that needs to be shown is the leaven of the ideal at work. The authors of both books undertake a convincing demonstration. Dr. Osusky writes about "The People's Capitalism"; the *Fortune* editors about "The Transformation of American Capitalism." The development of capitalism in Europe, Dr. Osusky contends, was greatly influenced by the feudal order out of which it emerged. The triumph of the new system was won at the price of important concessions to the old. A certain rigidity, a continuance of caste, an emotional aloofness from the masses was carried over to temper the spirit of the bourgeoisie. Big business keeps the form of cartels; and smaller firms, as in France today, have remained in the exclusive ownership of small families with an almost pathological aversion to borrowing from the banks or to selling stock on the open market. In contrast to this American capitalism is ventilated, popular, diversified, and free. It is destined to become more so as it is brought within the circle of the ideals and values that have animated American government from the start.

THE EVIDENCE presented by *Fortune* is indicative of future trends. Big modern enterprise is being run by hired management, and the manager is becoming increasingly a professional. His concern is "doing a good job" in the sense of making money steadily year in and year out through an institution that serves and satisfies a number of groups and interests. His responsibility is not merely to the owners nor to the stockholders, employees, or consumers but ultimately to society itself. Within the individual

(Continued on page 32)



The Soviet Dance of Death

RUSSIAN PURGE AND THE EXTRACTION OF CONFESSION. By F. Beck and E. Goodin. New York: Viking Press. 277 pp. \$3.50.

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

NO ONE knows what kind of government it is," Tolstoy once wrote, "until he has been in its prisons." The authors of this study have been in Soviet prisons, and in serene, detached fashion, as if their personal suffering had been no more than an opportunity to study a fearful yet fascinating phenomenon, they have written a treatise on Soviet prisons, concentration camps, purges, and confessions, and offered some thoughtful and seminal conclusions as to what these teach concerning the true nature of the Soviet state.

The history of mankind reveals no phenomenon quite like the mass purges of 1936 to 1938, purges which embraced a wide variety of humanity: idealists and cynics, Old Bolsheviks, Red Partisan heroes of the Civil War, close associates of Lenin, presidents of Soviet Republics, secretaries of regional Communist parties, members of the Soviet General Staff, veterans of the Czarist underground, Soviet scientists and intellectuals, "honored guests" and Comintern leaders from other lands, members of the Central Committee and the Politburo, holders of the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, high officers of the NKVD. Examining magistrates often landed in the same cells and concentration camps with men whom a few months earlier they had tortured, "confessed," and sentenced to jail. And there were millions of common workers, simple peasants, members of national minorities, as well as nomadic tribes that would not settle down and nomadic tribes that had settled down.

With incredulity and wonder the world has asked an unending series of questions to which there have been but dim and fragmentary answers. Could virtually the whole General Staff be agents of foreign powers? Did Lenin really surround himself with traitors... all but one? Could a leading committee of traitors carry through a revolution they wished to betray? Does the Soviet regime enlist so little loyalty that the plotters against it run into the millions? Was there ever in the whole history of mankind any regime that produced treason on such a mass scale? What manner of "trials" are these which turn off prisoners faster than America's belt conveyors do bolts and nuts? What makes men confess to crimes they manifestly could not have committed? How did it happen that even the judges, the prosecutors, and the chiefs of the secret police followed each other into death or oblivion? What is the rationale behind this irrational parade to the prisons and dance of death?

The only response so far to these troubling questions has come from two novels: Koestler's "Darkness at Noon" and Victor Serge's "The Case of Comrade Tulayev." The answers were suggestive, even harmonize with the present study; but in this fantastic realm fiction lags far behind fact. Now fate has enabled two able observers, who shared one cell in prison, to return from the "dark side of the moon." One was a Soviet historian, the other a German scientist. Both were sympathetic to the regime that ensnared them in its monstrous net. No cry of anguish, no word of personal suffering escapes their lips. With the detachment of scientist or historian they questioned cellmates, elicited stories from former NKVD men and examining magistrates, re-

corded the mechanism of confession; gathered reports at second hand and third from men transferred from other prisons and veterans of more than one arrest and sentencing. The result of their involuntary and voluntary investigations is the first scientific treatise on this weird phenomenon. It is by no mean overtitled when it calls itself: "Russian Purge and the Ex-traction of Confession." Indeed, it does more than it promises, for the last chapter, laconically entitled *The Theories*, analyzes the insights these phenomena give into the nature of the whole regime.

They tend to underplay the personal element—the role played by the temperament and character of Stalin himself. They miss the fact that when a "secretary" of a Central Committee purges fifty out of seventy-one members of the Committee whose "servant" he is, and a majority of all State officials, Party secretaries, and Party members, a coup d'état has taken place. But with these two reservations I cannot think of a single theory which the entire literature of Soviet studies has turned up that is left out of their reckoning. When the authors soberly calculate that the purge has made more enemies for the regime than it has removed and that the very nature of this state makes more such purges inevitable no one who has read the book can disagree. For government by purge is an integral part of this new system of state-decreed fixity of the citizen, state-decreed official truth, state-determined categories of "potential" and "thought-crime" enemies, state determined feelings, thoughts, and culture, in an absolutist, bureaucratic, *apparatchik* state that is total in its scope and universalist in its aspirations, that wages psychological and physical war on its own people even more than it does on other peoples, and is presided over by an autocratic leader who is infallible in all fields embraced by the all-embracing state.

Bertram D. Wolfe is the author of *Three Who Made a Revolution* and other works on Russia.

SOLUTION OF LAST WEEK'S
DOUBLE-CROSTIC (No. 895)

[ARTHUR M.] SCHLESINGER,
JR.:

THE VITAL CENTER

Ideology and logic play a minimal part in the appeal of totalitarianism. . . . Members of the party enjoy the discipline, . . . the release from individual responsibility, and the affirmation of comradeship in organized mass solidarity.

When the Devil Is Sick...

BALKAN CAESAR: *Tito vs. Stalin.*
By Leigh White. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons. 229 pp. \$2.75.

By I. D. W. TALMADGE

LET IT be said at the very outset that Leigh White has written a highly readable, informative, sober estimate of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia.

There is a saying in Washington that if all the experts on Tito's Yugoslavia were stretched end to end they still could not reach a conclusion. Broadly speaking, our experts and "experts" seem to fall into three categories.

Category A are the apologists who would have us believe that since Tito is against Stalin he is therefore a democrat.

Category B are the "purists" who admitting that Tito may be helpful to the Western cause still would not have us "soil our hands" by entering into any deal with him.

Finally, there is Category C—the "realists." They are the boys who favor all-out aid to Tito, with no strings attached, lest we "antagonize" a powerful potential ally.

Leigh White's position, we are happy to report, does not fit into any of these categories. He has no illusions about the true nature of Titoism. To him "Titoism is a lesser evil than Stalinism for one reason only: Yugoslavia, alone, is but a minor threat to our security."

He warns that we must not make a false distinction between Titoism and Stalinism. "If we depend on Titoism to stem the advance of Stalinism, as we depended on Stalinism to stem the advance of Hitlerism, we shall end up by coming to terms with Titoism as we came to terms with Stalinism to our undoing in 1945."

Mr. White concedes that Tito's Yugoslavia is essential to the defense of Western Europe. But he suggests that

we be just as skeptical and as hypercritical in dealing with our erstwhile enemy Tito as we have been in dealing with our Greek, Turkish, and Iranian allies. If it is the course of wisdom to demand reforms in Greece, Turkey, and Iran is it not the course of folly to tolerate the myriad abuses of Communism in Yugoslavia? We have no right nor have we the desire to exact material concessions from any of our beneficiaries. But we do have the right, indeed we have the most solemn of moral obligations, to exact the utmost in spiritual concessions from every tyrant who presumes to traffic with our aims.



—Erich Hartmann.

Leigh White—"no illusions about Titoism."

Mr. White is in no mood to forget and forgive. He had covered the Balkans during the war years and had the opportunity to observe first-hand the "bolshevization" of that region and the part played in it by Tito and his henchmen. A keen and competent reporter, he foreshadowed many of the subsequent developments in his book *"The Long Balkan Night,"* published in 1944.

In his present volume he serves to remind us of facts frequently overlooked by people with short memories. It was only a few years ago that Tito, still at the time Uncle Joe's favorite "nephew," had shot down our unarmed planes. Up to the very day of his rift with Moscow Tito continued to aid the Communist guerrillas in Greece in defiance of U. N. protests. To be sure, Tito sings a different tune today. But so did Stalin in 1942, when he needed our lend-lease aid. "When the devil is sick the devil a saint would be . . ."

It was Stalin who put Tito in the saddle. But he did it with an able assist from us and the British. We followed Britain's lead in switching our support from Drazha Mikhailovich's Chetnicks to Josip Tito's Partisans. Both London and Washington were taken in by Moscow. Winston Churchill, who should have known better, declared in Commons on January 18, 1945: "I am the earliest outside supporter of Marshal Tito. It is more than a year since in this House I extolled his guerrilla virtues to the world. . . . I earnestly hope that he may prove to be the savior and unifier of his country as he is undoubtedly

Encl ~~#~~ 13

Personal History. *The men whose life stories are reviewed on this and the succeeding pages are a motley group—an American general, a Nazi admiral, a Communist physicist—but their careers were shaped by World War II. Now that Dwight Eisenhower has become an all but avowed candidate for the Presidency, his fellow Americans would do well to study his record in John Gunther's tightly packed, revealing pages (see below) for help in the great decision they must make later this year. The case of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, whom Ian Colvin presents as a hero in "Master Spy" (page 14), provides provocative commentary on the slippery morality of our times. And in "The Accused" (page 13), his account of the living-death of a Soviet prisoner, Alexander Weissberg offers an indictment of totalitarianism as moving as a novel, as objectively precise as a scientific treatise.*

Portrait of a General

EISENHOWER: The Man and the Symbol. By John Gunther. New York: Harper & Bros. 180 pp. \$2.50.

By JONATHAN DANIELS

FEW reporters in the world can be more confidently counted on for a sharp and vivid picture of any subject than John Gunther. And so far as the picture is concerned he has produced a lively and impressive one in this pertinent portrait of General Eisenhower. Unfortunately, however, it remains a fairly familiar picture, new only in its technicoloring. Gunther is added but not much more Eisenhower.

It is still, at a time when many may be seeking one, the best brief facsimile of the General whose military eminence almost adds to his political mysteriousness. Gunther's book was finished before General Eisenhower announced that he was at least willing in the Presidential race. Already the book is a little dated (in view of activities by Senator Taft and statements by President Truman) in terms of Gunther's statement that Eisenhower could practically have the Presidency from either party and on a platter. The book stands up all the same as a good Eisenhower handbook for those who have their hopes in him.

In no sense is this a biography of the General. Only fifty pages are devoted to Eisenhower's background and career. The greater part of the book is devoted to a description of Eisenhower in his present job, that job itself, and to Gunther's own political prognostications. Strangely, while it is Gunther's idea that the "essential master point" about Eisenhower is his "civilian touch" Eisenhower appears on

most of this book's pages as the soldier—a genial, friendly, modest, humble, and very human general but very much the five-star soldier all the same.

This is strangely so despite a remarkable collection of details about the General's human and personal interests which Gunther here discloses. There is a full discussion of Eisenhower's bridge, golf, and poker playing (Eisenhower's pre-war poker winnings were \$3,900 a year). There was some interesting material, new to me, on Eisenhower as an amateur landscape and portrait painter. (He has trouble as a painter with eyes and hands.) Gunther has explored his reading habits and finds that, like President Truman, Eisenhower likes swift-paced Western stories.

This is all very interesting, but my impression is that lively information about these details takes up almost as much space in the brief book as the recital of facts about the domestic and non-military views of the General, about which there is now proper political curiosity. Gunther's portrait of a General who is really at heart a civilian—or at least has that civilian touch—seemed to me a bit like that of a clergyman who can readily dismiss by his hale heartiness any qualms among the laity which may be created by the cloth. It is easy to share Gunther's admiration but it would be easier to feel the greatness of Eisenhower if in his picture or in his personality there were signs of a life shaped by a little more trouble and pain, personal struggle, and public sympathy.

This book makes good reading. It may make fine politics. The one thing it seemed to me to fail to make was a portrait—wart and all and heart and all—of a man.



—Harris & Ewing.

Familiar Eisenhower plus "technicoloring."

In Soviet Inferno

THE ACCUSED. By Alexander Weissberg. New York: Simon & Schuster. 518 pp. \$4.

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

ALEXANDER WEISSBERG is an Austrian and a Jew, but when he rose to testify in the celebrated libel suit of David Rousset against the Communist *Lettres Françaises*, the counsel for the defense and his clique kept interrupting with such outcries as "What, another German!" and "It turns my stomach to see a Nazi German testifying before a French court!" Finally Rousset's counsel read a warm letter to Stalin from Einstein, and another, invoking the names of Blackett and Niels Bohr, and signed by Jean Perrin, Irene Joliot-Curie, and Frederic Joliot-Curie. The letters asserted Weissberg's innocence, his loyal services to the Soviet Union, his distinction in the world of physics. It was not the names of the five Nobel prize winners, but the fact that the Joliot-Curies are the leaders of the French Communist intellectuals that caused the rest of his testimony to be heard in silence. This episode suggests many of the features that make Dr. Weissberg's account of his three years in the inferno of the Soviet purges unique.

A convinced Communist and a physicist of high rank, Dr. Weissberg in

Bertram D. Wolfe is author of "Three Who Made a Revolution" and other works on Russia.

Encl #14

Ruth B. Shipley: Patriot and Champion
of Americanism

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

MR. FRED E. BUSBEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, July 5, 1952

MR. BUSBEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to add my voice in the defense of a conscientious, honest, honorable, and faithful Government servant, Mrs. Ruth Shipley.

An employee of the State Department for 38 years and head of the Passport Division for nearly a quarter of a century, Mrs. Shipley is representative of that type of individual who devotes a lifetime of service to her country.

The task of determining what American citizen should be issued a passport for travel abroad has always been troublesome. Many American citizens have traveled abroad using spurious, faked, or illegal passports. We have learned by sad experience that the Communist Party in this country specialized for years in the business of collecting passports. Not too many years ago the titular head of the Communist Party was convicted for passport fraud, only to obtain his release by commutation of sentence. Many similar cases have been brought to light by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the culprits escaping conviction due to the statute of limitations on such offenses.

It is the duty and obligation of Mrs. Shipley to deny passports for travel abroad to those American citizens when the available information discloses that the presence of such persons abroad would be a hazard to the security of the United States, or whether the traveler, by his conduct, would create prejudice against the United States.

Because of her refusal to issue passports to certain individuals, Mrs. Shipley has been the target of criticism, vilification, and abuse. The Communist Party of the United States, through its mouthpiece, the Daily Worker, is the prime mover of this attack. The American Civil Liberties Union, as usual, has chimed in with its usual hue and cry about "hearing and review." The Yale Law Review made its contribution with an unsigned article entitled "Passport Refusals for Political Reasons."

What are the known facts about this sudden attack on Mrs. Shipley? According to the New York Herald Tribune of June 1, 1952, the Communist bosses ordered key underground party members to step up their attack on the State Department's policy of "denial of passports for political reasons." They designated Mrs. Shipley as the main target of their attack.

The Daily Worker of June 10, 1952, carried an article to the effect that Paul Robeson cannot travel abroad and earn a livelihood with his magnificent voice because, in the opinion of Mrs. Ruth B. Shipley, his trip would not be in the interest of the United States. The Daily Worker further says that not only Com-

munist are being denied passports by Mrs. Shipley but the vast majority are progressives, New Dealers, or extremely moderate liberals.

This is the typical Communist smear technique. As a matter of fact, the political officers and security division of the State Department are consulted on all such matters. The person applying for a passport has the right to appeal to Mrs. Shipley and to be represented by counsel. And even then, Mrs. Shipley is not the final authority.

We are well aware of what happened to many of the smaller countries of Europe. We have seen this Communist conspiracy grow from an insurrection in Russia to the proportions of a threat to the entire world. We are well informed as to the part played by fifth columns and front organizations. We are informed as to Americans attending these front organization meetings in Europe and belittling the country of their birth while praising the Soviet Union. It is because of such conduct that it became necessary for the State Department to deny passports in cases when it was believed that the travel of such persons would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States.

It has been reported that among those who have been denied passports were two writers for the Daily Worker; Paul Robeson; Max Weiss, educational director of the Communist Party; Rockwell Kent; Howard Fast; Dr. Linus Pauling; Dr. W. E. B. DuBois; and William Patterson.

The educational director of the Communist Party and the writers for the Daily Worker would have but one objective in traveling abroad and that would be to further the cause of international communism. I do not intend to devote any time or space to Paul Robeson. In this individual we have the unfortunate example of one who has turned sour on the country of his birth. Well educated, recipient of many honors, Robeson preferred that his own son be educated in the Soviet Union. On his last trip abroad Robeson had the unmitigated gall to claim he spoke for the American Negro, a claim that was immediately repudiated by the honest and patriotic colored citizens of America. Is it any wonder he was denied a passport?

Dr. DuBois was one of those indicted in connection with the Peace Information Center. Time does not permit the inclusion of his long record of Communist-front affiliations here.

Howard Fast is a Johnny-come-lately in the ranks of Communist frontiers, but in a short time he has accumulated an amazing record of front affiliation.

Rockwell Kent has one of the most outstanding records of Communist-front affiliations of anyone in this country. For his activity on behalf of Communist causes he was rewarded with the job of heading the International Workers Order, a Simon-pure Communist organization.

William L. Patterson is one of the old-timers in the Communist conspiracy. He was formerly a top functionary of the International Labor Defense, the legal arm of the Communist Party.

Later he was the head of the Abraham Lincoln School in Chicago and presently he is the Communist functionary in the Civil Rights Congress. His wife, Louise Thompson, was a member of the women's committee and the national committee of the Communist Party.

It has been reported that the Daily Worker identified a Professor X as Prof. Linus Pauling one of America's most prominent and able scientists and that Dr. Pauling had been denied a passport to visit England. For the sake of argument let us concede that Dr. Pauling is one of America's most prominent and able scientists. Does that, of itself, qualify Dr. Pauling to receive a passport? Klaus Fuchs was considered one of England's most distinguished nuclear physicists, but he received one too many passports. Of course, I am making no comparison between Dr. Pauling and Klaus Fuchs, but let us take a look at Dr. Pauling's record.

Pauling was born in Portland, Oreg., February 28, 1901. He graduated with a bachelor of arts degree from Oregon State College and received his doctor of philosophy degree from the California Institute of Technology in 1925. He holds honorary degrees from Oregon State College, the University of Chicago, and Princeton University. He took post-graduate courses at the University of Munich, the University of Copenhagen, and the University of Zurich. He has been a lecturer on the faculties of the University of California, the University of Chicago, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 1931 he has held a professorship at the California Institute of Technology.

Despite all of this record of academic and scientific attainment, Dr. Pauling has shown a more than passing interest in communism and things communistic. He was affiliated with the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, that Communist organization so active against the Walter-McCarran immigration bill. He protested the deportation of Hanns Eisler, brother of Gerhard Eisler, both European Communists of long standing. He signed a statement in defense of Harry Sacher and other lawyers convicted of contempt of court in the trial of the 11 top Communist Party officials. He signed an open letter in defense of the trustees of the bail fund of the Civil Rights Congress. It is to be remembered that these trustees refused to reveal the sources of the bail fund posted to guarantee the appearance of the convicted Communist Party leaders. Pauling was an initiator of the National Committee To Repeal the McCarran Act, an act wherein the Congress said:

That there exists a world-wide Communist revolutionary movement, the purpose of which is by treachery, deceit, espionage, and sabotage to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in countries throughout the world; that due to the world-wide scope of the movement, the travel of Communist members, representatives, and agents from country to country is a prerequisite for the carrying on of activities to further the purpose of the revolutionary movement; and that individuals in the United States, by participating in this movement, in effect, repu-

date their allegiance to the United States and transfer their allegiance to the foreign country which controls the Communist movement.

Dr. Pauling has been active in several movements to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Since the ending of hostilities in World War II and especially since the resurrection of the Communist International as the "Cominform" the Communist Party line has been to advocate peace. But "peace" to the Communists means no war or preparation for war against the Soviet Union; no aggression against Communist-controlled so-called democracies, but, at the same time, a reversion to the Marxist-Leninist line of carrying on agitation and infiltration of imperialist and capitalist countries.

One of the first groups to raise the phony cry of "peace" was the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace. Dr. Pauling was one of the sponsors. He was also affiliated with the Mid-Century Conference for Peace, the Conference on Peaceful Alternatives, the American Peace Crusade, and the American Continental Congress for Peace. Is it any wonder that Dr. Pauling was denied a passport?

Objection has been made to the actions of Mrs. Shipley in refusing passports to certain American citizens on the ground that she possesses unchecked discretionary power in the Passport Division of the State Department, and her decisions are treated as final and are not subject to review by independent minds. Further objection is made because Members of Congress are denied access to the information upon which the denial of a passport was based. It has been contended that no division of government should be allowed to exercise unchecked, discretionary, and arbitrary powers.

Are we, the Members of Congress, "ye blind guides which strain at a gnat and swallow a camel" when we raise our voices in protest that the denial of a passport to an American citizen for travel abroad is the grant of an unchecked, discretionary, and arbitrary power? Are there not other matters vastly more important to the security of our country than the reasons why certain individuals are not permitted to gad about over the world proclaiming to the high heavens why socialism is better for the United States than our own particular and highly successful form of government?

I say, Mr. Speaker, that if the State Department and other Government agencies were as careful in screening their employees as Mrs. Shipley has been in screening applicants for passports, then there would be less ado about the pinkos, Communists, fellow travelers, and radicals in the Government service.

Bear with me for a moment while I give you an example of what I have in mind. There is a man employed in the State Department—I believe he holds one of the high positions on the Voice of America programs—by the name of Bertram D. Wolfe. While the name may mean nothing to most of us, there is no room for a misunderstanding of this man and his background. Wolfe was one of the founders of the Communist move-

ment in the United States, an intellectual and dyed-in-the-wool Marxist, a charter member of the Communist Party in America.

Wolfe was a member of the left-wing section of the Socialist Party, the founding fathers of the Communist Party in America. Like others in the Communist hierarchy, he made his pilgrimage to Moscow to sit at the foot of the throne of the dictator of international communism. In 1929, along with Jay Lovestone and others, he was ousted from the Communist Party on direct orders from the Communist International for failure to abide by a decision of that body. His appeal to the Comintern from the expulsion is couched in words and terms that leave no doubt as to his devotion to world revolution and sovietization of the world.

When his appeal failed, Wolfe, with Lovestone and others, formed the Communist Party of America (Opposition). Let us not be confused that the word "opposition" in the title of the organization means that the group was opposed to the Communist Party.

Wolfe is the author of a book entitled "What is the Communist Opposition?" Let us quote from this book on page 15:

The fundamental aims of the Communist movement are the same throughout the world—the overthrow of capitalism, the establishment of Soviet power, the building of a Socialist society. But the methods of reaching that goal, the tactics to be applied at a given moment, are different for each country and even for each stage of the struggle in a given country.

From page 37:

The Communist opposition stands unswervingly for the reunification of the Communist movement.

From page 50:

The Communist Party of the United States (Opposition) is a part of the Communist movement of the United States and of the international Communist movement. It stands for the reunification of the Communist Party of the United States, which has been split into three currents or tendencies, and for the reunification of the Communist International, which has been similarly divided. . . . We stand for the proletarian dictatorship, the rule of the working class. It is the only possible means of overthrowing capitalist political rule and economic domination.

From page 51:

The defense of the Soviet Union against all attack by any and all of the capitalist powers is the unconditional duty of the working class of all lands.

Thus wrote a man who now holds a high-level position in the State Department. How did he get there? Is it not more important to the Members of Congress and the safety and security of our country to find out how such people are able to worm their way into Government positions, rather than concern ourselves as to why a mere handful of rabble-rousers are denied the privilege of traveling in foreign countries?

Is it not of far greater importance for Congress to concern itself as to why we are denied access to information about such people as Bertram D. Wolfe than the reason some one was denied a passport?

By Presidential edict Congress is denied the right to review the files of such persons and determine for themselves how these ultra left-wingers manage to infiltrate the Government.

The case of Bertram D. Wolfe could be but one of many. But has any voice been raised in protest? Has the Communist Party, the Daily Worker, or that self-styled champion of civil liberties, the American Civil Liberties Union, protested the appointment of a one-time top functionary of the Communist Party to a high position in the State Department?

Mr. Speaker, it is time for the Congress of the United States to take a step in the right direction. Millions of dollars have been appropriated to the Civil Service Commission for the purpose of ferreting out those in the Government service concerning whom there is a reasonable doubt as to their loyalty. Yet, when Congress inquires as to how the program is operating, we are told that "in the interest of national security" it is none of our business.

I suggest and I urge that, in the future, no funds be appropriated to any Government agency unless it be specifically provided that Congress have access to information from that agency so that it can determine if the funds are being expended for the purpose for which such funds were appropriated.

Let me remind you of the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the recent decision affirming the conviction of the 11 top Communist Party leaders. Mr. Justice Jackson said:

The Communist Party, nevertheless, does not seek its strength primarily in numbers. Its aim is a relatively small party whose strength is in selected, dedicated, indoctrinated, and rigidly disciplined members. From established policy it tolerates no deviation and no debate. It seeks members that are, or may be, secreted in strategic posts in transportation, communications, industry, Government, and especially in labor unions where it can compel employers to accept and retain its members. It also seeks to infiltrate and control organizations of professional and other groups. Through these placements in positions of power it gains a leverage over society that will make up in power of coercion what it lacks in power of persuasion.

It cannot be said now that we are uninformed as to the aims and objectives of the Communist conspiracy. We should demand the right to review the file of the likes of Bertram D. Wolfe, and determine who has been asleep while on guard.

Knowing the feeling of the Members of Congress toward the very fine and efficient manner in which Mrs. Shipley has conducted the Passport Division over the years, I have no hesitancy whatever in stating that at least 98 percent of the Members not only appreciate her work but have nothing but praise for her. Their only regret is that we have not had more people of her character, integrity, spirit of patriotism and devotion to the best ideals of citizenship and Americanism in charge of some of the other departments of government.

Notwithstanding the fact that many so-called left-wing liberals in our Government from time to time have ab-

tempted to have Mrs. Shipley removed from office, they have not succeeded. The Congress of the United States is determined that this element in our Government will never succeed. Mrs. Shipley has, indeed, been a symbol of courage for having withstood the vicious smear and undermining tactics of unpatriotic people, both in and out of Government. She has done this with calm and dignity.

Mrs. Shipley has done much to protect the good name of the United States of America abroad and to keep the Communist Party from using the Passport Division as a transmission belt for its nefarious schemes for world revolution.

Mr. Speaker, the good citizens of the United States, and Members of Congress in particular, must make certain that the Communists working through their many front organizations and publications, as well as all the fellow travellers and self-styled left-wing liberals, never succeed in having Mrs. Shipley removed from her present position. In any such situation the Members of Congress would rise up for her as they would for J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

All patriotic Americans should pray to God that Mrs. Shipley continues in good health with the strength and courage to stand firm for those ideals and principles for which she has been recognized all through her life.

Tribute to Hon. Robert L. Doughton

SPEECH

HON. CARL T. CURTIS

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, July 5, 1952

Mr. CURTIS of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, had the Honorable ROBERT L. DOUGHTON never introduced a bill in Congress or plotted a measure through the House of Representatives he would go down in history as one of America's great.

He is great in mind and in character. His honesty has never been questioned. His rugged individualism is an inspiration to the most ambitious and puts the lazy and indolent to shame. He never hesitated to stand up and be counted. When others may have been tempted to be carried away by false notions, Uncle Bob always held steady. He has set an example in his fairness and courtesy to his colleagues. He has been interested in, and considerate of, every taxpayer in the United States.

Mr. DOUGHTON is a true patriot. To him, living within our national income and the payment of our national debt are absolute musts in the maintenance of our national honor. No one will ever be able to take the place of the Honorable ROBERT L. DOUGHTON in the Halls of Congress—what the Nation needs is more Members who will try to emulate him.

One of the rare privileges that has been mine as a Member of Congress has been to serve under this great man, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means.

The Road to Seizure

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. WILLIAM E. JENNER

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Saturday, July 5, 1952

Mr. JENNER. Mr. President, I take pleasure in asking permission to insert in the Congressional Record the following editorial from the National Grange Monthly for June 1952, by Herschel D. Newsom, master, National Grange.

As Mr. Newsom says, the problems of the attempted seizure of the steel industry by President Truman will be with us for a long time to come:

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE ROAD TO SEIZURE

(By Herschel D. Newsom, master, National Grange.)

While it is to be hoped that, by one means or another, the Federal Government's seizure of the steel industry will be a matter of history rather than a state of actuality by the time this editorial appears in print, it seems obvious that the scars and other effects including the bitterness, the misunderstanding, and the short tempers, certainly will not be forgotten, but are likely to exist for some time to come. It, therefore, seems appropriate that we think about the subject, its causes, how the situation might have been or should have been prevented and, as we look to the future, we might well ponder whether or not America can afford this sort of experience.

"THEY ASKED FOR IT"

The president of the United Steelworkers of America complained that they had been denied the privilege of engaging in collective-bargaining processes and had seen substituted in lieu thereof the necessity of pleading their case before the Wage Stabilization Board of the Economic Stabilization Administration. He further complained that they have been and are now told by their Government they cannot strike in order to gain acceptance of their demand. We cannot refrain from commenting "they asked for it." It should be recalled that at the time of the "labor walk-out on stabilization" in early 1951 the leaders of American labor had demanded that, under price control and wage stabilization, an official Government agency should be established and authorized to consider all labor disputes, economic and un-economic. They gained that objective! The Wage Stabilization Board was established and authorized to consider the so-called fringe demands as well as actual wage demands. The union's contention that "price discussions were thrust into the steel-wage controversy because and only because the companies wanted it that way" is hardly an accurate statement.

It is obvious that under a control program, or to use the actual official title—under Wage and Price Stabilization—it is impossible to divorce wages, and other costs of operation of business, from the subject of price. We are not prepared to justify any specific price demands of the steel industry. Neither are we prepared to justify any of the demands of the union or recommendations of the Wage Stabilization Board. We only say that it seems reasonable that the need of price change might readily be created by a substantial change in wage scale or in any other cost of operation, and conversely that it

seems unrealistic to insist they are two completely separable and unrelated problems.

FUNDAMENTAL LESSON

But there is an even more important fundamental lesson to this unhappy experience in modern American social, economic, and political history. Free labor unions were born and have grown out of the necessity of joint action on the part of the wage earners of America to employ the tool of organization to improve their economic and social conditions and those of their families. Collective bargaining, as originally conceived, is a part of the normal function and legitimate practice of such organizations, but we cannot refrain from expressing a personal feeling that the effect of industry-wide collective bargaining to that of creating a new monopoly which is potentially more powerful than any other agency in the Nation except the Nation itself, or in other words, the Government. This may well be another example of how our farm-family fraternity may be compelled to take a position on a matter that seemingly is somewhat removed from agriculture and rural life but which, nonetheless, affects all of us vitally. We have long felt that industry-wide collective bargaining should be prevented because it is as monopolistic in its concept as industry-wide pricing. In this particular crisis approximately 88 percent of one of the Nation's biggest industries has clashed head-on with an industry-wide demand of an industry-wide union and in the battle of these two giants, Government has assumed new and additional powers largely as a result of an effort to effect stabilization.

It is not our position here to discuss the propriety nor the effectiveness of any particular action of our Government in this controversy. It is our purpose to point out that seizure was a result of the road that we have traveled. It is difficult to see why we continually refuse to concern ourselves with the causes.

DOWN THE ROAD

Controls and increasing governmental authority are no satisfactory substitute for moral, political, or economic responsibility. If we fail to understand that the history of expanding liberty and freedom of the individual is likewise the history of restricted rather than extended power of Government, we will continue to travel the road that leads to seizure of property and conscription of manpower.

GI Bill of Rights

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ALVIN F. WEICHEL

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1952

Mr. WEICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I am including herewith the following news item from the Toledo Blade:

GI RIGHTS ASKED FOR KOREA VETS—WEICHEL JOINS GROUP IN SPONSORING BILL.

WASHINGTON, February 7.—Representative ALVIN F. WEICHEL, Republican, of Sandusky, Ohio, joined yesterday in sponsoring a bill to extend the GI bill of rights to cover Korea veterans.

The bill would provide 1½ days of training for every day of service, up to a total of 86 months—sufficient for the ordinary college degree.

An education of training allowance would be paid directly to the veteran \$110 a month for a single man, \$150 for a man with one or more dependents. This is intended to

Oil and the Good Neighbor

BY BERTRAM D. WOLFE

APRIL 8 to 15 was Pan-American Week. With due solemnity the President issued a proclamation countersigned by the Secretary of State calling upon churches, schools, and the people generally to observe "with appropriate ceremonies" the occasion on which the "twenty-one American republics commemorate their peace, friendship, and solidarity." Then, with an ineptness that has not before been shown by the State Department under the present Administration, Cordell Hull chose this same week to release his note to Mexico on oil and land claims. Inevitably, Mexico celebrated Pan-American Week with great popular demonstrations of protest. And the other Latin American countries looked on with mounting disquiet.

The best that can be said for the timing of the Hull note is that the Secretary's mind and that of the President were on other matters. The most charitable interpretation would make of it a pre-convention maneuver intended to short-circuit Republican-Garner criticism of Roosevelt and Hull for alleged passivity in the face of Mexican expropriations. Other aspects of the timing do not lend themselves to such charitable explanation. The suspicion will not down that the note was intended to stiffen the united front of the Anglo-American oil companies and forestall a compromise agreement between Sinclair and the Mexican government. All through March these difficult negotiations were progressing satisfactorily, and it was rumored that a draft agreement had been reached.

It is unfortunate that the note came at a time to influence not one but two Presidential elections. Mexico's electoral campaign is long past the convention stage, in fact, is nearing its culmination. The voting takes place in July, and may be followed—as has so often happened—by an uprising of the opposition. Fortunately, such an uprising seems less likely than usual—unless one, or both, of the opponents of the Administration's chosen candidate is led to think that he can count on oil-company subsidies, gun-running from Texas, and other forms of extra-official encouragement. The oil question has figured as a campaign issue, both the opposition candidates having criticized the Cárdenas administration for alienating foreign capital. The Hull note will inevitably be construed in some quarters as an attempt to influence the election and an encouragement to the preparation of an uprising this summer.

In justice to Roosevelt and Hull it should be said that worse notes have been sent to Mexico. But the senders

were less emphatic about their good neighborliness. And the document was after all stiff enough to be headlined in the *New York Times* as a "warning." The nub of the note lies in a doctrine which is enunciated at least four times in its pages. It challenges the "right," the "legality," and the morals of expropriation without "adequate, effective, and prompt compensation." Even a promise to pay in the future is rejected as "not expropriation but confiscation."

History, less severe than Mr. Hull, "recognizes" two distinct kinds of expropriation. One is the kind Mr. Hull is prepared to recognize: a normal action of a government engaged in exercising its right of eminent domain, perhaps to build a bridge or enlarge a harbor. It does not involve any social upheaval or any challenge to the legality or morality of the title to the property "condemned" or purchased. But there is also another form of expropriation, in which a government or people calls in question the legality of the title and its mode of acquisition. Examples of the latter type in our own history are the expropriation of the Crown lands and Tory estates after the American Revolution, the liberation of the slaves during the Civil War—both without compensation—and the repudiation of the loans contracted by the Southern states during the rebellion. This repudiation was made by retroactive, constitutional amendment, as in Mexico, and although many of the bondholders were Englishmen we would not hear of compensation or arbitration or foreign intervention.

An example even closer to the Mexican case is our nullification, without compensation, of the Teapot Dome oil concessions, an act which affected some of the same companies that are complainants against Mexico. The nullification was not by revolution but by simple court action. What a howl we would have set up if some foreign government had attempted to intervene on behalf of a foreign stockholder or company! Yet in law and in ethics the action of the government in the Teapot Dome case paralleled the present contentions of the Mexican government. The bulk of the Mexican oil concessions were secured from the self-perpetuating Díaz dictatorship in ways which violated the fundamental law and public interest of Mexico. Díaz and his actions were later repudiated by the Mexican people by revolution and by retroactive constitutional provision. Thus the Hull note is tantamount to a refusal to recognize the Mexican Revolution. To add insult to injury, the note specifically refuses to recognize the right of the Mexican courts to decide the

matter. If Mexico accepted the note's central contention, the country would, in fact if not in form, return to the colonial-feudal status of the Díaz period.

During the course of years of badgering, Mexico, ever conscious of the great power of its neighbor, has let drop its claimed right to undo Díaz's acts without compensation. It professes a willingness to pay, but not at such a rate as would bankrupt its weak economy and force it to grind the life out of its own people. In these years of crisis and debt repudiation we have sent no such hectoring notes to the non-paying European governments. The suspicion is inescapable that our readiness to lecture Mexico in this fashion springs from a consciousness of its nearness and our overwhelming military superiority.

But how, the Mexicans ask, can they pay whatever their courts may determine unless they can sell the oil and break the silent, powerful blockade of the oil companies upon their petroleum export? How can they pay considerable sums while their finances are in crisis, in part as a result of the deliberate raids upon their banking system engineered by the oil companies?

The Mexican peso—whose nominal par is two to the dollar—is selling now at six to the dollar. In this connection also the timing of the Hull note becomes significant, since it followed closely on a recommendation of a Senate subcommittee that silver purchases from Mexico should be discontinued. In that event a further drop in the peso might be expected. (The whole system of silver purchases at inflated prices is silly, but no more so than the silver policy pursued within this country, or the purchase of gold from the South African and Canadian mines at inflated prices.) Moreover, 70 per cent of Mexican mining is done by American companies—with Mexico deriving benefit only from the payment of wages and taxes and the support given to the peso. If we cut off that support to force an oil "settlement," we may find that American-owned silver mines will close down, that the Mexican government will intervene to keep them open by expropriation, and that there will be still more mouths clamoring at the State Department.

The Mexicans distinguish, and rightly, between foreign capital invested in Mexican factories to produce consumers' goods for sale in Mexico, and capital invested in the extraction of Mexico's natural subsoil wealth for sale in the foreign market. The former, the Mexicans contend, has some interest in raising the standard of living of the Mexican masses and thus expanding the domestic market for consumers' goods. But the capital invested in oil and mineral extraction has no such interest—quite the contrary. Since it extracts virtually the whole product for sale abroad, it has a natural affinity for corrupt officials easily suborned to give generous oil and mining concessions and for dictatorial regimes that permit a maximal exploitation of cheap native labor. It is significant that the break with the oil companies came not so much over

the amount of wages to be paid as over the amount to be spent on schools, recreation centers, sanitation, potable water, housing, vacations, and social services for employees.

Automatically, such notes as Hull's tend to revive the latent hostility that long divided the Americas into two unequal and unfriendly camps. We may be ready to forget our past history, but our southern neighbors cannot forget so easily. They welcome our recent better manners but insist that it takes more than fair phrases to make good neighbors or convince them that our economic penetration is not to be feared and that the big stick will never again be flourished in the Caribbean. Mexico is the outpost of Central and South America; all of Latin America is watching our treatment of it to see what our good-neighbor speeches mean when translated into action. By pressing the dubious claims of oil, land, mining, power, and railroad corporations, by encouraging them to refuse to come to an agreement with the Mexican government, by demanding that a Mexico in crisis devote all its meager resources to immediate payment of those claims, we are steering toward a new head-on collision with Mexico.

Woodrow Wilson followed a curiously similar trajectory, getting himself involved with Mexico over oil while Europe was at war. He came in the end to regret it. If the present Administration nourishes the idea that intervention in a European war is again a possibility, it is hard to believe that the State Department will deliberately press things to an open break. But one step is apt to lead to another, and error, too, has its own logic. We are dealing with a proud and sensitive nation that is being pressed dangerously close to the wall and is keenly conscious of its material weakness and past grievances. And we are acting in behalf of Anglo-American oil companies that are among the world's most arrogant aggregations of capital. Under such circumstances an open break could come easily.

The Hull note was a serious error, but not an irretrievable one. It preserved enough of the diplomatic amenities to leave a way out other than that of open conflict. Mexico's answer, it is safe to forecast, will be polite, dignified, but in essence unyielding, since to yield would mean bankruptcy and fresh turmoil.

A policy of generosity and neighborliness toward Mexico now would help that unhappy country to solve some of its basic problems. It would even be in harmony with the interests of the oil companies, which may thereby some day receive compensation in the form of a royalty percentage on oil sales. It would raise the domestic market and level of common life in Mexico, to the ultimate advantage of the American consumer-goods industries. In a time of spreading conflict, it would help to create a genuine, tolerant neighborliness which would enrich life throughout the Americas.

Encl # 15

are as vital a part of medical tradition as its science and its art. Practice, it is true, may lag behind principles, but at least such failure is regarded as discreditable; and it is hard to imagine any kind of civilization in which the ethical principles of medicine were disregarded. That is one reason why the future possibility of biological warfare is particularly repugnant. Today science finds itself, unexpectedly and without those centuries of tradition and experience, in a position no less important to the community than medicine: and its ethical principles have not yet clearly emerged.

Every candidate for admission to the earliest of American learned associations was required to answer yes to the question, "Do you love truth for truth's sake, and will you endeavor impartially to find . . . it for yourself and communicate it to others?" That affirmation might have its place in a modern scientific version of the Hippocratic Oath. But again the same dilemma arises—"endeavor impartially . . . to communicate it to others." Apart altogether from considerations of national security, in many fields today much of the best research is done, and done increasingly, in industrial laboratories. Those who have seen and admired such work, and the people who do it, cannot but applaud the foresight which made it possible. But if all the results are to be communicated at once and impartially to others, could directors and shareholders be reasonably expected to continue their support? Indeed, if an industry were nationalized could it afford to give away its secrets to competitors abroad? Not in any real world, in which a nation must remain solvent and industry must depend for success on the rapid application of new knowledge. The dilemma must be met by reasonable compromise, of which perhaps the most hopeful sign today is that many of the directors of industry come up through research departments. A friendly and familiar contact between management and research, and between industrial and outside scientists, can reduce this particular dilemma to manageable size.

A graver problem is provided by research under government, when considerations of security come in. In the emergency which became evident in 1935, the secret development of radar for purposes of air defense aroused no obvious pangs of conscience; and many other developments come in that class. But the surest of military maxims is that counter attack is an essential part of defense; to limit scientific methods to defensive weapons would be to ensure defeat, indeed it is quite impracticable. But let us be realists; so long as offensive weapons may be used, the part played by the scientist is no more immoral than that of the engineer, the workman, the soldier or the statesman, and the attitude of "holier-than-thou" is unbecoming. We all bear, as citizens, an equal responsibility. But is it practical to suggest that all scientists in all countries should agree, and hold to their agreement whatever happens, to take no part in research on offensive weapons? or at least should endeavor impartially to communicate its results to others? The answer is evident. There

are individuals in all free countries who find such work intolerable. In those countries their scruples are respected and they are at liberty to do something else; but let them not imagine that the problem is solved that way, or that those who think otherwise are necessarily stupid or immoral. The first condition of freedom is freedom of conscience, and the scientist has the same right to that as any citizen: but freedom does not extend to giving away other people's property, whether of goods or knowledge.

There seems to be no simple answer to the riddle. All knowledge, not only that of the natural world, can be used for evil as well as good: and in all ages there continue to be people who think that its fruit should be forbidden. Does the future welfare, therefore, of mankind depend on a refusal of science and a more intensive study of the Sermon on the Mount? There are others who hold the contrary opinion, that more and more of science and its applications alone can bring prosperity and happiness to men. Both of these extreme views seem to me entirely wrong—though the second is the more perilous, as more likely to be commonly accepted. The so-called conflict between science and religion is usually about words, too often the words of their unbalanced advocates: the reality lies somewhere in between. "Completeness and dignity," to use Tyndall's phrase, are brought to man by three main channels, first by the religious sentiment and its embodiment in ethical principles; secondly by the influence of what is beautiful in nature, human personality or art, and thirdly by the pursuit of scientific truth and its resolute use in improving human life. Some suppose that religion and beauty are incompatible: others, that the aesthetic has no relation to the scientific sense: both seem to me just as mistaken as those who hold that the scientific and the religious spirit are necessarily opposed. Co-operation is required, not conflict: for science can be used to express and apply the principles of ethics, and those principles themselves can guide the behavior of scientific men: while the appreciation of what is good and beautiful can provide to both a vision of encouragement.

Is there really then any special ethical dilemma which we scientific men, as distinct from other people, have to meet? I think not: unless it be to convince ourselves humbly that we are just like others in having moral issues to face. It is true that integrity of thought is the absolute condition of our work, and that judgments of value must never be allowed to deflect our judgments of fact. But in this we are not unique. It is true that scientific research has opened up the possibility of unprecedented good, or unlimited harm, for mankind; but the use that is made of it depends in the end on the moral judgments of the whole community of men. It is totally impossible now to reverse the process of discovery: it will certainly go on. To help to guide its use aright is not a scientific dilemma, but the honorable and compelling duty of a good citizen.

Tito and Stalin

WINDOW INTO THE COMINFORM

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE, Chief, Ideological Advisory Section, Voice of America, Dept. of State, United States International Information Administration, New York, N. Y.

Delivered before an interested group of specialists, Washington, D. C., June, 1952

I. AMBIGUITIES IN THE MARXIST ATTITUDE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

THERE is a certain ambiguity in the Marxian attitude towards the national question, which is the first matter which I propose to examine. If you read the

Communist Manifesto, you will find on the one hand a declaration that the workers have no country to defend; next, that their aim is to establish themselves as the nation; next you will find an economic or market theory of Nationalism and Internationalism—that the idea of nationality

grows up only when the nationwide market has developed so that you would automatically expect a feeling of nationality to coincide with the size of a given national or nationwide market.

On the other hand, you also have a declaration concerning the rights of complete restoration of Poland as an independent nationality in the Communist Manifesto. Poland was geared at that time part into the German market, part into the Russian market, part into the Austrian-Hungarian market. So it is quite obvious that Marx has abandoned his own economic interpretation of Nationalism in favor of recognition that there is a kind of demi-urge that has lived underground, something of the spirit of the Polish people which demands the restoration of Polish national independence. Thus even in the Communist Manifesto we find an ambiguity on the national question, which I take as the first background point in an approach to the question of Titoism.

Second, you will find in the relations between Lenin and Stalin a certain ambiguity on the national question. In 1920 Lenin was preparing a document (a series of propositions or theses) for the Communist International Congress on the *National and Colonial Question*. He sent a copy of it to Stalin for his opinion (as he did to a number of other people) and Stalin wrote back a criticism, expressing a disagreement with Lenin's thesis. Now that criticism (and I call your attention to the early date—June 12, 1920)—that criticism is extremely interesting.

Stalin writes:

"For nations which made up part of old Russia, our Soviet-type of federation may and must be accounted expedient as the road to unity. These nationalities either did not have a state of their own in the past or have long lost it, in view of which fact the Soviet centralized-type of federation will graft itself onto them without any serious friction. But the same cannot be said of those nationalities which did not make up a part of old Russia—which existed as independent formations, developed their own states and which, if they become Soviet, will be obliged by force or circumstances to enter into one or another governmental relationship with Soviet Russia.

"For example, a future Soviet Germany, Soviet Poland, Soviet Hungary, Soviet Finland—" (now this is 1920, and is a basic document which we might call Stalin's "Mein Kampf") "these peoples, having had their own state, their own army, their own finances, will hardly agree—even though they become Soviet—to enter at once into a federal bond with Soviet Russia of the type of the Bashkir or Ukrainian. For a federation of the Soviet type would be looked upon by the mass as a form of diminution of their state independence, as an attack upon it. I have no doubt, therefore, that for these nationalities the most acceptable form of reapprochement will be a Confederation." (By which he means a kind of alliance or loose union of nominally independent states). "I say nothing of the backward nations; for example: Persia, Turkey—in relation to which or for which the Soviet type of federation and federation, in general, would be still more unacceptable."

This criticism of Lenin's thesis (which, by the way, Lenin rejected) indicates that as early as June 12, 1920 Stalin already had a concept of a future Soviet Germany, a Soviet Finland, a Soviet Hungary. He recognized that they could not directly enter into the Soviet Union "Federation" and he proposed a transition form which today he calls "The System of People's Democracies." Thus the first approach

of Stalin to what today we call "Titoism" can be found in this document. Now where can you find this document today? It is not in Stalin's Collected Works. He has excluded it from the canon of his Collected Works because it is too revealing. Nevertheless, you can find it in Lenin's Collected Works—in the Russian Third Edition, Volume XXV, page 624, as a footnote, in which Stalin's criticism written to Lenin is given in full. It is a document worthy of much more study than our leaders have so far given it.

The third point in Stalin's special views on the national question to which I wish to call your attention, is a contempt on Stalin's part for the right of borderlands and neighbors to genuine independence. On October 10, 1920, he wrote:

"Central Russia, this fireplace of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the help of the borderlands rich in raw materials, fuel, food . . . The separation of the borderlands would undermine the revolutionary might of Central Russia . . . for the borderlands, there are possible only two outcomes:

EITHER together with Russia . . .

OR together with the Entente . . .

There is no third possibility.

The so-called independence of the so-called independent Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only a deceptive appearance covering up the full dependence of these governments (if you will excuse me for calling them governments) from this or that group of Imperialists." (PRAVDA, October 20, 1920; Stalin's Collected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 351-363).

The fourth constituent element in the Stalinist attitude on Titoism I find in his definition of an "internationalist." On August 1, 1927, he said,

"A revolutionary is one who, without reservation, unconditionally, openly and honestly is ready to defend and protect the U.S.S.R., since the U.S.S.R. is the first proletarian revolutionary state in the world. An internationalist is he who unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the U.S.S.R., because the U.S.S.R. is the base of the world revolutionary movement. And to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement is impossible without defending the U.S.S.R."

The last point of ambiguity in this Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist attitude towards the national question I offer in the form of a conversation between Bukharin and Armstrong, who wrote a book on Tito. Bukharin said to Armstrong:

"National rivalry between Communist states is by definition 'an impossibility.'"

By definition it is impossible for the Soviet Union to be Imperialist; by definition it is impossible for the United States not to be Imperialist; by definition whatever the Soviet Union does is peaceful and by definition whatever the Soviet Union does is democratic. And so we are not surprised to find that national rivalry between Communist states is by definition "an impossibility." Just as Capitalism cannot live without war, so war cannot live with Communism.

Bukharin did not live long enough to learn better.

II. THE BREAK BETWEEN STALIN AND TITO

We turn now to the open break between Tito and Stalin. This open break is as significant for our understanding of the Communist International, or the Cominform, as that famous unhealing fistula was for gastro-intestinal observa-

tion. You remember there was a doctor who once tried to operate and heal a fistula in the stomach of a living man. He failed, so he finally put in a window, took advantage of that open porthole, and continued to examine the functioning of the stomach and the intestines through it. Thus modern gastro-intestinal science developed. In the same sense the break between Tito and Stalin opened a window into the deeply secret processes that go on inside the Cominform. In the early days of the Comintern there were public debates, rival proposals, and thus we could get some notion of what went on. But, increasingly, the Comintern became monolithic, and with it came unanimity and overwhelming blanket secrecy. Were it not for this break we would have very little notion indeed of how the Cominform functions.

How shall we interpret the break between Tito and Stalin? We can interpret it first in emotional terms and say that Stalinism underrates the everlasting determination of peoples to be themselves. The 20th Century's chief lesson thus far, I should say, is that national independence is one of the few things for which men are willing to fight and die.

Secondly, we can interpret it in historical terms—people with different experiences, different traditions, different cultures, inevitably have differing values. Even a World State would never be able to bleach out all the varied national colors from life.

Third, we can interpret it in terms of national interest and national traditions. The Yugoslavs have a tradition of resistance to outside tyrants—a tradition formed in the struggle against the Turks, strengthened in the struggle against Hitler, and now given fresh life and meaning in the struggle against Stalin.

Fourth, we can interpret it in terms of a special Balkan political tradition. Every Balkan Communist, every Balkan Socialist, every Balkan Democrat, every Balkan Liberal, has been brought up in the tradition of the need for a Federation of Balkan Republics. When we speak of "The Balkanization of Europe" we have in mind the same thing which has been the curse of life in the Balkans. The Balkan peninsula has been the playground of Great Powers—France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia—and Balkan patriots have long felt that the only way their lands could cease to be a playground of the Great Powers was if they were to federate and form a genuine Federated Power of their own. So it was almost automatic for Communists in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Rumania, as it would have been automatic for Socialists or for Republicans and Democrats, the moment they came to power in all those countries and felt a kinship with each other—it was automatic to propose a Balkan Federation. But, at that moment there was only one great power that was still to be kept out of the Balkans by a Balkan Federation: namely, the Soviet Union. And Stalin reacted angrily to the proposal of a powerful Balkan Federation which might have stood up against him.

Fifth, we can interpret the Tito break in terms of personal conflict, and this is the more instructive because Tito is a kind of "pocket" Stalin. Of all the disciples of Stalin, the one that learned most from him and was closest to him was Joseph Broz, known as Tito. Now Stalinism is a jealous "ism." It is a kind of ersatz religion in which Stalin has become the infallible, the omniscient, the omnipotent leader and father of the peoples. The *vozhd* is a jealous *vozhd* and beside him there is no other *vozhd*. He may have disciples—twelve, or twelve times twelve, or any number—but he may not have partners, associates, or second-string leaders. The disciple who challenges this becomes by definition a "Judas Iscariot."

Sixth, we might interpret Titoism in ideological terms. We might bear in mind that orthodoxies tend to breed heresies; dogmas—challenge; commands—disobedience. Then the heresies, in turn, will claim to be orthodoxies, even as so many heresies in the Christian churches appeal to "primitive Christianity." So Titoism has appealed to "primitive Leninism," against Stalin's modifications or "betrayals" of what Tito claims to be orthodox Leninism. It is within this closed circle that Titoism has developed, and only now—reluctantly, hesitatingly, dubiously—some of Tito's ideologues are beginning to question certain tenets of Leninism itself.

III. THE MULTIPLE APPEAL OF TITOISM

Having made this multiple interpretation of the development of Titoism, I want to suggest something of the multiple appeal of Titoism. It appeals to national patriotism against treason to one's country; yes, and even to the class that a Communist professes to represent. Wherever you have to put the interests of the Soviet government above the interests of your own country, your own people, and against your own working class—then you are faced with the problem of treason. Reluctance to commit these forms of treason is one of the appeals that Titoism makes to the Communist in other countries.

Second, it appeals to "primitive Leninism" as a return to purity of doctrine and true equalitarian internationalism.

Third, it appeals to fellow travelers "out on a limb" and anxious to climb down without any loss of revolutionary posture. I refer to an O. John Rogge in this country or a Ziliakus in England. The cold war having created an intolerable situation for people out on that limb, the problem was how they could climb down, yet still appear faithful to some kind of revolutionary doctrine. Tito gave the answer, which I think helps to explain why a Ziliakus or a Rogge becomes so ardent a Titoist.

Fourth, Titoism has an appeal to his neighbors still needing a Balkan Federation to defend themselves—to Italy and to Greece.

Fifth, it is of especial interest to the Atlantic Pact Nations, for it represents the crack in the armor, the breach in the walls. I have every sympathy for the plight of the Yugoslav people who are still under the heel of a totalitarian dictatorship and from their standpoint it would certainly be much better if Tito were a Democrat and not a totalitarian Communist dictator. But from the standpoint of our interest at the present phase of the cold war, I can't help thinking Tito is more useful to us as a Communist than he would be as a Democrat.

IV. FACTORS WHICH MADE TITOISM POSSIBLE

Now I turn to the genesis of the Tito break. The first aspect that we must consider is the special circumstances under which Titoist Yugoslavia was born. Like Poland, Yugoslavia resisted German invasion from the outset. There is this difference, however, that Poland resisted both Hitler and Stalin while Titoist Yugoslavia resisted Hitler only when Stalin and Hitler broke.

Second, Yugoslavia is an ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare and although its main armies were easily smashed by the Wehrmacht, yet in the mountains of Yugoslavia guerrilla warfare was never abandoned.

Third, the Tito forces participated in the final liberation of Yugoslavia and functioned as a kind of junior ally to the Soviet Army.

Fourth, their mountains were never fully occupied by Hitler as their country was never occupied by Stalin. It was

the only East European state to escape Red Army occupation, therefore theoretically self-liberated.

Fifth, geographically, Yugoslavia is farthest from Russia of the so-called "People's Democracies." It has no contiguous border with the Soviet Union. It has direct contact with the non-Communist world—with Italy, with Greece and with the open sea along the shores of the Adriatic. These, then, are the special circumstances which made possible the rise of Titoism.

V. DIFFERENCES WHICH LED TO THE BREAK

Now I should like to examine some of the differences—muted, but stubborn—that developed between Tito and Stalin long before either of them recognized that these differences were leading to a break. On March 5, 1942, Moscow sent a cable to Tito, criticizing him for being too pro-Soviet and too openly Communist in his conduct of the struggle inside Yugoslavia. I quote a few sentences from the Moscow Cable:

"WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION THE FOLLOWERS OF ENGLAND AND THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE PARTISAN MOVEMENTS IS ASSUMING A COMMUNIST CHARACTER AND THAT IT INTENDS TO SOVIETIZE YUGOSLAVIA. THE BASIC AND IMMEDIATE TASK CONSISTS NOW IN THE UNIFICATION OF ALL ANTI-HITLER ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO CRUSH THE OCCUPIER AND ACHIEVE NATIONAL LIBERATION. IS IT REALLY TRUE THAT BESIDES THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS THERE ARE NO OTHER YUGOSLAV PATRIOTS TOGETHER WITH WHOM YOU COULD FIGHT AGAINST THE ENEMY?"

Now this is an instruction—not to cease to plan for a Soviet Yugoslavia, but to slow up and dissimulate the tempo of progress in that direction. We thus find that Tito is more Communist and more openly pro-Soviet than Stalin wishes him to be at that moment. A similar instruction went to Mao and, as you know, Mao Tse-tung accepted the instruction and continued to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek, but Tito stepped up his campaign against Mihailovich after receiving this cable. The Soviet Union continued to maintain a "hands off" appearance until very late.

There was no Soviet mission in Yugoslavia until February, 1944, although there was a Military Mission from Britain from May, 1942 on. In 1944 a Yugoslav brigade, trained in Russia, came equipped with uniforms with royal Yugoslav emblems and only after Tito protested were the emblems removed. In 1943, while Stalin was still uncertain whether Mihailovich or Tito would come out on top and still wished to avoid alarming the Western powers, he gave no direct help to Tito. Tito was puzzled, angered, and the only answer he knew was to step up his offensive and campaign of propaganda against Mihailovich. Only when the Americans and the British showed no unfavorable reaction and when all sorts of people in America and in Britain began to echo Tito's propaganda that Mihailovich was a Nazi collaborator—only then did Stalin conclude that his cautions and fears were exaggerated and only then did he begin to give open help to Tito.

Another curious document of 1942 is a lecture from Stalin to Tito on what "Internationalism" consists of during World War II. I quote:

"The defeat of the Fascist bandits and the liberation from the occupier is now the basic task and is above all other tasks. Take into consideration that the Soviet Union has treaty obligations with the Yugoslav king and government and that any open actions against these would create new difficulties in the common war efforts in the relations between the Soviet Union and England and America. Do not consider your struggle only from your own national viewpoint, but from the international point of view of the English-Soviet-American coalition. Strengthen your positions in the people's liberation struggle," (you see Stalin is not averse to what Tito is trying to do), "and at the same time show more elasticity and ability to maneuver."

On this Tito commented to his close crony, Mosa Pijade, "I did not give too many explanations to Grandpa, I merely asked for more weapons to carry out his instructions." And Grandpa, in turn, sent word that there were "technical difficulties" which prevented the sending of more weapons.

Next, it is well to remember that the party which Tito now leads is truly a Titoist Party. A bit of biography will help. Tito was born Joseph Broz in 1892 in Hapsburg, Croatia. He was a war prisoner of the Russians in World War I. There he was indoctrinated by the Bolsheviks, joined the Red Army, and got his first military training in the civil war that followed in Russia after World War I. Sent back to Yugoslavia, he became Secretary of the Metalworkers' Union of Zagreb. In 1928 he did a tour of duty of five years in jail, where he met Mosa Pijade, who was a fellow inmate, and their close friendship and collaboration began. When he got out of jail, he got a postgraduate course in the Lenin School in Moscow.

From the Lenin School he was sent to Paris to carry on some important Comintern duties in connection with the Spanish Civil War. In Paris he steeped his hands in the blood of "The Purges" when the Blood Purges were carried into Spain and served to demoralize the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. By this participation in the Purge, Tito rose from an obscure second rank figure in the Yugoslav Communist Party to the chief of that party. For, those earlier leaders who had stood in his way and were his superiors largely disappeared in "The Purges."

In 1941 the Yugoslav Party numbered 12,000 members. Less than 3,000 of them survived at the end of the Second World War, but by 1948 those 3,000 had swelled to 470,000—most of whom never knew any leader but Tito.

Now a glance at the Balkan Federation question. Dimitrov visited Tito at Bled in the summer of 1947. Their principal subject of conversation was the setting up of a Balkan Federation. Dimitrov for Bulgaria and Tito for Yugoslavia issued a joint communique about the immediate steps for the setting up of a Federation of Balkan People's Democratic Republics. Stalin reacted instantly with anger. Dimitrov was forced to retract and disclaim their joint initiative in articles which were published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIA. But Tito did not publish a disclaimer. This, therefore, is a key point in the break.

Nevertheless in the autumn of 1947 (when the Cominform was established as a public body with the primary aim of fighting the Marshall Plan and a secondary aim of setting up a federation of satellites in the Balkans under Soviet domination which would be just the opposite of a Balkan Federation such as Dimitrov and Tito had envisaged)—at that point Tito was still the shining example and his country the most advanced of all the People's Democracies that had been created during World War II. The Cominform headquarters were in Belgrade. Tito was regarded as

the outstanding of the Balkan leaders. Every one admired him for his power, for his having attained that power independently, and for his general manifestation of independence. Yugoslavia was being used throughout the world by Communists and fellow travelers as the model Communist state of those that had been newly born. Only after the open fight between Stalin and Tito were headquarters of the Cominform switched from Belgrade to Bucharest.

Now let us examine the relations between Stalin and Tito during the critical period. Tito visited Moscow in April, 1945. He came back with a twenty-year treaty of friendship and mutual aid, with a military mission to run his army, an economic mission to integrate his industry into the Soviet economic plan. And he learned, to his dismay, that that plan envisaged Yugoslavia as a kind of second-class agricultural, raw material, metal-producing land, subordinate in rank to Czechoslovakia, to Poland and to Hungary, for Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were slated for a greater degree of industrialization. I do not have to tell you that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary possessed a greater degree of industrialization at the moment they were taken over by the Communists.

Tito was, moreover, at that interview urged into open battle with his own people. One way in which Stalin keeps puppets as puppets is to get them thus into open struggle with their own people. He was urged to go head-on into forced collectivization of Yugoslav agriculture. He recognized that his army was to be reduced to an auxiliary troop of the Soviet Army and that the whole scheme reduced Yugoslavia to a subordinate part in a detailed blueprint from Moscow to all her satellites. He recognized, too, that far from "withering away," this form of state domination was destined to grow stronger and the Soviet Empire would be ever more unified, and the Balkan portions of it ever more subjected and coordinated into that Soviet Empire. He was put before the dilemma that Yugoslavia was to remain as before—poor, backward, weak, dependent, and subject to the will of greater powers, in this case the Soviet Union.

He paid a second visit to Stalin in May and June, 1946. Here they went into more detail on the same matters. He learned that the U.S.S.R. was going to reorganize the Yugoslav Army with modern tactics and modern equipment. There was to be no national manual of arms in this thoroughly national Guerrilla Army, but it was to take the Soviet manual of arms, just as, a little later, Hungary was ordered to teach its soldiers to take commands in Russian as well as in Hungarian. There was to be no national arms industry—generous equipment with weapons but if at any time they wore out or at any time Tito needed new munitions for them, he would have to come "hat in hand" to the Soviet Union once more. There was a Soviet Mission to go to Yugoslavia and take virtual command of the Yugoslav Army, just as the Yugoslavs were permitted to send a Mission to Albania to take virtual command of the Albanian Army.

The Soviet Intelligence was to teach the Yugoslav Intelligence how to operate and was to have such plenary powers that it could easily by-pass the Yugoslav Intelligence and act as an espionage system on Tito and his fellow Communists. The Soviet technicians were to get notably higher salaries, and, as the Soviet Army officers, were to get plenary powers, and be in key spots.

VI. TITO DRAWS FIRST

Tito left Moscow crestfallen and conferred with his Balkan confederates for closer cooperation to make counter-pressure so that the Communists of the Balkans would be treated with more wisdom (as he thought) and more dignity

than had thus far been the case. For the moment all the leaders of the other Balkan countries looked to Tito for leadership, not realizing how far things would go. There followed a period of maneuver. The Comintern, or Cominform, was ordering a sudden drastic turn to the "left," in connection with the stepping up of its "cold war." In America, Browder was "ditched." In Czechoslovakia, Masaryk and Benes were driven to their doom. Tito, as a good Stalinist, recognized the symptoms and made a sudden ultra-left swing himself—went away to the "left" of the orders which he expected would come from Moscow any day, and announced that he would be determined "to liquidate immediately all remnants of Capitalism in trade and in industry and agriculture." This drastic turn to the left is something for which Yugoslav economy and Yugoslav agriculture are still paying the penalty at the present moment, as each day's budget of news indicates.

Stalin was as smart as Tito and when he saw Tito taking this left turn on his own so that he could not be criticized as an "opportunist," he recognized that this meant "fight." And so the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began secret consultations with selected members of other Central Committees concerning Tito's "errors" and Tito's "excessive independence." And the Cominform (which had been set up for the fight on the Marshall Plan) now sharpened its offensive instruments for a major war on Tito and Titoism.

In late 1947 the Cominform met in Belgrade—on September 27—and Tito was still a leader among the Cominform leaders. He criticized heads of other Communist Parties for their timidity. He was shown sympathy by Dimitrov, by Gomulka, by Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania. Even Thorez and Togliatti, who were present, were hesitant and showed some admiration for the courage and the independence that Tito was showing. Zhdanov, representing the Soviet Union, was also friendly to Tito, but he was in the beginning of his eclipse in the Soviet Union and died in 1948. His people were rapidly removed from places of power.

At the beginning of March, 1948, the Vice Premier of Yugoslavia, Kardelj, went to Moscow in a vain effort to persuade Moscow to send more machinery for the purpose of the industrialization of Yugoslavia. He came back empty-handed. On March 18, the Soviet government secretly withdrew all military advisors and instructors from Tito's Army, charging that they were "surrounded by hostility." On March 19 they withdrew all civilian missions, charging "a lack of hospitality and a lack of confidence." On March 20, Tito demanded an explanation.

He wrote to Molotov, "We are amazed. We cannot understand. We are deeply hurt. Openly inform us what the trouble is."

On June 29, 1948, the unsuspecting world was startled by the publication of a Cominform blast against Tito entitled, "Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia"; and a Tito counter-blast, defensive in character but nevertheless obviously a counter-blast. The break was in the open. The period is an instructive one; it was a period when the Berlin crisis had come to a head. Berlin was being blockaded by the Russians. We were debating whether we should smash the blockade by running armored trains, properly defended, through the blockade lines.

At that time the Soviet military men were considering a military plan in case open war should begin. That military plan involved something which was of great importance to Tito and helps to explain Stalin's attitude towards Tito's Army. The plan was to smash westward, through Germany, in a frontal attack towards France and the Atlantic; but, at

the same time to outflank France by sending an army through the relatively less mountainous areas of Yugoslavia into Italy, following the valleys of the Po and the Adige and the Plains of Lombardy; then striking up into France through the most accessible of the passes, thus hitting our troops from the rear at the same time they were being hit from the front by the major forces of the Soviet Army.

This makes clear why it was that Stalin conceived of Tito's Army not as a guerrilla force to defend the mountains against invasion (for the only conceivable invader was the Soviet Union), but as an auxiliary troop to serve the Soviet Army and to become a part of it in that outflanking movement in case war should actually break out. Stalin insisted upon equipping Tito's troops to be such an auxiliary force in a Soviet regular army while Tito dreamed of maintaining his troops as essentially mountaineer guerrillas to defend the sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia in case of any attack.

This period was one in which U.N.R.R.A. supplies had been completely used up and the Yugoslav Trade Delegation in Moscow was begging in vain for aid in the industrialization of the country to get its Five Year Plan of Industrialization under way. It was directed instead to gear its minerals and ores into the more advanced industries of neighbor countries and of the Soviet Union.

VII. SOVIET IMPERIALISM

This brings us to the notion of Kremlin Imperialism, which Tito's break has made so clear. The subordination of the Yugoslav economy into the over-all plans and profits of Soviet industry; the attempt by the Soviet Union to get pro-consul's rights and extra-territorial status for its agents; its ambassador to be entitled to interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs; its agents to have the right to access to state secrets; its right to organize its own intelligence service to spy on the Yugoslav leaders, to be exempt from Yugoslav espionage and to recruit Yugoslav citizens as Soviet spies; its insistence that Soviet officers should get three or four times as much salary from Yugoslavia as the Yugoslavia generals and to have over-riding powers; its insistence of the rights of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to interfere in the affairs of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav state.

Now Soviet Imperialism combines all the imperialisms that have ever been invented in the long history of man: from the most ancient direct pillage and plunder and kidnapping of populations and extermination of elites to leave peoples leaderless, and the sowing of waste lands for strategic purposes, to the early 20th Century form of economic penetration, and then it has super-added its own forms of expansion of the total state through terror, concentration camps, deportations, police systems and the like.

Let us examine for a moment what we might call "classic economic Imperialism." The Soviet Union had set up (as Tito has now made clear by publishing the documents) mixed companies, *justad* and *justa*—shipping and aviation. Theoretically, the stock is owned 50-50 by the Soviet government and the Yugoslav government, but the Soviet government paid in only 9.83% of its share during the period in which the Yugoslav government had paid in 76.25% of its share. The managing director in Yugoslavia was a Soviet appointee; his assistant was a Yugoslav who was ignored for all practical purposes. Soviet planes were allowed to fly into Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia planes were not allowed to fly into the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia paid 52% more for her freight shipments on the Danube than the Soviet Union did and 30% more (for reasons that are not clear to me) than any

other satellite did. In other words, here was a system of direct economic exploitation thinly disguised under the guise of an equal partnership.

Similarly, the army equipment of Yugoslavia was left without replacement parts to keep it in subjection. Yugoslavia sent metals (principally iron) to Czechoslovakia and had asked in return for machinery in order to manufacture trucks. Czechoslovakia under Soviet orders sent not machinery to manufacture trucks, but sent trucks, meaning "you will never manufacture your own trucks." Yugoslavia found all its molybdenum monopolized by the Soviet Government. Its cost of production was fantastically high—500,000 dinars per ton, according to the Yugoslav White Book; but the Soviet monopoly paid only the world price—instead of 500,000 dinars, 45,000 dinars—so that Yugoslavia lost 455,000 dinars on every ton that was delivered, and the more it delivered the more it lost.

Finally, in this relation of metropolis to colony there was an ill-concealed basic contempt. One example will suffice: In one of the notes of the Soviet government to the Yugoslav government, dated August 30, 1949, you will find this sentence: "The puppy is feeling so good that it barks at the elephant." Nevertheless, the puppy has so far checked the elephant, so we must now examine how the puppy managed to hold the elephant at bay.

First, Stalin had unexamined illusions as to the absoluteness of his own power. Up until that time no one had been able to stand against him! Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev—they all looked bigger to him than did little Tito, but at his breath they were blown over. He had only, he thought, to sound the trumpet and the walls of Tito's pocket Kremlin would collapse; he had only to hurl an anathema and Tito would vanish in a puff of smoke. Not only Bukharin, Trotsky and Zinoviev proved vulnerable to his anathema, but he had no difficulty with Poland, Hungary and Rumania. However, Tito had a power center of his own just out of reach. Moreover, he was the perfect disciple—a kind of pocket Stalin.

VIII. THE CRACK IN THE KREMLIN WALL

In the chess game which now ensued they both played by the same book. He was able to anticipate each move. Every time Stalin touched a piece, he envisaged the entire alteration of configuration of the game—for he was playing the same game. He was invited to Moscow to parley—he politely declined the invitation. He was invited to Bucharest to parley at the Second Cominform session—he stayed away. Attempts were made to assassinate him—he protected himself well, though not as cautiously as Stalin does.

But there is an invisible wall which helps to protect him. There is danger in assassinating him before he has been discredited, before he has gone through the process of acknowledging his errors, discrediting himself, spitting in his own face, crawling, apologizing and doing all the other things that Cominform leaders have to learn to do at certain stages in their careers. Only then could he be safely exterminated, confessed—"purged," or assassinated. But to assassinate him before this has happened is to make a banner and a martyr of him. This, too, protects him. A coup d'etat was tried against him, but he comes from a land where people, as they say in Mexico, "learn to get up early"; that is, he drew first.

In April 1948, before the open break, he threw Hebrang and Zujovic in jail, recognizing that they were secretly organizing a Stalinist faction in his party. Hebrang is still in jail. When General Jovanovic, who was trained in Moscow and returned to serve in his army, packed his bags one night and made for the frontier, Tito seemed to get the jump

again and Jovanovic was shot trying to escape.

A "revolution" in Yugoslavia has been called for, and called for, and called for—but the call falls on deaf ears. Tito, who had enormous opposition in his own country, undoubtedly has less opposition today than he had when Stalin attacked him, rather than more opposition. With his internal opposition, every knock from Stalin is a kind of boost. He was gradually moved over into the position of a national hero. Without ceasing to be a Communist, he is also in the position of a national hero defending Yugoslavia's independence against a great bullying power. Therefore, Stalin's committees in exile have been branded as "puppets," "traitor," and Tito himself is a hero even with the people who resent his total state regime.

Charging Tito with ingratitude and lack of discipline has not proved effective, so Stalin has tried more complex ideological attacks. But an ideological attack permits an ideological defense. The Cominform has said that Yugoslavia has a police regime, terror, no party democracy, holds no party congresses. Tito answers, "You have a police regime; you have terror; you, also, have no party democracy; you hold no party congresses."

So every article of the indictment has become a fortiori an article of the indictment of the Stalin regime itself and this is the most distressing thing that had happened to Stalin since he came to power. Gradually Tito has stepped up his defensive until it has become an offensive, and he has done it with rare tactical skill. Today the Soviet regime is truly on the defensive against this tiny, ridiculous "puppy who is barking at the elephant"; on the defensive because from inside the Communist camp come the clear words of truth about Soviet Imperialism and Soviet terror and Soviet ruthlessness which, when they come from non-Communists, have less effectiveness. This is the true crack in the Kremlin wall of infallibility. Therefore, Stalin cannot tolerate it and refuses to tolerate it but he tries expedient after expedient, move after move, and every time playing by the same book, having gone through the same hard school, having a somewhat better moral case. Tito out-guesses him and blocks each move on his party.

There are only two possible moves which might bring results. One of them is to run all his neighbor states into an attack—an open war upon him. This is too dangerous. Danger No. 1—that the armies of the Balkan neighbor states are themselves infected with some admiration for this assertion of independence of a Balkan power; Danger No. 2—Tito has (on a Balkan scale) a mighty good army and may not be overthrown without the intervention of the Soviet Union. Danger No. 3 (and largest of all)—during the period when Stalin wants neither total peace nor total war he cannot risk an open attack upon Tito, for out of a local war too easily can come a total war.

Now there is a certain logic to Tito's position which we in the democratic lands watch with the closest attention. He is engaged in a critique of Stalinism which has ended with a complete rejection of Stalinism. Nevertheless, the structure of his own state is still basically Stalinist in character: that is to say, he still has his political prisoners; he still has his forced collectivization; he still has his one-party state; he still has his secret police; he still has his terror—all the things he learned from Stalin. He has glossed them over a bit, undoubtedly softened them a bit as his relations with his own people become less tense; nevertheless, the structure is there. But the logic is one which compels him anxiously to reexamine that structure. I do not say to dismantle it—that is what we are watching with interest—but certainly he is constantly reexamining it.

The logic also of his position requires him to seek allies. He has been forced into calling off the war on Greece and in Greece. He has been forced into closer relations with Greece, Turkey, Italy and Austria (which is all that is left of the possibilities of a Balkan Federation against Soviet aggression). He has been forced to apply for help from the Free World; and we have given him help, and that too has its logic. We have not made conditions. We have had much debate as to whether we ought to make conditions and what conditions we ought to make, but the fact is that we have made no conditions. We are not endorsing his internal regime, but, on the other hand, neither are we making our critique of this internal regime a major criterion at present. The major criterion is that he represents a crack in the Cominform. He represents a Communist defiance of Communist aggressive Imperialism that emanates from the Soviet Union, and he represents a struggle for independence of his country against the Soviet Empire. These things we are prepared to support to the extent that we are now supporting them because in the kind of world in which we live they are definitely assets, creating a better situation rather than a worse situation.

The full logic of his position is limited by his own dogmas and predispositions. I have recently spoken with Bebler and I found that Bebler, Kardelj and Pijade (who are the major theoreticians of Tito-slavia) are approaching very tenderly the question of re-examining Leninism. They are grave and bold in re-examining Stalinism. They are at the point now in their thinking where they are asking themselves, "Shall we also re-examine Leninism to see if in Lenin, too, there was some imperfection which gave rise to Stalinism?" And they are beginning to come to the conclusion that there was. How far that process will go, I do not venture to predict.

The final thought that I would like to leave with you is this: there is also logic to Stalin's position. Leninism was defined by a Russian Marxist once as "Marxism a la tartar" (Marxism with tartar sauce). If that is true, we will have to find a much more drastic qualification for Stalinism. It is a kind of mountaineer blood-feud Marxism, geared to a total state and an aspiration to total rule of the world. But there within the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist camp Stalinism has suffered its first check. And I do not believe that Stalin is so dumb as not to learn from what has happened.

Just as the British after 1776 never lost another colony, so Stalin has determined after June, 1948, never to permit another Tito and never to lose another Yugoslavia. But Britain's response was appropriate to the organic nature of the British regime. It was a slow, hesitant, blundering but incessant loosening of the bonds, until the British Empire changed (and is still changing under our eyes) into the British Commonwealth of Nations.

We have watched India break the bonds and yet remain a part of the Commonwealth. I hope (and believe) that we will yet watch Egypt break the bonds and remain in organic relation to the Commonwealth. We have watched Ireland (where the situation was more tense certainly than in Egypt) break the bonds of colonialism and yet remain a part of the Commonwealth. So with Burma. In other words, the process continues and Britain has never lost another colony because according to its own inner nature it has gradually loosened the bonds.

Now according to the inner nature of the Stalin regime the direct opposite procedure is taken—to tighten the bonds. Being the ruthless total state that it is and Stalin being the kind of man he is, he can think of nothing but to squeeze

tighter; to coordinate the countries more rapidly into his machine; to hasten the conflict between rulers and ruled; to remove those who have any roots in their own country and put in their places puppets who are completely dependent upon him; to let loose a hail of blood purges, executions of faithful and devoted Communists like Laszlo Rajk, Traicho Kostov, Clementis, Gomulka, and like loyal collaborators such as Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia. There has been a hail of accusations of Titoism, and one by one the men who have national roots in their own country. In their own Communist Parties and in their own labor-

ing classes—these men have been executed in advance of the possibility that they may some day commit the crime of considering the interests of their country as different from the interests of the Soviet Empire.

However, there is also a danger in that method of solving the problem of Titoism. When you draw the bonds tighter and tighter you augment the potential discontent. Thus the Soviet Empire appears to grow tighter and stronger with its more ruthless coordination of all of its parts, but at the same time that introduces fresh elements of weakness into every one of the lands that Stalin dominates.

The Consumer is King

WHAT RETAILERS CAN LEARN FROM THEIR EXPERIENCES IN RECENT YEARS

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IF one takes a very quick and superficial glance at some of the census figures on retailing, he might conclude that nothing much has happened in recent years—that the field is one of great stability, at least as far as type of operation is concerned. Even if he should go back as far as the first census figures covering 1929, he would find department stores doing from 8 to 9 per cent of all retail business, a figure which is still valid today. Twenty odd years ago and still today he would find mail order sales at between 1 and 2 per cent of all, cooperative and house-to-house sales at something less than one per cent, chain store sales of 21 to 22 per cent and sales of independent stores (including the retail outlets of voluntary chains) of 67 to 69 per cent.¹ There are no lessons here, he might exclaim, since nothing has happened! Retailers, he might continue, have not had twenty years of experience; they have just had the same yearly experience twenty times!

THE LAW OF CHANGE

To those who have lived in retailing these last twenty years, such a conclusion would be absurd indeed. It overlooks the fact that within such designations as "department store," "independent store," and "chain store" many changes have taken place. Shopping centers, self-service, cycle billing, life, supermarkets, branch stores are but a few of the developments which occupied little, if any, space in retailing literature twenty years ago.

Moreover, there have been great changes in the fortune of individual firms. Many independents of twenty years ago are now the successful operators of rapidly growing chains; others have closed their doors in failure. In 1914 both Frederick W. Loeser Company, one of greater New York City's most respected department stores, and nearby Abraham and Strauss had yearly sales in the neighborhood of \$15 million; today Abraham and Strauss is "in the black" at the 70-odd million dollar sales level while Loeser's is closed following a liquidation sale.² While total grocery and combination store sales have gained about 360 per cent since 1940, Food Fair Stores, Inc. has shown the astonishing growth of nearly 900

per cent.³ Even as late as 1945 the sales of Sears, Roebuck & Co. were but one and one-half times larger than those of that other retail giant, Montgomery Ward; today it sells two and one-half times as much as does Ward.⁴

In other words, instead of stability, the story of retailing in recent years is one of change, change, and more change. In fact, this is the first, and one of the most important, lessons we can draw from recent retail history. And it is an important lesson because it suggests that even today's most modern retailer can not rest on his laurels, that he must continue to change with the times or he, too, will be left behind in the fast-moving procession. Unless he follows new experiments in retailing, unless periodically he is willing to spend money to modernize his store or stores, unless—in brief—he is willing to be progressive, someone will be standing here twenty years from now and point to him as the horrible illustration of the retailer who refused to recognize the law of change.

SPECULATIVE BUYING

A second lesson—one which the experiences of recent years indicate that we have not yet learned—is that speculative buying is an evil.

Back in 1944 when Professor Duncan and I published the first edition of *Retailing Principles and Methods* we included a paragraph in one of the chapters on buying which appears essentially unchanged in the current third edition, as follows:

Many retailers follow a policy of varying the length of the period for which they purchase according to whether they expect a rising or a falling price level. When rising prices are expected, buyers place large orders, in the hope of being able to resell at the higher prices and thus obtaining a larger-than-usual gross margin. When falling prices are expected, a very close hand-to-mouth buying policy is pursued. In regard to this policy, it may be said that, if the retailer is quite consistently right in predicting price-level changes, retailing is not the field for him. He could make a much larger income speculating on some commodity exchange and not have the worry connected with the operation of a store. In other words, a retailer is in business to make a merchandising profit, not a speculative profit. If he wants to speculate, he does not need to bother with operating a store at the same time. To put it very

¹ For sources and analyses of these Census data cf. C. F. Phillips, *Marketing* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938), XII-XVIII and D. J. Duncan and C. F. Phillips, *Retailing Principles and Methods* (3rd ed.; Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1951), chap. II.

² F. J. Viser, "Requiem for a Department Store," *The New York Retailer*, April, 1952, p. 2.

³ 1952 Annual Report for year ending April 26, 1952, p. 8.

⁴ *Business Week*, April 5, 1952, p. 114.